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Since 1991, I have conducted research on
ethnically and religiously ‘mixed’ pilgrim-
ages (in such places as the Serbian Ortho-
dox monasteries of Grac̆anica and the
Roman Catholic shrine of Letnica), which
offer clear examples of this contact across
religious and ethnic boundaries. At present
this seems unimaginable, but until very re-
cently, Muslims and Christians of different
ethnic backgrounds visited one another’s
sanctuaries, worshipped one another’s
saints and ignored the evident theological
objections of religious orthodoxies. Particu-
larly in the field of popular religion, which
religious authorities traditionally control
the least, boundaries were most often disre-
garded. There are numerous examples in
Kosovo (and beyond) where Muslim and
Christian forms of pilgrimage and saint ven-
eration have amalgamated and formal reli-
gious divisions have become blurred. Most
interestingly, in Kosovo, Serbian Orthodox
shrines have often demonstrated a propen-
sity to attract Muslim pilgrims of various
ethnic backgrounds. The following account
deals with one such Serbian shrine, Zoc̆išt e ,
which I visited in 1991. Its recent fate some-
how symbolizes the breakdown of a shared
existence once enjoyed by Serbs and Alba-
nians. It shows that religious c o m m u n i t a s
(Victor Turner), always a precarious matter,
can turn into precisely the contrary under
certain conditions. 
In July 1991, I went to visit Zoc̆ište, a mixed
Serb-Albanian village three miles from the
town of Rahovec, in the southwest of the
province. Just outside the village on a hill-
top, there is an old medieval Serbian Ortho-
dox monastery (dating from the 14t h c e n t u r y
or even earlier). Its shrine has a reputation
for being particularly helpful in cases of dis-
eases of the eyes and mental and psychoso-
matic disorders. The church is called Sveti
V r ac̆i (the Holy Medics) after the saints Kuz-
man and Damnjan, patron saints of the
monastery. My reason for visiting this shrine
was that, until the late 1980s, many Muslim
Albanians from Zoc̆ište and nearby Rahovec
would come to the monastery to join the fes-
tivities. The story holds that before the Al-
banian protests of 1989, which were violent-
ly suppressed in Rahovec (Orahovac in Ser-
bian), Albanian pilgrims were even more nu-
merous here than Serbs. 
Yet in the last few years the growing dis-
trust between Albanians and Serbs put an
end to this ‘mixed’ pilgrimage: Albanians
had begun to boycott. As I heard from a local
Albanian taxi-driver, only a handful of old
and very ill Albanians would still make the
effort to go to Zoc̆ište, and perhaps some
Muslim Gypsies, as well as Slav Muslims and
Turks from Prizren. In the village itself, rela-
tions seemed to have deteriorated, also due
to the fact that Albanians had begun to out-
number the Serbian inhabitants. Local Serbs
said that they felt they were being pressured
into leaving, especially by the strong Alban-
ian clans of the village. The small town of Ra-
hovec was now ethnically segregated, al-
though relations between Serbs and Albani-
ans had been quite harmonious or even
symbiotic before, due to processes of mutu-
al assimilation and absorption. One of the
most interesting features of life in this small
town was that old urban Albanian families
were Slavophone, that is to say, they did not
speak Albanian at home, but rather a Slavic
dialect (n aš g o v o r – our tongue). During the
1921 census, the majority of urban Albani-
ans in Rahovec had therefore been regis-
tered under the category ‘Serbs or Croats’.
During my own research, some asserted that
their language was similar to Macedonian,
apparently trying to dissociate from any
connection with Serbian. Since most Albani-
ans had been sacked from their jobs in 1990,
there was now a great deal of ‘bad blood’ be-
tween local Serbs and Albanians.
During the pilgrimage, the entrance of the
monastery is animated by booths, mainly
manned by Gypsies selling snacks and vari-
ous toys and trinkets; whereas within the
confines of the monastery there is an out-
door café run by Serbian youth from the vil-
lage. There are also other simple, improvised
fairground attractions run by Gypsies. Dur-
ing my visit, a Serbian tradesman was selling
posters and badges containing images of
leading Serbian nationalists like Vuk Draš-
k o v ić, Slobodan Miloše v ić, and Vojislav šeše l j ,
as well as small Serbian flags and other Chet-
nik paraphernalia. From the café I could hear
old Chetnik songs, and later in the after-
noon, down in the village, I saw an Albanian
café with Albanian music blaring from the
speakers. This was just opposite a Serb mar-
quee emitting even more deafening decibel
levels of Serbian songs.
While in 1991 Albanians boycotted the
pilgrimage, Gypsies were present in quite
substantial numbers. These were mostly Or-
thodox or ‘Serbian’ Gypsies (Srpski cigani)
from Suva Reka and Rahovec who seemed
to be quite well assimilated into the Serbian
community. During the holiday, Serbs and
Gypsies closely intermingled, apparently
knowing each other quite well. While I was
present, there was also a smaller but quite
conspicuous presence of Muslim Gypsy
women, wearing the characteristic wide
baggy trousers and speaking Albanian, who
hardly joined in with Serbs and Orthodox
Gypsies; obviously they were not part of the
Orthodox c o m m u n i t a s developing within
the walls of the monastery. 
Although this was meant to be a feast, the
atmosphere was quite tense during my visit:
the war had just started and (as a Dutch-
man) I sensed a great deal of suspicion (at a
time when the Dutch Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, Hans van den Broek, was heading the
European Community efforts to stop the
war in former Yugoslavia). At dawn shots
were fired, probably by some drunken Serbs,
and later that morning army jets flew over,
as a reminder to everyone that the situation
was far from normal. Suspicion was, howev-
er, not only directed against foreigners: I
witnessed a Serb pilgrim from Prizren accus-
ing a local peasant of being an Albanian
‘spy’, because of his local dialect, which
sounded to him like an Albanian speaking
Serbian. After the poor peasant showed his
ID to his fellow Serb from Prizren he was
told jokingly, but not without serious over-
tones, ‘You had better change your lan-
guage if you want us to become friends’.
Deep distrust is characteristic of the Serb
The war in Kosovo and the accompanying ethnic
cleansing has catapulted this region to the centre
stage of Western attention after so many years of rel-
ative silence and indifference. Already in the 1980s,
many analysts pointed out that tensions between Al-
banian and Serbian nationalism and divisions be-
tween the Christian Serbs and the (mainly) Muslim
Albanians were growing, and were turning the
province into a dangerous Balkan hotspot. Compar-
isons were drawn, especially by Serbian nationalists,
with the famous Battle of Kosovo fought between the
Ottoman Turks and Balkan Christian forces in 1389 –
a ‘clash of civilizations’ between two deeply antago-
nistic and incompatible nations. In light of the recent
developments, it is logical that the rift between Alba-
nians and Serbs is now perceived as a hard and fast
line of division. Yet Kosovo has had a history of coex-
istence, with considerable movement across this eth-
nic and religious frontier, through economic ties, cul-
tural diffusion, religious exchange and conversion.
Throughout history, the ethnic and religious barriers
have been anything but watertight. K O S O V O
The End of a ‘Mixed’ Pilgrimage
G E R  D U I J Z I N G S
C i r c u m a m-
bulatory 
procession at
t h e m o n a s t e r y
o f Z oc̆išt e
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Europe has witnessed yet another round of religion-related vio-
lence; again a Muslim population has suffered dramatically from
‘ethnic cleansing’. The violent replacement of ethnic groups in areas
that once were part of the Ottoman polity has left few communities
untouched, and the dismantling of mixed societies which date back
to pre- and early modernity continues. Again, the rationale of na-
tionalism exposes the dark side of the modern condition. In the
broader context of Europe, the paradox is that, on the one hand, at-
tempts are made to form a society based upon the ideal of a multi-
cultural identity while, on the other hand, the coexistence of diver-
gent identities is put to trial. Whereas the Muslim
population in Europe in general has increased
markedly due to recent migrations, Europe’s in-
digenous Muslims suffer major setbacks. Perhaps
we should not read too much religion or ideology
into the tragic events, but in the case of the Serbian extremism di-
rected against the Albanians of Kosovo it seems hard to locate pos-
sible material motivations. The horrors of Bosnia and now Kosovo
cast deep shadows over the future of remaining minorities in the
now-battered Serb Republic, in particular the Muslims of the Sancaq
area. In this edition of the ISIM Newsletter, Ger Duizings (p.1)
demonstrates that traditionally mixed religious practices in Kosovo
had already come under severe pressure in the decade preceding
the war. Michael Sells (p. 31) describes how religious symbolism in
the Balkans has been politicized by nationalists whose devotion to
‘historic’ land has produced a horrid caricature of the history of
inter-communal relations in the Balkans. 
Recent outbreaks of communal fighting in Indonesia and the re-
newed clashes in Kashmir have further brought to the fore the reali-
ties of political religion. In a recent meeting in Beirut, a Lebanese
scholar critiqued a specific statement in the Research Approaches
and Thematic Profile of ISIM (see Newsletter 1, p. 3) which seems to
downplay the importance of political radicalism as a topic of scholar-
ly concern; although they constitute a minority, radicals often pro-
vide leadership to those who would normally be considered to be
moderates. Serb politics of the 1990s may be a case in point. Marc
Gaborieau (p.21) while being careful not to speculate about the ulti-
mate goals of the movement, questions the non-political nature of
the Tablighi Jama’at – an icon of moderation – suggesting  that teli-
gious politics are not only a matter of purpose, but also of style. 
Although the series of recent events forces us to reflect upon the
political uses of religion, only few states and societies are actually
ruled by distinctive religious ideologies. Much space in this issue is
devoted to less direct ways of disseminating ideas
and practicing ideals in Muslim societies, ranging
from performance of song, to the exhibition of reli-
gious manuscripts, to the writing of women into
national history. A series of articles deal with mate-
rial culture, in particular architecture, and with the various uses of
space in – mainly – urban contexts. Urban, sacred, and moral spaces
constitute a field of research that seems to call for a clearer multi-
disciplinary approach than many other fields. Diverse diasporic ex-
periences are covered in various contributions. Helene Basu (p. 39)
reports on her experiences in field research among the African dias-
pora in India, and Andrée Feillard (p. 17) on the meetings she had
with Indonesian ulema, indeed a category for which we invite more
contributions. The same goes for critical essays on current trends in
the study of the Muslim world. In a sweeping argument, Hammed
Shahidian (p. 5) opposes the centrality of religion in the understand-
ing of these societies. He criticizes the emphatic treatment of trends
that – in his eyes – may limit the freedom of groups and individuals.
Institutes like ISIM, which concentrate on the study of Islam and so-
cieties of Muslims, have only to benefit from their critics. ♦
D I C K  D O UW E S
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The ISIM solicits your response to the ISIM News-
letter. If you wish to contribute to the Newsletter,
style sheets may be obtained upon request from
the ISIM Secretariat or on the ISIM website. In order
to offer update information on activities concern-
ing the study of Islam and Muslim societies, along
with news on vacancies, grants, and fellowships,
the ISIM relies on its readers. The information will
be made available on the ISIM Website.
The ISIM Newsletter is a tri-annual publication
o f the International Institute for the Study of Islam
i n the Modern World (ISIM). Responsibility for the
facts and opinions expressed in this publication
rests solely with the authors. Their views do not
necessarily reflect those of the Institute or its sup-
porters. The ISIM Newsletter is free of charge.
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E d i t o r i a l
Conference on the ‘Trans-
formation Processes and
Islam in A f r i c a ’
Co-Sponsored by the ISIM
Islam has always been a vehicle of eco-
nomic, political and ideological re-orien-
tation in African societies. The explosive
increase in communication has intensi-
fied these processes, transforming the
face of both Islam and Africa, also in re-
gions which, until well into the 20th cen-
tury CE / 14th century AH, had remained
virtually untouched by Islam. This confer-
ence aims to bring together Dutch re-
searchers investigating transformation
processes related to the presence of
Islam in sub-Saharan Africa. The invited
international scholars, Louis Brenner
(SOAS, London UK) and Lamin Sanneh
(Yale University, New Haven CT), will
place this topic into a wider perspective.
Louis Brenner will deliver a keynote ad-
dress on ‘Recent developments and chal-
lenges in the study of Islam in Africa: in-
ternational perspectives’. The rest of the
day’s programme will be fixed on the
basis of the abstracts submitted. 
Organizers: Africa Studies Centre (ASC)
in co-operation with the International
Institute for the Study of Islam in the
Modern World (ISIM)
Convenors: Wim van Binsbergen,
Anneke Breedveld, José van Santen
Place of event: African Studies Centre,
room 1A27, Pieter de la Courtgebouw,
Wassenaarseweg 52, Leiden 
Date of event: Friday, 15 October 1999 
Contact person: Ms. Dr. Anneke
Breedveld, African Studies Centre;
P.O. Box 9555, 2300 RB  Leiden,
The Netherlands,
E-mail: brdvld@rulcri.leidenuniv.nl
Tel: +31 (0)71-527 33 75
A t t e n t i o n !
We kindly asks that you consult the
ISIM Website regularly for information
and announcements concerning the
upcoming ISIM PhD and post-doctoral
fellowships. Information of the opening
for the position of ISIM Chair in Amster-
dam will be placed on the Website in
the coming months. Electronic forms
for all of these as well as for the ISIM Ad-
vanced Degree programme can be
found on the site as well. ♦
R e t r a c t i o n
In the ISIM Newsletter 2, the following
errors were made in our ‘info pages’:
The e-mail address of the Islamic Area
Studies Newsletter of the University of
Tokyo, Japan, which was listed on page
46, had an incorrect e-mail address. The
correct address is: i-office@l.u.tokyo.ac.jp
On page 47 an academic meeting was
listed under ‘Beyond the Border: a New
Framework for Understanding the Dy-
namism of Muslim Societies, to take
place from 8-10-99 to 10-10-99, in Kyoto,
Japan. The title for that meeting should
read: ‘1999 International Symposium’
and the correct fax is: +81 3 5684 3279. 
We have also been notified that in the
meantime, the telephone and fax num-
bers for the Islamic Area Studies Project
in Tokyo have been changed.
The new numbers are:
tel. +81 3 5841 2687, or 8952,
and the fax +81 3 5841 2686.
We sincerely apologize for the incon-
venience. ♦




The ISIM starts its Advanced Degree programme in November 1999
(deadline for applications is passed). For the year 2000, the Advanced De-
gree programme will begin in late September. ISIM invites applications
for 2000. The closing date for applications is 1 January 2000. 
The Advanced Degree programme prepares students (holders of a Mas-
ter’s degree or its equivalent) for PhD research. It is open to graduates in
the humanities, social sciences, and religious studies. The applicants must
specialize in a field specifically related to the study of modern Islam and
Muslim society. The programme lasts for one academic year and includes,
among others, training in social science and cultural-historical approach-
es and methods, and topic specialization through workshops and tutori-
als. The programme combines course work and individual supervision.
Staff of the ISIM and the participating universities, as well as visiting fel-
lows are engaged for the programme, which is offered in cooperation
with several institutes abroad. The emphasis in the selection is clearly
placed on proven outstanding academic capacity. Although the Ad-
vanced Degree training is a preparatory programme for PhD research,
this does not guarantee entry into an ISIM PhD programme.
The tuition fee is 10,000 guilders (currently approximately 5,000 USD).
However, (partial) waivers may be obtained in certain cases. For the acad-
emic year 2000-1 a limited number of grants will be offered. For informa-
tion and application forms, please contact the ISIM secretariat or consult
the ISIM Website. ♦
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Nathal M. Dessing is a PhD researcher at Leiden
University, specializing in life cycle rituals of Muslims in
the Netherlands. E-mail: dessing@rullet.leidenuniv.nl
Inst itut i o na l N ew s
N A T H A L  M .  DE S S I N G
Professor Muhammad Khalid Masud has recently
been named Academic Director of the ISIM for three
years. He succeeds Professor Wim Stokhof who, as Di-
rector in Charge, laid the foundations of the Institute
and led the search for an Academic Director. We will
miss the distinctive presence of Wim Stokhof, but we
are delighted with the arrival of Muhammad Masud at
the ISIM. Masud joins the ISIM from the Islamic Re-
search Institute (IRI), International Islamic University,
Islamabad, Pakistan, where he was professor and
head of the Islamic Law and Jurisprudence Unit. 
One of the objectives of the ISIM is to build coopera-
tion networks with academics and institutions in
other countries in order to develop the field of the
study of Islam in the modern world as a scientific dis-
cipline and to seek institutional collaboration in this
respect. The first of such meetings was held in Beirut
on 27 May 1999 with the German Orient Institute in
Beirut as host. Scholars from academic institutions in
Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, and Syria attended the
m e e t i n g .
ISIM’s New Academic Director 
M u h a m m a d
K h a l i d M a s u d
Muhammad Khalid Masud was born in 1939
in India. His family fled to Pakistan when the
state was formed. After working as a teacher,
he entered the Punjab University at Lahore
and in 1962 obtained an MA in Islamic Studies
with honours. From 1963 to 1999, he was as-
sociated with the IRI, where he held many po-
sitions, including editor of the journal Islamic
Studies for two spells in the 1970s and 1980s.
Masud took several periods of leave from
the IRI in order to study and conduct research
abroad. From 1966 to 1973 he studied at
McGill University in Canada, where he re-
ceived an MA in 1969 and a PhD in Islamic
Studies in 1973. His MA thesis on Deobandi
fatwas dealing with legal problems for which
there is no precedent, such as those arising
from Western dress, banknotes, the gramo-
phone, and the use of toothbrushes, estab-
lished his enduring interest in methodology
and the impact of social change on Islamic
law. The questions posed by such novelties
could not be solved within the framework of
the widely accepted theory concerning the
'usûl al-fiqh, developed by Al-Shâficî and fur-
ther refined by subsequent Muslim scholars.
According to them, there are four sources of
evidence in Islamic law: the Koran, tradition
literature (hadîth), consensus (ijmâc), and rea-
soning by analogy (qiyâs). However, if no
precedent exists, reasoning by analogy is not
possible. Solving this category of legal prob-
lems requires alternative principles on the
basis of which one is able to declare some-
thing lawful or unlawful. This methodological
question led Masud to the Malikite Shâtibî
(d. 1388), whose works (especially Al-Muwâ-
faqât, Fatâwa, and Al-Ictisâm) are frequently
cited by modern scholars and have con-
tributed to the modernists’ conception of Is-
lamic law. Unlike his predecessors, Shâtibî
adopted the concept of maslaha as an inde-
pendent principle: a method of inductive rea-
soning that takes into consideration the en-
tirety of Koranic verses and hadîth, rather than
specific verses and hadîth. According to
Shâtibî, something is lawful if it is supported
by textual evidence and social practice. In this
framework of thinking, change is allowed in
câda but not in cibâdât. Masud’s doctoral dis-
sertation on Shâtibî formed the basis of his
book Shatibi’s Philosophy of Law, published by
the IRI in 1973 and in a revised and enlarged
edition in 1995. 
In 1977 Masud obtained a Fulbright post-
doctoral award, which enabled him to visit li-
braries in Philadelphia and other cities in the
United States for research that resulted in his
book Iqbal’s Reconstruction of Ijtihad (Lahore,
1995). His extensive international experience
also includes a stay in Nigeria from 1980 to
1984, where he was senior lecturer at the Cen-
tre for Islamic Legal Studies at the Ahmadu
Bello University in Zaria. There he taught Ma-
likite law and had the opportunity to become
acquainted with Malikite law in practice. He
was a member of the Committee on the Com-
parative Study of Muslim Societies, Social
Science Research Council, New York, from
1985 to 1990. This appointment gave him the
opportunity to widen his international con-
tacts and to further develop his interest in so-
cial sciences. In 1990, the Committee held a
workshop in London on the Tablîghî Jamâ'at,
a twentieth-century transnational movement
for the renewal of Islamic faith. This meeting
was organized within a wider project on Mus-
lim transnationalism led by James Piscatori.
Masud edited the proceedings of this work-
shop, entitled Travellers in Faith (forthcoming).
Masud has also conducted research on the
position of Muslims in non-Muslim societies
from the perspective of Islamic law. In ‘Being
Muslim in a Non-Muslim Polity’, in Journal of
the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs (1989),
he distinguishes three approaches to the
question of the permissibility for Muslims to
live in non-Muslim countries. He argues that
the approach that allows Muslims to live in
non-Muslim countries provided they are al-
lowed to fulfil their religious duties is the most
constructive. Masud has surveyed this funda-
mental debate and elucidated many of its
subtleties.
In his contribution to Russia’s Muslim Fron-
tiers: New Directions in Cross-Cultural Analysis,
edited by Dale F. Eickelman (Indiana Universi-
ty Press, 1993), Masud explores the limitations
of existing scholarly analysis of Muslim poli-
tics. Supporting James Piscatori, he suggests
that many scholars resort to impressionistic
and general statements, for example in as-
suming that the nation-state constitutes an
appropriate unit of analysis in the Muslim
world. He has also co-edited a volume entitled
Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and Their
Fatwas (Harvard University Press, 1996). This is
a collection of analytical studies of specific fat-
was on various issues contributed by several
scholars. His interest in Islamic law and social
sciences also underlies his current research
project on religion, law, and society in Islam.
As ISIM Academic Director, Masud will build
on his broad international experience. As a
Pakistani at the head of a Western academic
institution, Masud will be able to assure that
both Muslim and non-Muslim scholarly ap-
proaches to the Islamic world are represented
and accepted at the ISIM, and that the appear-
ance of double standards in dealing with
Islam is avoided. His plans for the ISIM involve
the development of a methodology based on
three pillars: social sciences, religious studies,
and history. Thus far, modern Islam has been
approached mostly from the perspective of
one of these disciplines, whereas Masud
favours a multidisciplinary approach that
builds on all three. Furthermore, to avoid
stereotyping Islam, he emphasizes the impor-
tance of comparative studies of Islam and
Muslim societies. In this way, Masud hopes to
bring out the diversity of Muslim responses to
contemporary problems, which is superim-
posed on the underlying unity of Islam. ♦
ISIM Beirut Meeting
spect: intellectual debates, Islam and State,
Muslims in diaspora, and transnationalism.
The ensuing discussion recognized the need
of closing the gap between Islamic studies
and social sciences through comparative and
multi-disciplinary approaches. Some com-
mented that in the region, the gap may be
too wide, given that Islamic studies are often
understood as the reproduction of religious
guidance and that it would be difficult to sat -
isfy the entire field. Moreover, the practice of
interdisciplinary approaches is rare. It was re-
marked that the production of a state-of-the-
art in relevant fields and discourses in the dif-
ferent regions was vital in order to address
the current fragmentation. So far overviews
are lacking. 
Commenting upon the ISIM Research Ap-
proaches and Thematic Profile (see ISIM
Newsletter 1, p. 3) most participants ex-
pressed that the initiative is remarkably am-
bitious given its broad orientation and most
welcome given the lack of comparable initia-
tives. Critical remarks on the ISIM profile were
invited. Several participants observed that
moderate Islam is the mainstream expres-
In addition to the introduction of the ISIM,
the agenda of the meeting aimed at, firstly,
the development of the field of the study of
Islam in the modern world and, secondly, the
modalities of cooperation. Martin van Brui-
nessen presented the research approaches
and a thematic profile of the ISIM. He stressed
that the institute’s approaches are interdisci-
plinary, grounded in the social and cultural
sciences and building upon the insights of
history and religious studies. He explained
that the Institute will conduct its research on
the developments associated with moderni-
ty, modernization and globalization. He iden-
tified four main areas of interest in this re-
sion, but that the influence of more radical
forms of Islam should not be downplayed be-
cause it provides leadership to communities.
Moderates, it was said, sometimes lack the
confidence needed for political action. 
The concern was expressed that social sci-
ence approaches de-emphasize the more
traditional views and the purely religious as-
pects of Islamic revivalism. On the other hand
Islamicists tend to attach too little impor-
tance to fieldwork and contextualized under-
standings of Islam. In particular in the field of
gender, fieldwork is imperative because re-
liance on textual sources only obscures gen-
dered differentiation. It was also stressed
that the ISIM research agenda should not be
restricted to the Western views and con-
cerns; it must also reflect Muslim voices. 
The discussion on possible ways of cooper-
ation focused on the development of re-
sources, in particular source materials, both
digital and otherwise, and on the establish-
ment of networks of cooperation. It was
agreed that the meeting served as the start-
ing point of building a network for the re-
g i o n . ♦
P a r t i c i p a n t s
– Prof. Aşye Ayata
(Middle East Technical University, Ankara)
– Prof. Mehmet Aydin
(Dokyu Eylul University, Izmir)
– Prof. Sadiq Jalal al-Azm
(University of Damascus)
– Prof. Ahmad Baydoun (Lebanese University)
– Dr Dalal el-Bizri
(Lebanese University / Cairo University)
– Prof. Martin van Bruinessen
(Utrecht University/ISIM)
– Dr Dick Douwes ( I S I M )
– Dr Mona Fayad (Lebanese University)
– Dr Nizar Hamzeh
(American University of Beirut)
– Dr Johannes den Heier
(Netherlands-Flemish Institute, Cairo)
– Prof. Fehmy Jadaane
(Jordan University, Amman)
– D r Farid Khazin
(American University of Beirut)
– Prof. Muhammad Khalid Masud ( I S I M )
– Dr Annelies Moors
(University of Amsterdam)
– Prof. Ahmad Moussalli
(American University of Beirut)
– Dr Muhammad Sammak ( I j t i h a d )
– Prof. Ridwan al-Sayyid
( L e b a n e s eU n i v e r s i ty / I j t i h a d )
– Dr Thomas Scheffler (Orient Institute, Beirut)
– Prof. Erik J. Zürcher (Leiden University/ISIM).
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A f r i c a
R . O .  R OM  K A L I L U
Until recently, the study of the influence and image of
religion in the rich visual art of the Yoruba, the largest
ethnic group of Nigeria, was limited to indigenous
and Christian religious terrains. However, contacts
with Islamic culture predated other non-local reli-
gions and are also manifest in the artistic panorama
of this group, offering a paradoxical image of enrich-
ment and iconoclasm. A Yoruba saying confirms the
antiquated history of Islam in their culture:
Ifa is primordial
Islam is primeval




o f N i g e r i a
To appreciate the dynamic interactions
between Islam and the visual arts of the
Yoruba requires a comprehension of their
religious set-up. The indigenous religious
outlook of the Yoruba is pluralistic. An indi-
vidual may belong to one or more religions.
This helps to explain the traditionally toler-
ant attitude towards non-local religions.
The Yoruba believe in one God, the Creator
and the Cherisher of the whole universe, to
whom reference is made in the oral tradi-
tion, most especially in the divination cor-
pus of Ifa. God has no shrine built for His
worship; being omnipotent, he cannot be
confined within space, but is rather called
upon in prayer whenever the need arises.
The Yoruba had also developed a pantheon
of gods who are invariably anthropomor-
phic and are venerated and placated in vari-
ous ways. In their liturgies, these deities are
conceived as worshippers of God. They are
considered as intermediaries between Him
and the people. The tolerant reception of
Islam is not unconnected with monotheistic
teachings concerning God, to whom ‘be-
longs all that is in the heavens and on
earth…’ (S 112: 1-3), to whom ‘everything
renders worship…’ and to whom ‘is due the
primal origin of the heavens and the
earth…’ (S 2: 116-117).
Although the Islamic concept of the di-
vine was not alien to the people, the Yoruba
and Islamic traditions were contrasted by
the cultures they radiate. The Yoruba had a
non-literate religious culture and records of
religions have been preserved to a large ex-
tent through oral tradition and visual art
forms. This is also true of the situation
today. The Yoruba have developed a non-
literate way of appreciating religion and a
very high sensitivity to image construction,
whereas Islam discourages the use of icons
and encourages writing. As a consequence,
a paradoxical relation of love and hate be-
tween the Yoruba culture and Islamic teach-
ings became extant; a relation to which peo-
ple responded artistically.
Islam in the Yoruba Artistic
P a n o r a m a
A remarkable example of the influence of
Islam on Yoruba visual arts is to be found in
the theme of a bearded figure with leather
sandals. Varieties of this peculiar theme are
carved on door panels and house posts. It is
essentially composed, in addition to the
beard and sandals, of a standing male fig-
ure, wearing a long narrow dress (j a l a b i y a)
with a pair of trousers. The figure also dons a
turban. Carrying a big leather wallet with a
long strap on his shoulder, he holds a rosary
in one hand and a slate in the other hand.
The figure is at times also depicted holding
a spear. This representation of a male figure
also reflects the fact that women did not
participate, at least openly, in the teaching
and spreading of Islam to Yorubaland.
Bearded figures reflect the early images of
contacts with Muslims. The theme is sup-
ported by oral records. In Otura-meji, an Ifa
verse, metaphorical allusions to the early
Muslims in Yorubaland are made in con-
junction with the imagery of the figure with
s a n d a l s :
Ka taluku kai lai 1
A w o r o k o n j o bi 2
The egret is the Muslim priest to the birds
Whenever he wakes up he calls out ilaafi, ilaafi
He slides his sandals unto his feet
and treks away
It was divined for Amodu 3
That goes to Arabia
Although the sculptures are not painted
and are finished in the brown colour of the
wood, the egret – with its immaculate white
colour to which the Muslim is likened in the
Ifa verse – suggests a sense of neatness and
purity. The Yoruba regard the egret (a w o-
r o k o - n - j o b i) as the neatest of all birds. The
j a l a b i y a depicted on the figure is indeed in
real life almost invariably white in colour.
The depiction of the spear with the bearded
figure portrays the more violent encounter
with the Fulani Muslim warriors in the early
1 9t h century. Significantly, the theme indi-
cates that the early bearers of Islam to
Yorubaland were associated with the slate:
standing, perhaps walking postures and
pair of slippers, most probably of leather –
all of which suggest a social order, a concep-
tion of dedicated, disciplined and learned
minds with some level of competence as
scholars and teachers of their faith. Their as-
sociation with the kola nut (o b i) – which the
bird, Aworokonjobi, is believed to be fond
of eating – and long distance journey indi-
cate that they were in some way connected
with the Arabs and the Berbers, and particu-
larly the Hausa, who traded kola nuts with
the Yoruba states.
Paradoxical influences
The impact of Islam in the art is paradoxi-
cal. It has enriched the visual arts of the
Yoruba but has also served as the basis for
the destruction of some indigenous art ob-
jects. Islam has not had any stylistic impact
on the Yoruba sculptural traditions. Themes
associated with Islam are invariably ren-
dered in Yoruba styles. Nonetheless, it has
enriched their arts in terms of motif and
form. For example, the typical flat Qur’anic
school slate is used as a motif in Yoruba
wooden sculpture. Also the Qur’an, repre-
sented as an open book, and the rosary are
used as motifs in both wooden sculpture
and gourd carving. Islamic names of God
and short phrases in Arabic letters are also
used as motifs on carved door panels. The
inscriptions are also commonly written, en-
graved, or made in bas-relief on walls of
mosques, houses and on motor vehicles,
particularly the commuter vehicles belong-
ing to Muslims. Stylistically, the Arabic in-
scriptions do not reflect the rich free-flow-
ing rhythm and the elegance characteristic
of Islamic calligraphy. This is partly due to
the limitations of the medium, usually
wood, on which they are made. It is also be-
cause the texts are written by artists, usually
unlettered or not knowledgeable of Arabic,
who merely copy whatever is written for
them. Also till today, Islamic education in
Yorubaland concentrates on Qur’anic stud-
ies; it has not taken any interest in calligra-
phy as an art. Gourd carving – the gourd
being a medium that lends itself easily to
such carving techniques – has only recently
adopted Arabic texts as motifs (see photo). 
A few geometric motifs found in Yoruba
art appear to have been inspired by decora-
tions on saddles and other horse riding
equipment as well as ornamented swords,
reflecting Sudanese and Bornu influences.
Interlaced motifs are now commonly found
in Yoruba leatherwork, gourd carving and
woodcarving. Such motifs have a pre-Islam-
ic origin but are associated with Islamic cul-
tures in West Africa. Their southward spread
to Yorubaland has been attributed to trade
contacts through the Hausa. The same ap-
pears to be true of cloth embroidery, which
in West Africa is associated with the dress of
Muslim scholars and teachers.
Islam does not encourage direct represen-
tation of living forms, it therefore became
associated with a certain level of iconoclasm
in Yorubaland. The arts of the Yoruba were
dominated by sculptures. And in spite of a
growing Muslim population, people re-
mained fond of ornamenting their doors
and house posts with carvings. The Fulani
jihad, however, was accompanied by de-
struction of art. Some Yoruba settlements
were despoiled of their valuable artistic
treasures. For example, between 1833-35,
on more than one occasion the Fulani ruler
of Ilorin sent warriors to ransack the town of
Oyo-Ile to remove, amongst other things,
numerous brass posts and all the masquer-
ade costumes. These art objects were de-
stroyed, the metal being melted to make
cannon balls needed for warfare. It was not
unusual, until the last decade of this centu-
ry, to find Muslim preachers publicly de-
stroying indigenous art objects belonging
to new converts or their families. And for the
same iconoclastic reasons, some artists in
the indigenous arts such as the brass casters
of Ilorin, who professed Islam, stopped the
production of figurative forms.
Notwithstanding the iconoclastic inci-
dences, few Yoruba Muslims have any seri-
ous iconoclastic tendency. Yoruba tradition-
al thought still exerts some influence on
them. Many continue to use sculptures for
architectural and other decorative purpos-
es. Such sculptures also identify them with
Islam. Other Yoruba Muslims have integrat-
ed their cultural aesthetic sensitivity into
their faith and are thus not averse to the dis-
play of pictures and figurative objects that
have religious significance. Photographs,
stickers and painted portraits of men of
God, particularly those of Sheikh Ibrahim
Niyas of Kaola (Senegal), the spiritual head
and reformer of the Tijaniyya tariqa, as well
as those of other sheikhs of local signifi-
cance are displayed or painted on vehicles
or on houses.
The Yoruba’s use of visual art continues to
be one of the ways in which their concep-
tion of Islam is recorded. At the same time, it
is a means of identifying with Islam through
a much-valued aspect of their culture – the
visual arts. Its uses indicate that the Yoruba
see their art not only as part of an ethnic
identity, but also as a means of identifica-
tion with foreign influences. ♦
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D e b a t e
H A M M E D S H A H I D I A N
Until the 1970s, ‘Islamic societies’ were considered ho-
mogeneous, facsimiles of each other, founded on im-
mutable religious precepts. This mystique simultane-
ously situated ‘the Islamic world’ in the realm of fancy
and justified colonialist politics. Yet in recent decades,
that approach has been disputed. New scholarship un-
derlines that far from adhering to ordained laws, Mus-
lims must meet earthly realities; far from replicating
an ideal, societies with a predominant Muslim popula-
tion comprise diversity and dissension.
Islam’s ‘Others’:
Living (Out)side Islam
Categorical identifications like ‘Muslims’
and ‘Islamic countries’ prevail in academic
and non-academic parlance. When scholars
dismiss misconceptions of a uniform ‘Islam-
ic land’, emphasis falls strongly on the diver-
sity of Islamic expressions. Overlooked are
many of us who do not identify ourselves as
Muslims – either we consider ourselves
many things including Muslim, or harbour
alternative religious convictions, or simply
do not adhere to any creed. Casting our so-
cieties ‘Islamic’ automatically designates
Islam as norm, all others as deviation. We
are made strangers in our own home.
But not only in academic pages do we ap-
pear as the strangers. In real life, presumed
Islamic ubiquity suffocates us. Our life has
been a tireless effort to escape the shadow
of Islam, to redefine social parameters, and
hence to create a rightly deserved space:
open societies wherein all are legitimized.
From our standpoint as marginalized ‘oth-
ers’, Islamic culture and politics appear dis-
similar from both orientalist and diversity
a p p r o a c h e s .
Where monolithic walls of orientalism
have been smashed, a wider net of multifar-
ious Islams entraps us ‘others’. Being some
kind of Muslim becomes our quintessential
determinant. We are presented as family –
as if we welcomed this – as adherents of, not
subjects to, Islam. Islam is thus judged t h e
culture, Islamic politics t h e politics. In most
contemporary scholarship, ‘defending Is-
lamic culture’ is posed as the prime element
of nationalist agendas. What of those who
do not defend Islamic culture yet still take
part in resurgence? Doubtless, strands of
the nationalist movements prioritize de-
fending Islam; yet one can hardly equate na-
tionalism with Islamic zeal. Consider how
the 1979 Iranian revolution is deemed an I s-
lamic revolution, notwithstanding insur-
gents’ staunch opposition to the Islamic Re-
public, and the brutal persecutions that
have bloodied culture and politics under
the IRI. Islam’s ‘others’ are seen but ignored,
heard but unacknowledged. Our omission
results through formulating from the outset
a paradigm obfuscating difference.
We could more easily accept omission
were it limited to socio-historical descrip-
tions. Yet our alleged piety comprises nor-
mative discourses and political imperatives:
all we do ought to be in an Islamic context.
We hear that ‘any instance of diversity
opens a broader range of avenues for the
Middle East in search of its cultural identity
within Islam’ .1 What does this statement
mean? Is this a truism – viz. ‘if we stay on the
road of Islam, we’ll end up in many Islamic
places’? A political agenda – ‘Muslim Middle
East, search for diversity in Islam to maintain
our Islamic cultural identity’? Or an in-
evitability – ‘there is no alternative to Islam
in the Middle East’? But, what happens to
non-Muslims in a ‘Middle East in search of its
cultural identity within Islam’?
Old politics revisited
We enter the inescapable maze of ‘many
Islams’. Intellectual life in this labyrinth has
been stifling as we must search for a(nother)
new and improved Islam. At every turn, we
confront one more prosaic assortment of
‘regressive’ and ‘progressive’, ‘fake’ and ‘au-
thentic’ Islams. We invest valuable energy
engaging with hackneyed claims that ‘t h i s
version differs fundamentally from others’;
‘t h i s rendition works unprecedented won-
ders’. Consider enthusiasm over ‘Islamic
feminist’ threadbare clichés. Triteness
dressed barely less offensively than the
original. We are encouraged to rest content
because Qur’anic verses that ‘suggest a
more egalitarian treatment of women are
highlighted’ in the ‘Islamic feminist’ revi-
s i o n .2 But what does it mean to treat women
in a ‘more egalitarian’ manner? Why should
women’s rights be based on edicts granting
but some degree of equality? On what is this
august order based? Verses ‘call[ing] for re-
strictions on women’s actions are reinter-
preted. Often a word has multiple meanings
and a less restrictive synonym can be adopt-
e d ’ .3
Old politics revisited: impose a biased ren-
dering of edicts, take a deep breath, and
hope for the best.
I do not deny the possibility of change in
Islam, nor that followers could revise Islam
to accommodate the modern world. Yet I
object to the rest of us – we ‘others’ –being
roped within the ‘new improved’ paradigm
as our only alternative. Assumed Muslims,
we are compelled to seek alternatives only
from this collection. We are urged to posit
human rights and liberties – nowadays es-
pecially gender politics – in the particularis-
tic fashion of cultural relativism. ‘Westerners
might object to our solutions, but these are
compatible with our way of life’. Presumably
part of a happy family, we are silenced lest
we offend a relative. We are told that every
(re)rendering, every apologia for Islamic
dicta, signals intellectual virility – or, in fash-
ionable postmodernese, posits ‘choices be-
fore an active agency’. Yet genuine surges
toward new intellectual life are considered
suspect, susceptible to manipulation.
Propositions that, in a non-Islamic con-
text, outrage audiences, are taken uncriti-
cally when authored by ‘insiders’. The argu-
ment that h i j a b liberates by allocating
women a safe zone might raise concerns
which yet are rarely verbalized lest the in-
quirer be stamped ‘Eurocentric’. No such re-
action would be elicited were the statement
transposed into a non-Islamic situation:
‘Modest dress protects women against
rape’. Our benevolent colleagues should
recognize that Islam’s ‘others’ have tried for
a long time, notwithstanding difficulties, to
rend the veils of roundabout apologies. We
appreciate their regarding non-Westerners
as civilized, capable of ameliorating their so-
cietal ills. But their silence deprives us ‘oth-
ers’ from genuine concerns, sincere sup-
port, and thoughtful exchange. Worse yet,
this silence betrays a(nother), albeit more
sophisticated, form of racism by intimating
that though they would not tolerate such an
argument about themselves, it might ex-
plain our situation. We do not expect them
to fight our battles (nor do we appreciate
their deciding our battles), yet we welcome
democratic dialogues. In the context of
equal exchange, non-native critiques do not
sound condescending. Indeed, many ‘others’
share more in common with our geographi-
cal strangers than with fellow denizens of our
l a n d .4
Twin clubs
Political and cultural hurdles are com-
pounded when Islam is designated the offi-
cial creed. State and religion become twin
clubs, at each other’s convenient disposal
whenever either is challenged. This partner-
ship claims its toll on our efforts. Frequently,
some feel obliged to ‘watch what we say’ to
avoid identification with ‘deviant’ foreign
theories. Such self-censorship distorts ideas,
overlooks dangers, and avoids pivotal
though perilous challenges that some resis-
tance might survive. The problem is obvi-
ously not association with non-native ideas;
rather, that a n y t h i n g can easily be branded
‘foreign’. Could one create a ‘safe space’ for
defiance, without penalty of treason? I be-
lieve not. When competing voices w i t h i n t h e
Islamic discourse are easily condemned,
what safety has a non-Islamic, let alone an
anti-Islamic, voice? Were we to stand as far
from ‘foreigners’ as might be imagined,
safety would remain illusory. Accusation of
treason is often wielded as a weapon
against Islam’s ‘others’. With no sin to avoid,
we may only dodge the attack. But when we
express this inherent jeopardy, we are
blamed for repeating orientalist propagan-
da, if not for colluding with the enemy.
When we refuse to think within Islam’s
limits, we are rebuffed: ‘ours is an Islamic so-
ciety within which we must seek cultural
identity’. When critiquing Islam, we are an-
swered that ‘religion is not really “that im-
portant” in light of “other factors” – eco-
nomic, historical, political, or cultural’. Post-
modernists advise that we attend not to
Islam, but to its interpretations. But do Islam
a n d its construal belong to mutually exclu-
sive planes? We thus run smack into a con-
tradiction. Were Islam so strong as to define
societies, it could not be haphazardly jetti-
soned due to interpretive diversity. Con-
versely, a fluid, shapeless Islam would serve
a very limited analytical purpose.
We are reminded that some Muslims toil
for reforms; that religion alone is not re-
sponsible for our social ills; that injustice is
not exclusive to Islam. We object not to Is-
lamic reforms, but to their inadequacies.
Many of us have opposed all oppressions;
not solely those rooted in Islam. Indeed, we
were guilty of not according Islam – the in-
famous ‘cultural factor’ – its due strength.
Islam has been a major contender in the
process of social change. Where it has not
directly opposed our efforts, it circum-
scribes the scope of our endeavour to its
own benefit. This force must be combated to
achieve justice, democracy, and freedom.
Towards the future
No moratorium on Islam need be called,
no quarantining of Islamic ideologies need
be legislated. Yet Islam must be construed –
in real life, not just in apologies – as merely
o n e factor to contend with. Democratic or-
ders should accommodate believers, but
prefixed by Islam, no democracy proves
genuine. We must dispense with illusions of
‘overall egalitarianism’, ‘greater liberality’,
and sanctions ‘nonetheless feminist’. Islam
is repeatedly presented as the inescapable
solution to our problems. Various reformu-
lations amount to little more than repackag-
ings of old wine in new linguistic bottles.
Little has been offered to even promise a
democratic, free future. Accomplishing the
goals of social justice, democracy, freedom,
and gender equality requires that we tran-
scend the boundaries of Islam, especially
political Islam’s borders. We must walk un-
charted paths, rather than familiar alleys en-
suring loss. ♦
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G e n d e r
N I K K I  R .  K E D DI E
The important role of women in the recent global rise
of religious politics is evident. Some are baffled as to
why women are attracted to movements that are
often conservative and non-egalitarian in their gen-
der attitudes. Scholars, however, often give only
scant attention to the important role of women and
of gender attitudes in religio-political movements –
questions concerning veiling or abortion are dis-
cussed, but in analysing these movements, attention
shifts from women to more male-related questions of
political control, terrorism, and the like. The first
1999 issue of the Journal of Women’s History is a spe-
cial issue on women in religious politics worldwide.






In scholarship on women that has flour-
ished in recent decades, comparisons have
usually been either global (e.g. all women
have shared in certain kinds of subordina-
tion) or within contiguous or culturally simi-
lar societies (e.g. women from all over
Africa, Europe, or the Middle East). New in-
sights may be gained by comparing women
from different cultures. Religious politics is
one of several modern global political
trends in which women have come to the
fore. Nationalism has had a particular reso-
nance and colouring among women, and
socialism is often seen as solving their prob-
lems, including inequality, through the radi-
cal reorganization of society. Fascism,
Nazism, and other secular right-wing poli-
tics have had many active female devotees.
And women’s movements have become
global in recent decades. The authors in the
special issue deal with women in 20t h - c e n-
tury religious politics in the Muslim world,
from Bangladesh to the Arab world, and in
the United States, Latin America, and South
A s i a .
Why women enter religious
p o l i t i c s
The socio-economic conditions that creat-
ed possibilities for women to enter politics
are similar in many parts of the world. These
include the rise of capitalism and industrial-
ization, which first separated the domestic
and work spheres, but also provided new
opportunities for women to work outside
the home. Trends affecting women in most
societies included: the need for an educated
work force, disciplined for regular tasks and
hours, which helped create public educa-
tion; urbanization, which spread new needs
and social patterns; and the effect of war
which brings women into the labour force.
All of these affected women both positively
and negatively. Although some women
acted, mostly indirectly, in politics in the
pre-capitalist past, women’s organized po-
litical participation is overwhelmingly a
phenomenon of modern capitalist societies. 
Women’s political views and participation
have always been diverse, but women have
often been associated with movements for
reform and for the betterment of their posi-
tion. In the US, women were involved in
abolitionism, welfare programmes, temper-
ance and women-centred causes like female
suffrage. A similar pattern is found in the
Global South, where women have been in-
volved with welfare, women’s education,
and legal reforms to benefit their cause. The
forces and ideas of modernization, while
having important negatives for women,
have been mostly favourable to efforts for
greater equality and activity in the public
sphere: capitalist societies promote the
opening of labour and consumer markets to
wider groups and to making fewer status
differentiations than in the past. Every-
where, modern trends had to contend with
centuries-old systems, based originally on
the consequences of frequent childbearing,
which placed men in superior positions and
claimed women’s mental capacity was infe-
rior. Such gender inequality was reinforced
by nearly all religions, which retained their
appeal to many people even after many of
the conditions that gave rise to their views
on gender had passed. Recent trends, while
giving more women a chance at education
and work outside the home, have had more
problematic consequences for many women,
often encouraging divorce, migration pat-
terns that separate men from women;
sweated labour, prostitution, and other
trends disrupting the previous functioning
of the family, whose role is less central than
it once was. The undermining of the older
family (which is idealized by religious and
conservative authors) had both positive and
negative results for women, with some ex-
periencing more negatives than positives. 
Given these and other problems, it is not
surprising that some men and women seek
salvation in what are seen as traditional reli-
gious values. What is new is the degree to
which religion is tied to strong political
movements. Although religious nationalism
(the identification of a nation with a reli-
gion, as found in South Asia and Israel) goes
back at least a century, such religious na-
tionalisms, including religious Zionism and
Hindu nationalism, have become much
stronger in the past two decades. Similarly,
movements that are not nationalist but
evince a reaction against one’s own nation-
al government and culture – considering
these as immoral and hostile to true religion
– including most Islamist movements and
the American Christian Right, have been
formed or greatly strengthened since the
1970s. 
The rise of religious politics in very differ-
ent cultures has also been furthered by the
perceived failures of secular nationalism,
whether in the US since the 1970s, in South
Asia, or in a variety of Muslim countries.
Many have been disillusioned by varieties of
secularism, including secular nationalism,
and also varieties of socialism since the fall
of the Soviet Union. Religious politics and
the role of women in it existed before the
1970s, but it became strong worldwide
more recently. Religious politics appeal to
women for several reasons. In most coun-
tries there are more women than men
among religious observants, and this ‘reli-
giosity’ carries over into religious politics,
even where activists are predominantly
male. Women active in religious politics
mainly come from religious backgrounds,
and many are glad to use new partial free-
doms to express themselves in ways that in-
clude elements incorporating their beliefs
and which their families and peers find ac-
c e p t a b l e .
Also, many religio-political movements
are seen as providing protection to women.
In the Muslim world, some movements in-
sist on women’s inheriting and managing
property, as Islamic law says they should,
and allow for women’s education and work.
Although these forms of protection are
fewer than those advocated by secular lib-
erals, this may be seen as less significant
than the factors that favour women’s partic-
ipation in these movements. Many women
find such protection more important than
subordination in the ideologies of their reli-
gio-political movements. Protestant move-
ments in Latin America, the US, and else-
where often ask that men be faithful to their
wives and families. This, to many women, is
more important than the abstract question
of subordination or obedience, which can
often be at least partially circumvented. In
the Muslim world, ‘Islamic dress’ is found to
protect women against unwanted male ad-
v a n c e s .
Religious politics also allow women to be
activists in their milieu, and to meet and act
together. Mutually supportive communities
are often created, while more religious or
‘traditional’ women might not feel comfort-
able in secular or feminist groupings.
Women participate in general social and
ideological trends of their times and the
current trend in many parts of the world in-
cludes a rise in religious politics. 
Class is also expressed in religious politics,
including the religious politics of women. In
many societies the educated elite has been
attracted to secular ideas, while various
popular class and more traditionally educat-
ed or less educated groups have recently
tended towards religious politics. On the
other hand, in the Muslim world it has often
been students of science and technology
who have been most sympathetic to these
movements – more broadly, however, it has
been mainly students from less urban and
more religious backgrounds who have been
sympathetic. Women as well as men from
these groups tend to favour traditional-
seeming ideological solutions. 
Much religious politics may be seen as
backlash to other trends, and such cultural
reaction is significant. Everywhere old
moralities have been under assault, from
films and media, from the increasing market
for one gender in labour migration, for sex-
ual services, and so forth. Invoking what are
seen as traditional religious moralities and
standards is not a surprising reaction to this
disruption, nor is the participation of many
women in fighting what are seen as trends
undermining the family. While the tradition-
al family has been over-idealized in most
cultural and religious ideologies, it is also
true that current trends have been felt as
negative by many women. In many cultures,
women have seen in religious values a way
to improve male behaviour in the family;
this may be seen especially in US and Latin
American Protestant movements.
Special features of women
i n religious politics
Keddie’s article in the above-mentioned
JWH issue accounts for different approaches
to women in two types of New Religious Pol-
itics: those trying to control governments,
and those stressing nationalism and territory.
The former, which include most Islamist and
Christian Right movements, have conserva-
tive, scripture-oriented positions on women
and the family. The latter, including South
Asian movements and territorial Israeli
groups like Gush Emunim, are not always
conservative with regard to women, and in-
sofar as their main enemies are Muslim, may
even contrast their progressivism on women
to Muslim views. The article also discusses
differences between cultural relativists, who
hesitate to criticize other cultures, and uni-
versalists, who defend women’s rights as
global. 
Besides common features, the role of
women in contemporary religious politics
has many special culture-specific aspects
that are discussed in the special issue. The
authors agree that gender relations are
never fixed and can be renegotiated in the
context of women’s participation and ac-
tivism, including activism in ‘fundamental-
ist’ movements. Women can renegotiate
the traditional patriarchal bargain to their
advantage and seek empowerment and ex-
panded opportunities within the more so-
cially accepted sphere of religious activism
that affirms their domestic roles. While his-
torical and contemporary religio-political
movements can offer women avenues of in-
dependence and initiative and in some
cases help bring about progressive social re-
form (as with ‘Islamic feminists’ in Iran), they
usually involve major concessions and ac-
commodations to a larger male-dominant,
patriarchal order. Re-imagining other alter-
natives for women’s agency and activism in
society, and more particularly in politics, is
perhaps the next step. ♦
Nikki R. Keddie is professor emerita of History
a t UCLA and fellow of the American Academy
o fA r t s and Letters. 
For further details, see the introduction to the issue,
‘Women and Twentieth Century Religious Politics’,
The Journal of Women’s History, 10 (Winter, 1999),
ed. Nikki R. Keddie and Jasamin Rostam-Kolayi. 
N o t e s
1 . The word ‘fundamentalism’ is rarely used –
m a i n l y because it is now considered pejorative
and is often misleading. 
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N o t e s
1 . M a s l a h a is the underlying reason or the objective
of a given ruling in Islamic law; public interest.
E c o n o m i c s
A B D U L L A H  S AE E D
Islamic banking has developed from its early experi-
ments of the 1960s into a major force in the Islamic
world, with assets of more than 100 billion dollars,
and is still growing rapidly. Today it is not difficult to
find an Islamic bank or an Islamic branch of a conven-
tional bank in many Islamic countries. Responding to
the needs of their Muslim clientele, some major West-
ern international banks have set up their own Islamic
branches as well. Even in Australia, the relatively
small Muslim community has managed to set up its
own financial institution. This is equally true for a




The role of Islamic banks in the life of Mus-
lim communities is increasingly active as
more and more institutions are being estab-
lished – from village banks to major interna-
tional development banks. All this in com-
petition with conventional banks but with
significant cooperation with them as well.
Such growth and development has not,
however, had a smooth ride; the catch-
phrase has been ‘proceed with caution’.
Nevertheless, Islamic banking has moved on
from its rather naïve, simplistic and moralis-
tic models of the 1950s and 1960s, models
which were solely based on Profit and Loss
Sharing under the extremely risky contracts
of m u s h a r a k a (partnership) and m u d a r a b a
(commenda). 
Approaches to Islamic banking
Three approaches to Islamic banking may
be identified and placed on a continuum:
idealist, pragmatic and m a s l a h a1 o r i e n t e d .
The idealist approach seeks to retain the
‘purity’ of Islamic banking by restricting it to
contracts allowed under Islamic law. This
was the 1950s and 1960s model. At the op-
posite end of the continuum are the Muslim
scholars who argue that interest is not in-
herently evil and that the term r i b a does not
include modern bank interest. This ap-
proach is the most ‘liberal’; indeed, it even
makes a case for there being no need for
separate Islamic banks at all. Provided they
adopt ethical principles, conventional
banks, in their view, can provide financial
services. Between these two extremes lies
the pragmatic approach, which is realistic
enough to see that the idealist model of Is-
lamic banking has significant problems in
terms of feasibility and practicality but, at
the same time, does maintain the interpre-
tation of r i b a as interest. The majority of Is-
lamic bankers are pragmatists, who are pre-
pared to balance practicalities with tradi-
tional Islamic principles.
Pragmatic adjustments
The result has been that these bankers
and their s h a rica h advisers have opted for a
less risky form of Profit and Loss Sharing by
modifying traditional contracts, such as m u-
d a r a b a and m u s h a r a k a, to suit the banking
needs of the late 20t h century. More impor-
tantly, for the bulk of their financing and in-
vesting operations, they have opted for
safer and less risky contracts such as m u r a-
b a h a, which is very similar in some respects
to lending on a basis of pre-determined re-
turn. So successful has this been, that
m u r a b a h a-type contracts now make up at
least 75% of such investment operations of
most Islamic banks, despite the concerns of
some idealists that m u r a b a h a could be used
as a back door to dealing on an interest
basis. This is a pragmatic triumph indeed. Si-
multaneously, the use of the less secure
contracts such as m u d a r a b a and m u s h a r a k a
has been dramatically curtailed, retaining
only a small share of assets on the invest-
ment side.
The pragmatists have also adjusted the
concept of money, which, in the s h a rica h , i s
equivalent to ‘coin’ and a mere medium of
exchange. In the s h a rica h, money cannot be
sold for money, that is more for less, and it
should not have a ‘price’. This definition of
money, espoused by the idealists, has been
modified in the interests of practicality. This
adjusted concept of money exists quite
comfortably with notions of the value of
money in relation to time, of present value
being higher than future value, and of it
being possible to charge a sum against time
in certain types of debt. 
A third pragmatic adjustment is the inter-
pretation of r i b a. Without question the the-
oretical position of Islamic banking is that
r i b a is equivalent to interest in all its forms:
nominal or real, fixed or variable, simple or
compound. Nonetheless, in Islamic banking
practice, r i b a has come to be considered a
‘legal’ concept rather than an economic
one; that is, it is seen as a contractual oblig-
ation on a borrower to pay an increase in a
loan – money for money. Under this legal
definition, certain contracts that allow for
fixed interest are now feasible. A case in
point is the murahaba contract. Prominent
theorists of Islamic banking argue that there
is no substantial difference between fixed
interest and mark-up in a m u r a b a h a c o n-
tract. The latter is considered acceptable in
Islamic law, as it does not involve exchange
of money for money. In strictly economic
terms, however, the mark-up (profit) in
m u r a b a h a would be equivalent to fixed in-
terest. Similarly, the legal maxim has been
relaxed, according to which ‘every loan that
begets an advantage is r i b a ’. This is seen, for
instance, in the case of inter-bank opera-
tions in which reciprocal placement of funds
on an interest-free basis is made. Money is
advanced by one Islamic bank for a certain
period of time, on an interest-free basis, on
the understanding that the other bank reci-
procates at a later date, either with the same
amount of funds, or with less over a shorter
time. 
As part of this more pragmatic orienta-
tion, the concept of paying a ‘fine’ is now
widely accepted in Islamic banking. This oc-
curs where a debtor defaults on a loan de-
spite being able to repay. A fine, which can
be equivalent to the normal rate of return,
can be imposed on the debtor by the bank.
The s h a rica h boards generally approve of
this fine as compensation for the loss suf-
fered by the lender. Similarly, variable com-
missions or fees are charged on certain
transactions, such as purchase of traveller’s
cheques, and this has also become general-
ly acceptable in the practice of Islamic
banks. Another interesting development is
the offering of ‘prizes’ to savings or current
account holders in order to encourage de-
positors to keep their deposits with the
b a n k .
Examples of these pragmatic adjustments
are also available in the case of profit and
risk. In the former, Islamic bankers do take
into consideration market interest rates in
calculating their profits when making fi-
nancing or investment decisions. A further
change is that it is now accepted in practice
that time can enter into the calculation of
profit, although in the literature many early
jurists object to the idea of varying the
amount of profit according to the time in-
volved. As to risk, there has been somewhat
of dilution of the idea that money must first
be risked in order to earn a return. In Islamic
banking today, there are many examples of
risk-minimization: m u r a b a h a profit, short-
term commercial m u s h a r a k a and m u d a r a b a
profit, and rent-sharing arrangements. 
The pragmatic approach has been suc-
cessful in a number of other interesting de-
velopments in Islamic banking. Some Islam-
ic banks have begun to use what may be
termed ‘cleansing’ of profits earned from in-
vesting in companies which deal on a basis
of interest. According to a complex formula,
the h a r a m share of the profit related to
these companies and in which the Islamic
bank has invested, is taken out before profit
from a particular portfolio is finalized. Simi-
larly, a number of Islamic banks are experi-
menting with the idea of ‘securitization of
debt’ and trading in such debt, again anoth-
er innovative idea. A further issue under de-
bate is whether profit can be predeter-
mined. If ultimately accepted, this practice
will change Islamic banking dramatically,
bringing a large number of contacts, which
are not yet acceptable to Islamic banking,
into the fold of acceptable products. 
In all of this, Islamic bankers have thus
been highly creative in their approach to
the development of their institutions’ oper-
ations. Although Islamic banking has its
roots in the idealist literature, it has under-
gone a process of redefining the acceptable,
made possible by the flexibility available in
interpreting s h a rica h texts, as well as by the
need to keep pace with the present global
environment. What we are seeing is that the
pragmatic approach has facilitated the de-
velopment of a viable Islamic banking sec-
tor. However unacceptable these adjust-
ments may be to the idealists, they have
nevertheless provided Islamic banking prac-
titioners with much needed flexibility in de-
signing appropriate h a l a l investment prod-
ucts for their Muslim clientele, and this is
likely to continue in a more radical fashion
into the future. ♦
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Rel i gi o us  St ruc ture s
H A S A N - U D D I N  K H AN
Cultural identity can be expressed in many ways; per-
haps most apparent is its manifestation in architec-
ture. The contemporary mosque as a building type
not only expresses collective identity but also sym-
bolizes piety and is emblematic of how communities
present themselves to the outside world. In general,
contemporary mosques from the 1950s to the 1970s
revealed a concern for projecting the ‘modern Mus-
lim’. However, since the 1980s, mosques commis-
sioned by national governments and institutions
seem to be more architecturally conservative and
tradition-bound, and refer to past models that are
seen as manifestations of political and religious au-
thority. A case in point is the Mosque of Hassan II in
Casablanca, Morocco, completed in 1993.
I d e n t i t y ,
A u t h e n t i c i t y
a n d P o w e r :
the Mosque
of Hassan IIKing Hassan II, who ascended the throne in1961, continuing in the line of the Alawid dy-
nasty established in 1666, commissioned the
grand complex. The King, often referred to in
Morocco as Amir Al-Moumine, le Réunifica-
teur, le Saveur et le Réassembleur (in the sens-
es of ‘Leader of the Faithful, the Unifier, the
Saviour and the Builder’), is an active patron
of the arts and seems to have been conscious
of the power of buildings and places to im-
part a sense of stability and legitimacy. In
1968, the King announced his decision to
build a grand mosque in Casablanca, the eco-
nomic centre of the country, which lacked a
focal monument.
It has been said that the siting of the
mosque was inspired by the Quranic verse
describing the Creation of the World: ‘-and
His throne was over the waters’ (Sura XI:7).
Casablanca, on the sea, was also seen as
having a natural advantage from which to
signal the presence of Islam. This intention
is clearly manifested in the form of the mas-
sive 200 metre-tall minaret, a landmark with
a laser light-beam shining towards Mecca
for a distance of 30 kilometres. The building
itself is the largest mosque built in the mod-
ern world.1 The issue of scale, of representa-
tion of the importance of the Kingdom and
its ruler, was resolved in an equation of
‘greatness equals size’. 
The architectural language draws perma-
nency and legitimacy from the great histori-
cal Moroccan mosques of the 12t h c e n t u r y ,
such as the Kutubiyya in Marrakech. For the
King, who is both the secular and religious
head of the country, these considerations
became important amidst the uncertainty
of modern political circumstances. 
Given this formidable assignment, the
French architect Michel Pinseau had limited
scope for interpretation and innovation.
The complex is comprised of five main ele-
ments. The Mosque itself consists of a
prayer hall which can accommodate 25,000
worshippers, areas for ablutions, thermal
baths, meeting and VIP rooms, press facili-
ties and other ancillary spaces, and the tall
minaret. Next, the m a d r a s a is a semicircular
protrusion containing a Quranic school, a li-
brary specializing in Islamic sciences, and
other conference and audio-visual spaces. A
third element is the Public Library and Mu-
seum, composed of two symmetrically
arranged separate buildings along the main
access plaza. The esplanade itself, a huge
open space covering some 30,000 square
metres and surrounded by columns, is an
area that can be used as an extension of the
prayer hall to accommodate over 80,000
people. The fifth element is that of transport
facilities, with an underground road and
parking spaces for 1,100 vehicles and 40
large coaches.
The building, following the styling of the
historical Moroccan mosques, is far larger in
scale and even richer in the use of materials
and detailing. In plan, the complex is remi-
niscent of a basilica in that the narrow end
of the rectangular prayer hall (200 x 100m.)
is adjacent to the q i b l a wall, instead of the
customary wider side allowing for the maxi-
mum number of worshippers to be aligned
together facing Mecca. A huge retractable
roof covers the centre of the prayer hall to
form an internal ‘courtyard’ when it is
opened. The hall itself rises from a height of
27 metres to 65 metres above the floor.
Women’s galleries occupy mezzanine floors
along each side of the main hall with direct
access from the ablution facilities. The ablu-
tion chambers below the prayer hall present
a forest of columns and fountains, the most
elaborate facilities of their kind anywhere in
the world. In addition, there are h a m m a m s
and a heated pool that may well conjure up
images in the Orientalist paintings of Ingrès
or Gérôme. The sumptuousness of the inte-
riors takes traditional Moroccan craftsman-
ship and ornamentation to new heights and
the beige marble, green tile work, copper
and brass doors, and traditional green roofs
of the exterior help unify the grand com-
p l e x .
The project was financed mainly through
the subscriptions of about 13 million people
contributing approximately US 400 million.
Taxes and contributions from individuals
(almost mandatory for government employ-
ees), corporations and the royal treasury
made up the rest of the funds. Official fig-
ures published at the time of the opening
put the cost at US 700 million, but it appears
that the real cost may have been about US1
billion. In 1995, another appeal through the
media was made, this time for funds to
maintain and operate the complex. 
After seven years in construction, the
building was finally inaugurated in August
1993, on the eleventh day of the month of
R a b ic al-Awwal (the eve of the anniversary of
the Prophet Mohammed’s birth) in the year
1414 AH. This was exactly four hundred
years after al-Mansur inaugurated his Baadi
Palace in Marrakech. The anthropologist
Elaine Combs-Schilling pointed out the sim-
ilarity in the way these ceremonies were
conducted. She notes: ‘The significance of
such a gesture is not accidental. The cere-
mony itself, almost identical in content and
form to the one centuries earlier, reaffirms
nationhood and the King’s secular and reli-
gious roles. The prayer hall is full to capacity;
the King and his cortege enter watched by
his subjects, presidents and diplomats from
around the world, and some one thousand
media people. The candle-lit procession, the
prayers led by the King, and the incantation
of paeans of praise to the Prophet by the
three winners of a poetry competition cul-
minate in a new symbolic event. The King
asks the female winner of the fourth award
to read her poem – probably unprecedent-
ed in a mosque – and the ceremony closes
with this reading.’2
The values that the monarch stands for,
both as Guardian of the Faith and father of
his people, are reaffirmed by these symbolic
acts and by the architecture of the building.
It is the same idea that was manifested in
the Shahanshah Aryamehr’s (Shah Reza
Pahlavi’s) celebration of the 2,500t h a n n i v e r-
sary of the founding of the Persian Empire,
held in historic Persepolis in October 1971,
televised to an audience of millions in Iran
and throughout the world. In the 20t h c e n t u-
Hasan-Uddin Khan, an architect and critic, is visiting
professor of Architecture at Roger Williams University
(Rhode Island) and at MIT, Cambridge, USA. He is the
author of several books and numerous articles on
a r c h i t e c t u r e .
N o t e s
1 . For a more detailed description of the Hassan II
Mosque, see Renata Holod and Hasan-Uddin
Khan’s The Mosque and the Modern World
( L o n d o n : 1997), pp. 56-61.
2 . I am indebted to Elaine Combs-Schilling for
h e r interpretation of the opening ceremony of
t h e mosque. See her book, Sacred Performances:
Islam, Sexuality, and Sacrifice (pp. 157-174) and
‘Casablanca 1993: Negotiating Gender and Nation
in Performative Space’ in Journal of Ritual Studies
10 (Summer 1996), pp. 3-35.
3 . Mohammad Arkoun, ‘The Metamorphosis of the
Sacred’, in Martin Frishman and Hasan-Uddin Khan
(eds.), The Mosque (London: 1995), pp. 268-272.
Hassan II Mosque
by the sea.
T h e plaza with
t h e museum and





g r o u n d .
ry, such acts of national reaffirmation are ex-
tended into the international arena, aided
by mass communication technologies and
the media.
The use of architecture to represent
power within one’s own state has a long his-
tory. However, it should be noted that, in
Islam, the building of a mosque is an act of
piety. Even when an individual builds a
mosque it does not belong to that person
but to everyone – in reality often to the
State or to a waqf (endowment or trust). The
action of King Hassan blurs the line between
individual and state patronage, but the op-
eration of the mosque speaks somewhat
more strongly of state influence. The status
of this building brings it close to being a na-
tional mosque. Because of its importance, it
has not one but two imams. Nominations to
these positions are confirmed by the King.
This has become customary in Morocco, as
well as in some other countries, and can be
viewed as a form of political control. It
should be noted that in some places the
mosque has been used by opposition
groups as a ‘refuge, lair and a springboard’
(to use one of Mohammad Arkoun’s phras-
e s )3 for political activities, something which
may well have been observed by the astute
monarch in Morocco. The evidence of state
control of the mosque is not to belittle the
genuineness of the motivation to build the
mosque, but it does illustrate the issue of
the use of architecture to represent ‘authen-
ticity’ of culture, and to express the authori-
ty and legitimacy of the State. ♦
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Re li gi o us  St r uctur es
S H AR I F A H  Z AL E H A
One major issue in the current programme of Is-
lamization in Malaysia is the construction of Islamic
institutional infrastructures in new growth centres.
In Bandar Baru Bangi, a new town close to Kuala
Lumpur, both the State and its Muslim residents ad-
dress the issue by building mosques and s u r a u ( c o m-
munal prayer places). Outstanding as an Islamic sym-
bol and sanctuary in the town is not a mosque, but
rather a s u r a u that is endowed with vast human and
financial resources mobilized through grassroots op-
erations, upon which it continues to function. The
growth of mosques and s u r a u, and differences in
their identities in Bandar Baru Bangi, may not repre-
sent typical trends in Malaysia, but they do reveal the
on-going competition between State and society to
promote the Islamization cause. 
Surau and Mosques 
in Malaysia
Urbanization that took place in Malaysia
soon after the country achieved indepen-
dence in 1957 was associated with the de-
velopment of new growth centres where in-
dustrial villages, administrative centres and
housing units were to be built. Bandar Baru
Bangi is one of these centres. It is located in
the district of Hulu Langat in the state of Se-
langor and is about 25 kilometres from
Kuala Lumpur. Bandar Baru Bangi was de-
veloped in stages starting in 1977. The land
on which it grew was originally covered
with secondary jungle and oil palm planta-
tions. These were gradually cleared to make
way for houses, shops, factories, a shopping
complex, offices and a golf course. The pop-
ulation of the town now stands at approxi-
mately 40,000. Malays make up 85 percent
of the total population and belong to the
professional, managerial, administrative,
technical and sales categories of occupa-
tion. 
When Bandar Baru Bangi was being devel-
oped, Islamic fundamentalism (or d a k w a h)
was on the rise in Malaysia. Close to the
town was Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
(UKM), one of the hotbeds of d a k w a h m o v e-
ments. There student associations were in-
fluenced by the reform ideas of the Muslim
Youth Movement of Malaysia (led then by
Anwar Ibrahim), the Islamic Representative
Group, and the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party
(PAS). The associations regularly organized
socio-religious activities to increase aware-
ness amongst students of the central role of
Islam in society. Likewise, lecturers arranged
for seminars calling for the Islamization of
knowledge. UKM thus served as the fount of
Islamic dynamism from which the first
group of Bandar Baru Bangi residents, who
moved into the town in 1978, drew ideas
and guidelines to help them organize their
religious life in the evolving new communi-
ty. 
Leading them in the process were several
lecturers and administrative officials of
UKM, who were deeply committed to actu-
alizing the fundamentalists’ call for Muslims
to reach back to Islamic history and teach-
ings for alternative ideology and practical
solutions to help counter the secularizing
influences of the West. They accomplished
this by mobilizing economic resources from
within and outside Bandar Baru Bangi to
construct s u r a u in the few neighbourhoods
that had developed in Section 1 of the town. 
Organization and identities
A surau is actually a place for prayer. Irre-
spective of its size, state authorization is re-
quired for its establishment. The first of
t h e s e, Surau Al-Umm, was created in 1979. It
was originally a room in a semi-detached
house that belonged to the state agency
that developed the town. A few years later,
the residents collectively purchased the
house and turned it into a s u r a u. Later,
Surau An-Nur was built in another neigh-
bourhood in the same section, followed
soon after by Surau Damai in Section 2. As
Bandar Baru Bangi grew in size and popula-
tion, more surau were built. This was gener-
ally done upon the initiative of the mem-
bers of a particular neighbourhood. To date
the town has 12 s u r a u, six of which are
found in Section 1 and all of which are ad-
ministered by a community-elected com-
mittee of volunteers. 
Bandar Baru Bangi is also served by two
mosques: the UKM Mosque and the Masjid
Jamek Bandar Baru Bangi. Both owe their
existence to the State. The UKM mosque
was built in 1982 and functions as an ancil-
lary of the university. Mosques constructed
in the university actually represent a mod-
ern phenomenon very much in line with the
State’s Islamization policy. Being part of
UKM, the management of the mosque is en-
trusted to a special unit in the office of the
chancellery. This unit is manned by a few of-
ficials who work at UKM and is therefore
identified with the university bureaucracy.
For religious matters, the unit relies on lec-
turers of the Faculty of Islamic Studies. 
The state mosque is headed by a profes-
sional i m a m, who is assisted by the n a z i r ( s u-
pervisor), b i l a l and s i a k (caretaker). All four
mosque officials are appointed by the Se-
langor Department of Religious Affairs (Ja-
batan Agama Islam Selangor, JAIS) and re-
ceive pay from the government. Helping to
link the mosque and the community is the
mosque committee, comprised of ten peo-
ple. In theory, members of the mosque com-
mittee are elected by the community. How-
ever, in practice, JAIS ‘appoints’ them based
on the recommendations of the i m a m. Thus
the administrators of the state mosque are
identified with the state religious bureau-
cracy where all details concerning sermons,
types of mission work and categories of
preachers are handled by administrators
and clerks responsible to the government. 
S u r a u A n - N u r
A s u r a u or a mosque is generally thought of
as a place for obligatory prayer and other re-
ligious assemblies. However, in the context
of current Islamization in Malaysia, both insti-
tutions have the additional responsibility of
doing mission work (d a k w a h) in view of
heightening the people’s consciousness of
the relevance of Islam in modern times. Thus
the ability of a s u r a u or a mosque to organize
a range of socio-religious activities for this
purpose greatly affects its identity, character
and status as an Islamic sanctuary. In this re-
gard, the earlier mentioned Surau An-Nur
stands out. Regarded as the most active reli-
gious institution in Bandar Baru Bangi, this
surau regularly runs Quran and t a f s i r c l a s s e s
for men and women, conducts t a h l i l s e s s i o n s
and systematically schedules religious talks
on a range of topics that deal with spiritual
matters and current social problems. These
talks are delivered by preachers with out-
standing Islamic credentials, some of whom
make allusions to issues of social justice and
truths, sometimes with stark candidness. The
s u r a u too is able to garner large amounts of
donations sufficient for setting up its own
foundation to provide financial assistance to
needy students and the poor. Because of its
increasing popularity, Surau An-Nur has
been recently enlarged to accommodate the
hundreds arriving from within and outside
Bandar Baru Bangi to perform the Friday
noon prayer and participate in its activities. 
Surau An-Nur’s prominence may be attrib-
uted to three factors. First is its location in
the elite section of Bandar Baru Bangi
whose residents are generally economically
well endowed and who donate generously
to the s u r a u. Second is the leadership and
patronage of Ustaz Harun Din, a highly es-
teemed u l a m a k in Malaysia, that the s u r a u
enjoys until today. A former professor at the
Faculty of Islamic Studies, UKM, Ustaz Harun
Din played a crucial role, especially in the
early years of the s u r a u, in helping members
of the neighbourhood to run the surau a n d
by networking with other u l a m a k and Islam-
ic organizations. Thirdly, there is a high level
of religious sentiment sustained by the peo-
ple living in that neighbourhood. Most of
these belong to the generation of Malays
who were exposed to the Islamic funda-
mentalist currents of the 1970s and early
1980s. Imbued with a high level of religious
commitment, they dedicate themselves to
making Surau An-Nur the focal point of their
own religious life. Furthermore, many of
them work at UKM and can therefore easily
cooperate on religious matters. 
The other eleven s u r a u are pale by com-
parison to Surau An-Nur. Many do not orga-
nize religious talks on a regular basis and a
few function as arenas for individuals to
compete for status. As such, they do not at-
tract many people and only come to life dur-
ing Islamic festivities. 
Both UKM and the state mosques have the
resources to conduct Quran classes and
arrange for preachers to provide religious
talks. Between the two, the latter attract less
attention. In the popular view, the state
mosque exists for the use of state agents to
elaborate Islamic orthodox teachings and
legitimize government acts and policies.
Being a state agent, the i m a m imparts com-
ments on controversial religious or political
issues, such as the Anwar Ibrahim case,
through indirect references. Furthermore,
he plays up the social distance between
himself and members of the congregation.
In contrast, the UKM mosque is not viewed
as a mouthpiece of the State. Mission work
through sermons and religious talks attract
large audiences, but these activities do not
provide sufficient opportunity for groups to
consolidate and help generate a vibrant reli-
gious situation in and around the mosque. 
In conclusion, suffice it is to say that mos-
ques and s u r a u are the legitimate institu-
tions of religious expression in the urban
setting in present-day Malaysia. Surau c o n-
struction undoubtedly represents grass-
roots operations to either support or com-
pete with state structures, i.e. the mosques.
However, what makes one s u r a u m o r e
prominent than another depends to a great
extent on its resources, both human and fi-
nancial. The success of Surau An-Nur in be-
coming the religious hub of the town, is fa-
cilitated by some peculiarities of the neigh-
bourhood within which it is located, in par-
ticular the charisma of Ustaz Harun Din and
the sustained high level of religious senti-
ment among the residents. 
The Bandar Baru Bangi experience also
shows that the autonomy and scope of lo-
cally initiated religious institutions do not
shrink in the face of an expanding state ap-
paratus. Although a s u r a u cannot exist with-
out authorization from the Department of
Religious Affairs, it does not have to depend
on the latter to operate. Thus a surau such as
that of An-Nur, when sufficiently developed
in terms of size, popularity, funding, goals
and contacts, has the potential to eclipse a
m o s q u e . ♦
UKM Mosque 
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Mate ri a l Cul tur e
R OG I E R  B E D A U X
Mali is a country of rich history and diverse culture.
Its cultural heritage is, however, threatened by both
pillage and illicit trade. Looting has dramatically in-
creased in recent years, especially in the Inner Delta
of the Niger and the Dogon country, and has obliged
the Malian authorities to take measures to counter-
act this negative development. 
Protecting Mali’s  
Cultural Heritage
The fight against the loss of cultural her-
itage in Mali has been reinforced by the en-
hancement of legislation aimed at regulat-
ing archaeological excavations and pro-
hibiting unauthorized excavations. It also
forbids the illicit export of cultural heritage.
But a further step at the grassroots level has
also been taken by creating awareness of
the importance of protecting Malian cultur-
al heritage in the local population. This is
done through radio and television broad-
casts, exhibitions, and articles in magazines
and newspapers. The establishment of ‘Cul-
tural Missions’ in the cities of Djenné,
Tombouctou and Bandiagara, which figure
on UNESCO’s List of World Heritage Monu-
ments, formally reinforced this. However,
regional and international cooperation,
which is currently being sought, is still
somewhat wanting. A joint-programme be-
tween Mali and the Netherlands has given
rise to several projects for conserving and
protecting Malian cultural heritage, one of
which concerns one of the major old centres
of West-African Islam.
Architectural heritage
m a n a g e m e n t
The city of Djenné is one of the oldest
known cities in West Africa. Archaeological
traces of early settlement, dating from the
3r d century BC, have been found in the city.
Urbanization was well developed by the
1 0t h century and the region must have
been densely inhabited. Some 79 sites
within a radius of 4 km around Djenné ap-
pear to have been inhabited during this
period. Evidence for extensive settlement
is indicated by one of the largest mounds
in the region, the site of Djenné-Djeno,
measuring more than 33 hectares. Due to
the advantage of its location in the fertile
Inner-Niger Delta, which ensured rich pas-
tures, fertile soils, and fish and game in
abundance, Djenné developed into a flour-
ishing commercial centre, initially mostly
interregional, later also becoming a post
on the long-distance trade routes across
the Sahara. 
The Inner Niger Delta played a major role
in the history of West Africa and was closely
related to the development of such me-
dieval empires as Ghana/Wagadu, Mali, and
Songay. Many people were attracted to this
fertile region bordering on the Sahara, the
Marka/Songay (urban merchants), Bozo
(fishermen and masons), Fulani (herdsmen)
and Bamanan (agriculturists) forming the
majority. Their descendants can still be seen
in Djenné and together with the merchants
from the North and the South determined
its real cosmopolitan character. To date, the
town has a population of some 12,000 in-
h a b i t a n t s .
Nowadays, only the monumental mud ar-
chitecture reminds us of Djenné’s former
grandeur. The famous mud-brick architec-
ture, which made the reputation of Djenné,
is threatened however, not by the fragile na-
ture of the material, but by the economic re-
cession preventing the inhabitants to main-
tain their houses and by social transforma-
tions endangering the traditional house
structure. This also incited UNESCO in 1988
to accept both the city itself and the archae-
ological sites around it as a World Monu-
ment. 
The architecture of the monumental two-
storied mud buildings with their decorated
façades is world famous. The mosque, for
example, measuring 75 square metres, is
the world’s largest mud construction. It
dates from 1906-1907 and was built on the
ruins of the first mosque, according to oral
tradition built in the 13t h century. The ruins
of this first mosque can still be seen in pho-
tographs from 1893. Archaeological excava-
tions yielded evidence of the use of mud
bricks as early as the 8t h to 9t h centuries, and
of rectangular house plans dating back to
the 11t h and 12t h centuries. However, the
exact age of the existing houses is difficult
to ascertain. All we know for sure is that
some of them figure in photographs from as
early as 1893 onwards. Since these houses
then already show signs of a certain age, it
may be estimated that they could at least be
some 200 years old. 
Ever since the 1970s, the wide possibilities
of research in Djenné attracted many re-
searchers. An exhibition on Djenné, based
on this multidisciplinary research and com-
plemented with a catalogue, first opened in
Leiden (the Netherlands) in 1994 and was
later also shown at Bamako and Djenné it-
self. Presenting a vivid image of this multi-
ethnic city, a wide audience became aware
of the disastrous situation of its architec-
ture. Consequently, in 1995, the Dutch Em-
bassy at Bamako took the initiative and
asked the Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde
(Leiden) to draw up a plan for the restora-
tion of the city. A joint Malian-Dutch mission
went to Djenné to make an assessment of
the actual situation. It then appeared that
more than 30% of the monumental build-
ings that had been visited by Dutch re-
searchers in 1984 had disappeared and
those houses still extant were in a dramati-
cally poor state of conservation. 
A plan for the restoration of the city, sub-
mitted to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, met with the favourable decision to
subsidize the project (for the period of 1996
to 2003), which concentrates on the restora-
tion of some 168 monumental buildings in
the city of Djenné (out of a total of some
1,850). It also focuses on setting up an orga-
nization to assure safe management of the
cultural heritage. The project is currently
being executed by the Rijksmuseum voor
Volkenkunde, in close cooperation with the
Musée National du Mali in Bamako, and the
Mission Culturelle de Djenné.
Local masons in Djenné – often of Bozo
ethnic origin – carry out the restoration
work, along with blacksmiths, carpenters
(for making doors and windows) and pot-
ters (for the earthenware windows and
drainpipes). Local masonry techniques and
available materials are used. The quality of
the mud-brick architecture in Djenné is di-
rectly linked to the craftsmanship of the ma-
sons, who are formally organized in a kind of
guild structure, the b a r e y - t o n, which is
unique in Africa and has its origins probably
in the 15t h century. It is through this organi-
zation that the craftsmanship, which guar-
antees the high quality masonry of the
houses in Djenné, has been passed on from
generation to generation. The internal orga-
nization of the barey ton is strictly hierarchi-
cal, involving apprentices, young masons
and master masons. The latter are expert
craftsmen and possess the necessary magi-
cal knowledge. Each family has a long-es-
tablished relationship with a specific
mason’s family, in which magic also plays an
important role. In the project, naturally, this
connection between houses and specific
masons is duly respected.
Restoration ethics
Because Djenné has been registered as a
World Monument, the project has adopted
certain principles of restoration, based on
the International Venice Charter for the
Conservation and Restoration of Monu-
ments and Sites. These principles have been
adapted conform to local circumstances.
Even for World Monuments, there are no ab-
solute and universally accepted restoration
principles. The project tries to retain the at-
mosphere of the city based on its location,
with its typical structure of narrow streets
and small squares and, especially, the mon-
umental mud-brick houses with decorated
façades plastered by hand. This ensemble
must survive. For this reason a number of
168 mostly monumental houses were se-
lected for restoration, sometimes bordering
a street or square, sometimes standing by
themselves, spread all over the city and in
various states of deterioration. This selec-
tion is primarily based on architectural crite-
ria. In the project now being carried out, the
architecture and the city’s atmosphere of
around the turn of the century are taken as
an arbitrary model for the restoration. It is
from this period, the beginning of French
colonization, that the oldest written records
and illustrations survive. 
Before any intervention, careful recording
and research is necessary. The documenta-
tion consists of: the already existing plans
and photographs; drawings and pho-
tographs of the actual condition; plans for
the restoration with a detailed description
of the work to be carried out, a calculation
of the quantity and quality of the required
materials, and a tender. The restoration
plans are made by a Malian architect and
submitted to an international committee.
The principle to retain as much of the origi-
nal parts of any monument as possible is of
paramount importance in making of deci-
sions. The elaborate documentation en-
sures that all restoration work is more or less
reversible. It will also permit a reasonable
control, which was formerly virtually impos-
sible. 
We hope that this project will give rise to a
larger interest in the city of Djenné and will
contribute to the conservation of one of the
most beautiful cities of Mali. This project is
further expected to reaffirm the still often
overlooked fact that Africa has indeed, a
rich history and that its traces must be re-
s p e c t e d . ♦
Dr Rogier Bedaux is professor of African Material
Culture at Leiden University and curator of the
African Department of the Rijksmuseum voor
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Re li gi o us  St r uctur es
N E L I DA  F U C C A R O
For centuries Islam has provided a set of cultural
norms, principles of social organization, legal pre-
scriptions and often instruments of political mobi-
lization for many urban communities. It has there-
fore contributed substantially to the articulation of
urban environments. However, Islam has not shaped
clearly identifiable urban systems, at least in the
sense suggested by the notion of the ‘Islamic’ city
which has fuelled much academic debate in the past
d e c a d e s .1 As this notion is representative of an ideal
type, it clearly implies the existence of a somewhat
‘monolithic’ Islam. In reality Islam has been extreme-
ly diverse both in time and space. Furthermore, it is
essential to recognize that there is a striking variety
of political, social and cultural systems within which




Ma’tams in Bahrain 
before Oil 
In pre-oil Bahrain, the articulation of
urban space was primarily the result of the
close interaction between tribal solidarities,
mercantile values and a tradition of cos-
mopolitanism which throughout history
shaped a multi-cultural social fabric. Tribal
solidarities were undoubtedly major forces
in defining the political dynamics of the Gulf
region. From the late 18t h century, the polit-
ical ascendancy of tribal groups belonging
to the cU t u b confederation in the coastal
areas of the Gulf led to the imposition of
tribal rule over Bahrain. The new tribal
elites, and in particular the al-Khalifa family,
were able to maintain their political legiti-
macy by exerting effective control over a
mercantile economy which was based in
urban areas. In the 19t h and early 20t h c e n-
turies much of the urban expansion that oc-
curred in Bahrain resulted from the eco-
nomic forces unleashed by the pearl boom.
In the city of Manama particularly, a mercan-
tile settlement whose population by 1905
was approximately 60% Shi’i, the economic
and political developments of the period ac-
tively encouraged urban growth. In the
course of the 19t h century, Manama became
the most important market centre of the is-
land and the focus of British imperial inter-
ests in the Gulf region.
The role played by Islam in the expansion
of Manama can only be understood in the
context of the meaning assumed by sectari-
an identities within the specific framework
of the Bahraini polity. The authority of the
new tribal rulers was identified with Sunni
Islam which, in the eyes of large sections of
the local Shi’i population, became the reli-
gion of oppression and of ‘unjust’ tribal rule.
Accordingly, Shi’ism became an instrument
of resistance to the political hegemony of
the tribal elites, although especially urban
communities displayed a remarkable de-
gree of adaptation to new political and eco-
nomic realities. From the late 19t h c e n t u r y ,
the articulation of Shi’i networks which cen-
tred upon m a ’ t a m s (funeral houses) played
a central role in the expansion of a number
of Manama’s residential areas. The history of
m a ’ t a m s highlights the ways in which reli-
gious solidarities, as they structured an
urban institution, were major determinants
in the shaping of urban space. It also shows
the extent to which these solidarities were
closely connected to the definition of social
relations and power structures in the specif-
ic urban milieu of Manama.
Manama’s funeral houses
In contemporary Bahrain the word m a ’-
tam can refer to a specialized building and
to a congregation of people. In both capaci-
ties, funeral houses have been central to the
definition of Shi’i identity and still represent
the privileged relationship which links the
local Shi’i community to Imam Husayn. M a ’-
t a m s are multi-functional organizations
which, similar to the Iranian h o s e y n i y y e s, are
the venues for the celebration of Ashura, a
series of ritual performances which com-
memorate the martyrdom of Imam Husayn
and for the dissemination of Shi’i teachings
and traditions. Ma’tams are also informal
places of leisure and socialization where
non-Shi’i are usually welcome. Until the end
of the 19t h century, m a ’ t a m s were sponta-
neous gatherings which met regularly in pri-
vate houses, both in rural and urban areas.
After the 1890s the sudden proliferation of
specialized m a ’ t a m buildings in many resi-
dential areas of Manama allowed many Shi’i
communities to acquire new social and po-
litical visibility. Since then m a ’ t a m b u i l d i n g s
have become strongly identified with the
urban landscape as it seems that no ‘official’
m a ’ t a m s were established outside Manama
until the 1950s. The establishment of ‘offi-
cial’ funeral houses coincided with the be-
ginning of the public celebration of Ashura,
especially with the performance of open air
processions which in the following decades
became an important outlet for the political
grievances of Shi’i urban groups. 
Further, and more importantly for the
transformations which affected Manama’s
urban space in this period, m a ’ t a m s b e c a m e
the architectural sign of the Shi’is’ ‘love for
Husayn’. As such, they were particularly in-
strumental in the consolidation of immi-
grant groups within expanding Shi’i neigh-
bourhoods. For instance, the ma’tam al-
cAjam al-Kabir, established in 1892, func-
tioned as the focal point for the Persian
community of Manama, many of whose
members had arrived in the city from south-
ern Iran after the 1850s. This funeral house,
which was located at the edge of the urban
settlement in a sparsely populated area
known as Mushbir, functioned as the core
for the expansion of what in later years be-
came one of the Persian quarters of Mana-
ma. Similarly, the emergence of the m a ’ t a m
al-Ahsa’ iyyin in 1895 in the Mukharaqa dis-
trict defined a new urban identity for many
Shi’i immigrants from al-Hasa, a coastal re-
gion located in the eastern province of
Saudi Arabia.2 In this period many m a ’ t a m
congregations were made ‘official’ by the
replacement of mud and reed huts, where
believers occasionally met, with masonry
buildings. In 19t h century Bahrain, this use of
urban space indicates a transformation of
the built environment that increasingly dif-
ferentiated rural areas from expanding
urban settlements. The establishment of
permanent masonry buildings for m a ’ t a m
purposes, and indeed their maintenance,
required substantial capital. Thus the m a ’-
t a m boom of the 1890s has to be considered
in the light of the emergence of a powerful
Shi’i mercantile elite which benefited from
the pearl boom of the late 19t h century and
from increasing British protection. Their di-
rect association with the ‘official’ m a ’ t a m s
was an indication of religious piety but it in-
creasingly became a sign of wealth and so-
cial prestige.
Urban forms and
S u n n i authority 
The spatial distribution of m a ’ t a m b u i l d-
ings in Manama would indicate that Shi’i
places of worship remained confined to the
residential areas of the city. The suq, which
was the political and economic centre of
Manama, and the largest area of public utili-
ty, was in fact a Sunni-controlled space, as
indicated by the fact that the majority of
warehouses and commercial premises were
either owned by tribal Sunnis or more often
endowed as Sunni w a q f s. Although many
Shi’i entrepreneurs who supported m a ’ t a m s
in the residential areas of the city operated
from the suq, they were generally unable to
acquire property there. Their wealth was
usually invested in urban neighbourhoods
where houses and shops in particular were
often registered as Shi’i waqfs for the bene-
fit of specific funeral houses. A useful com-
parison can be made with many Iranian
cities where h o s e y n i y y e s, the local counter-
parts of the Bahraini m a ’ t a m s, were inte-
grated in large commercial and religious
complexes and directly supported by shops
located in central bazaars.3 In Manama, the
tribal government’s concern with the con-
trol of revenue from trade clearly affected
the development of the suq and deter-
mined the peripheral location of Shi’i places
of worship in relation to the political and
economic cores of the city. Although the
rulers made extensive use of the only Sunni
religious court of Bahrain, which was strate-
gically located in Manama, they were gener-
ally reluctant to enforce an official Sunni tra-
dition. Rather, they extensively relied on
tribal custom. In the first decades of the 20t h
century, the only large Sunni mosque that
was visible in the urban texture of Manama
was located in a residential area called
J a m ic. The fact that the quarter was named
after the mosque is a clear indication of the
extent to which the presence of large places
of worship in the city was unusual. 
Islam was undoubtedly a very important
dimension in the urban development of
Manama, a city which was controlled by
Sunni rulers but whose socio-religious
structure was predominantly Shi’i. However,
as the case of the m a ’ t a m s shows, sectarian
identities alone cannot explain the develop-
ment of specific urban forms unless these
are contextualized in the wider political and
socio-economic setting. ♦
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Urb a n Tr ansf o r mat i o n
J E AN - P A U L  L O U B E S
Located in a metropolitan area of Xi’an, ancient capi-
tal of several majors dynasties in China, is the famous
Great Mosque. This edifice, in the heart of the Hui
district, provides one of the more important tourist
sites of Xi’an. The resulting wealth of the district, also
adding to the economic vitality generated through
commerce, lies at the origin of a remarkable architec-
tural transformation. This study focuses on the Hui
people, whose centuries-old Muslim identity has re-
cently come to express itself through contemporary
vernacular architecture.
Transformation of the 
Hui district in Xi’an
The great economic power of the Hui
Muslims, when considered in conjunction
with the fact that there is a total lack of
building regulations (uniquely within the
Hui district), is conducive to the develop-
ment of an uncontrolled transformation of
the ‘urban form’. Observing this local ‘out-
law’ situation offers an excellent context in
which to analyse what is called ‘contempo-
rary vernacular architecture’. This term con-
sists in two parts: Vernacular architecture
refers to architectural work by the local peo-
ple, without any institutional or professional
help. The process is based on the cultural
background of the residents, as well as their
technical and economic resources. ‘Con-
temporary’ refers to the architecture of
today, made of modern material and tech-
niques such as reinforced concrete, glazed
tiles, modern metal windows, and includes
the invention of new solutions for plan and
design, in other words, new types of houses.
The beginning of
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n
From the eighties, a great change oc-
curred in the ‘urban form’ of the famous
Drum Tower (emblematic monument of the
Hui district) area. This change was relatively
progressive at the outset (1985-90), achiev-
ing greater momentum with the strong
economic development in China from 1990
onwards. It is in this last decade that one
can speak of a ‘new urban form’. This form
is mainly characterized by three, four or
five-storey houses and flat roofs with acces-
sible terraces. The district now has many
common traits with medinas – in the habit-
ual typology of urban form. 
The transformation can be observed at
two levels: urban structure and public
space; and architectural form (the emer-
gence of a new architectural type and new
terminology). The new type of architecture
is based on the inhabitants’ large capacity
to invest, which has lead to the transforma-
tion of the ancient traditional Chinese
town. This latter term signifies the regular
city inherited from the ancient urban net-
work of structures consisting in low court-
yard houses (one or two floors), with tiled
Chinese roofs. These Hui houses, which
once composed the urban fabric of the dis-
trict, were identical to the Chinese houses
(often cited in literature as ‘traditional
house’ from the North of China). That is to
say, they expressed the Chinese ethnic
identity rather than the Muslim religious
identity of the Hui. 
The ancient urban network maintained a
plot of greenery in the empty spaces, such
as in the main courtyards, back yards with
gardens, and public spaces with trees lined
along the streets. The present rebuilding
process in this area has saturated these for-
mer empty spaces by, for example, filling
up the courtyard with additional construc-
tions. Complete saturation of the urban
network was attained at the end of the sev-
enties, the first observable consequence of
the lack of space. Of course this did not con-
cern only the Muslim district, but rather all
the Xi’an districts inside the perimeters of
the city wall and all Chinese cities during
this period. The great economic vitality of
the Hui, however, made the transformation
more rapid and precipitated the move to
yet another phase: substitution of the an-
cient courtyard house by an altogether new
type of dwelling. The narrow parcel of land
of the former is taken up and used to build
the latter. From a professional point of view
(of an architect or an urban planner), this
narrow patch is generally thought too nar-
row to be used. If the new rebuilt district
needs three, four or five-storey houses in
order to accommodate increased density,
an architect would usually suggest group-
ing several parcels together, allowing for
more efficient use of the land and a more
rational plan of housing. With the urgency
of housing problems and, as mentioned be-
fore, the fact that there is no housing regu-
lation, the inhabitants simply cannot wait
for a solution. They thus take matters into
their own hands.
The narrowness of the parcel necessitates
new organization of space, new geometry
for the rooms with new proportions which
professionals such as architects could never
normally accept. The constraints of shared
property and local agreements amongst
neighbours are at the origin of what we call
‘invention’, which in this case can be con-
sidered a successful process of densifica-
tion. With three, four or five-storey houses,
accommodation of a higher population
density is obtainable. But the challenge for
the authorities in charge of rehabilitation or
rebuilding programmes is to make it sus-
t a i n a b l e .
Accessible terraced roofs characterize the
new architecture, with annexes like storage
space, cellars, and shelters for animals. Cer-
tain prior uses of the courtyards are now
found on the terraces. The new multi-
storeyed house is organized around a patio,
smaller than the ancient courtyard and used
mainly to provide light and to distribute the
various flats. The level of sanitation equip-
ment has increased considerably. Sanitary
installations and toilets appear on the first
floor with a water point at each level.
The turning point
By 1997, 60 to 70% of the district area was
estimated to have been transformed ac-
cording to new vernacular architectural de-
sign. Though not respecting the habitual ar-
chitectural figures, the new architectural
type offers solutions where the authorities
in charge of urban issues fail to do so. But
this is not all. 
Until recently, the Hui people were wary
of expressing their Muslim identity by way
of architecture. One could not observe dif-
ferences between Han houses and Hui
houses. The revival of pilgrimages to Mecca,
authorized since the eighties, and the in-
creased contacts of the Hui with other Mus-
lims in the world, has opened them up to
new architectural references. The Hui have
now experienced the Arabo-Islamic archi-
tecture found in many countries of the East.
They take these references and imitate the
figures. After centuries of simply producing
typically Chinese architecture, the Hui archi-
tecture now emphasizes differentiation. In
this way, the Hui affirm their identity and re-
inforce their distinct characteristics. 
The current period represents a funda-
mental turning point in the history of Hui ar-
chitecture, and is not limited to housing. In
several mosques, domes and cupolas are
erected instead of the tiled roofs of ancient
Hui mosques. A progressive transformation
of these mosques has occurred. In the past,
they were organized according to norms of
the Chinese temple. There is a new urban
scenery: arches incorporated in the design
of windows and doors, vaults, and cupolas.
These signs clearly manifest that one is in an
Islamic space.
It seems paradoxical that inside of this
Muslim district of Xi’an, all Chinese authority
in the field of urban regulation and control
is disappearing. Perhaps the delicate situa-
tion between Hui and Chinese municipal
authorities explains the fact that regulation
stops at the limits of the district. Building li-
cences do not exist in this zone and there is
no control over, or even knowledge of, how
many square metres are built each year.
Such a phenomena merits further research
by anthropologists and architects in terms
of the anthropology of space as there are
many more general questions remaining to
be answered. What type of space do people
create when there is no control? What pat-
terns or foundational structures do people
choose under these conditions? What is the
place of architecture in (in this case Muslim)
group identity? Vernacular modern archi-
tecture offers a most fertile terrain for fur-
ther research into these questions, in this
case concerning identity and the expression
thereof through the re-forming of urban
space by a Muslim minority group. ♦
Jean-Paul Loubes is architect and professor
a tt h e School of Architecture and Landscape
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Ur ba n Tr a nsfo r ma ti o n
B R I A N  L A R K I N  
The Plaza cinema squats on the edge of the Old City
of Kano, Nigeria. Outside women sell bean cakes,
men hawk cassettes, cigarettes, and oranges. Buses
stop and taxis unload, disgorging passengers who
hurry on to catch other buses, different taxis. ‘Drop
me at the Plaza.’ ‘Meet me at the El Dorado.’ These
quotidian directions are uttered by urbanites who
have little interest in going to the cinema but who
have internalized the fact that cinema theatres,
along with mosques, the post office, banks, and
other institutions of the post-colony, architecturally
punctuate the city. Their built forms create an ab-
stract skeletal structure around which the city’s ner-
vous system circulates. 
Cinema Theatres 
and Moral Space
in Northern Nigeria 
Cinema is one of the quintessential tech-
nologies of modernity. In the case of Kano, it
is a colonial modernity, often perceived as an
un-Islamic (kafirai) threat to local construc-
tions of ethnicity and religion. Kano is the
largest city in northern Nigeria and while its
inhabitants are mainly Hausa Muslims, it con-
tains considerable ethnic and religious diver-
sity. To go to the cinema in Kano is to step
outside of Africa, to move beyond the moral
relations of an Islamic society and into the In-
dian, American, and Chinese realities project-
ed on the screen. Cinema is seen as distinc-
tively modern because of this ability to desta-
bilize and make people, ideas and commodi-
ties mobile. Yet at the same time cinema the-
atres are parochial, an intimate part of urban
topography that draw around them con-
geries of social practices that make cinema-
going an event. 
In 1937, the Rex opened in Kano. Before
that, films had been screened in dance halls
but had no purpose-built space of their own.
This opening could be seen as unremarkable,
the coming to prominence of an entertain-
ment form well established elsewhere in the
world. But this ignores how moments like
these were foundational in the incremental
enveloping of Hausa social space by a trans-
formative colonial one. Cinema theatres were
introduced to Kano as part of a much wider
transformation of the colonial public sphere.
Like the beer parlours, theatres, public gar-
dens, libraries and commercial streets that
proceeded them, cinema theatres created
new modes of public association that chal-
lenged existing relations of space, gender
and social hierarchy. The cinema theatre thus
created new modes of sociability that had to
be regulated – officially by the colonial
administration and unofficially within local
Hausa norms. 1
The Hausa distrust of cinema was cemented
when the construction of cinema-halls was
mapped on to the moral geography of Kano
City. After the arrival of the British in 1903, the
mud-walled city of Muslim Kano was segre-
gated from the European township and
Sabon Gari, the area where the young male
migrants from the Christian south were arriv-
ing in numbers. Sabon Gari was and is an area
of ill repute in Hausa eyes and stands as the
moral antithesis to the birni, the Old City,
where female seclusion is maintained, prosti-
tution and the sale of alcohol are forbidden
and the values of conservative Islam upheld.
The first cinema shows took place in the
Sabon Gari in dance halls where men went to
meet women and alcohol was sold. This is
where the Rex was built and its original appli-
cation included a request for an open-air bar
that would promote social recreation beyond
the cinematic event. Cinema in Kano quickly
established a reputation as an illicit, immoral
arena which respectable people should
avoid. Cinema-going was regarded as iskanci
(dissoluteness) and was (and is) associated by
many Hausa with the immoral cultural com-
plex known as bariki: which includes beer par-
lours, dance halls, certain hotels, and male
and female prostitution. The mixed-sex na-
ture of cinema theatres meant that they were
also socially unacceptable for most Hausa
women. Those who did attend were seen as
karuwai (prostitutes), and their presence
meant that pleasure and desire were to be
found both on and off the screen, the erotic
pleasures of one context feeding off the
other. 
Despite its popularity with certain sections
of Hausa society then, the space of cinema
was quickly saturated with an un-Islamic
moral aura. There were questions about
whether the apparatus itself contravened the
Islamic prohibition on the creation of images.
The early Hausa names for cinema, majigi
(from magic) and dodon bango (evil spirits on
the wall) carried the traces of this initial reli-
gious distrust, just as the official royal names
of the theatres – Rex, Palace, and later Queens
– indexed the conflation of technology with
empire. 
Cinema theatres took hold in the Hausa
imagination as a social space and practice
that enacted the moral qualities of the areas
in which they were located. They mimicked,
in profane form, symbolic and material quali-
ties traditionally associated with mosques
and markets. Just as the mosque traditionally
marked out the physical boundaries of moral
society and the creation of a public arena for
ritual and economic activity, the cinema the-
atre came to take on this role in inverted fash-
ion. Like the mosque, it created an arena for
public association, for ritualistic attendance; it
drew around it satellite enterprises selling
food or books and magazines; and it consti-
tuted a landmark of the urban topography. 
In Kano, mosques, cinema theatres and
markets were (and are) threshold spaces that
mediated the boundaries between northern
Nigeria and the wider world. Through ritual
practice, film and commodities, these institu-
tions connected participants to spiritual and
material realities across national boundaries.
Yet while transnationally oriented, they were
at the same time local. Kano cinema theatres
were situated next to major markets, and
these institutions shared the task of marking
out the spatial borders between the different
ethnicities, religions and races that were
brought together (and then kept separate) in
the segregated colonial city. The Rex for in-
stance, was located on the border between
the European township, Muslim Fagge and
Christian Sabon Gari. Later, the Plaza was con-
structed just outside the mud walls of the Old
City, separating Hausa from their non-Hausa
fellow Muslims in Fagge; the El Duniya
marked off Fagge from the European town-
ship; Queens separated Sabon Gari from
Bompai, a commercial area, and so on. 
The carefully fashioned balance between
space and religion in Kano was threatened in
1953 when the construction of the Palace cin-
ema next to Kurmi market in the Old City dis-
rupted the boundaries on which the moral di-
vision of Hausa urban space was built. Before
the Palace, there had never been any contro-
versy over the siting of cinema houses. The
Rex and the El Duniya were both located in
non-Hausa areas and hundreds of Hausa
youth left the Old City nightly to attend per-
formances at these cinemas. In the Old City,
the news that a cinema was to be opened
there sparked outrage and a massive effort to
prevent its construction. A fatwa was issued
forbidding the showing of films because of
the religious injunction on the creation of im-
ages, but was overruled when it came before
the Emirate Council. Petitions were signed to
entreat and pressure the Emir into halting
construction. The opening of the Palace was
marked by violence and the Emir had to call in
the police to arrest the ringleaders. Months
after the opening, the police were still arrest-
ing youths who were stoning patrons of the
open-air cinema. 
In 1951, while the controversy over the
Palace was raging, matters worsened when
the El Duniya burned down, killing 331 peo-
ple out of an audience of 600. The tragedy
was popularly seen as divine punishment for
participation in this immoral arena and the
rumour quickly spread that the film being
screened contained the image of the Prophet
Mohammed. The tragedy spawned many
other rumours which grew so strong that the
colonial Government was forced to take offi-
cial notice and counter them over the radio.
Twice daily for two days in four different lan-
guages, the Radio Diffusion Service an-
nounced there was no truth to stories that the
people handling the bodies of El Duniya vic-
tims died, or that Native Authority warders
who helped in the tragedy had all gone mad,
or that prisoners from Kano prison (who
helped in handling the corpses) could not eat
for days afterwards. 
Cinema theatres seem to have an ontologi-
cal security based on the solidity of an audito-
rium which places audiences in familiar rows
underneath the spectacle of light and dark
unfolding on the screen. But in reality physi-
cal spaces have to enter and take hold in the
imagination before they take on social signifi-
cance. They must be made to have meaning.
The conflict over the siting of the Palace cine-
ma reveals the ways in which the public
sphere of colonial modernity was contested
and how control of the moral dimension of
urban space was often embedded in the sur-
face of institutions of everyday mass culture.
The construction of cinemas, where they
were located, the stories about cinema, the
act of naming them, all contain residues of
the history of colonialism and the urban expe-
rience. The physical coherence of the cinema
theatre, its seeming reproducibility cross cul-
turally, masks the dynamic process whereby
this global edifice becomes localized, its
bricks and mortar invested with social mean-
ing as it is carefully placed and integrated into
the colonial and postcolonial urban topogra-
phy. ♦
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Rel i gi o us  St ruc ture s
R ON AL D A .  L U K E N S - B U L L
In the centre of Tebu Ireng, Indonesia’s most famous
Islamic boarding school, is a mosque-graveyard com-
plex which includes the grave of Hashim Ashari, the
founder of Tebu Ireng who is remembered and
revered as both a Sufi master and an Indonesian na-
tional hero. Around this physical and spiritual cen-
tre, a number of new spaces (schools, a telecommuni-
cations office, computer labs, and banks) have
emerged. It is argued here that the very landscape of
Tebu Ireng spatializes the kinds of relationships that
the school’s leaders argue that Muslims should have
with the State, secular science, and the global market
place. 
In East Java, the sacred geography of a pe-
santren (Islamic boarding school) serves as a
model for how faith and modernity should be
ordered in the lives of Indonesian Muslims.
Pesantren Tebu Ireng has been for many In-
donesian traditionalist Muslims a model for
how to engage modernization through edu-
cation. In addition to being a popular board-
ing school for students from throughout In-
donesia, it is also a popular pilgrimage desti-
nation (over 2000 pilgrims each month). As an
institution that has undergone a transforma-
tion from being a traditional centre of Islamic
learning, famous for training ulama, to a reli -
gious boarding school primarily for junior
high and high school students, Tebu Ireng’s
landscape reflects a tension between main-
taining tradition and modernizing.
A balanced centre
The mosque and the m a h k a m ( g r a v e y a r d )
at the centre of Tebu Ireng form the most
sacred space. The landscape proudly pro-
claims that both normative piety (as exem-
plified by the mosque) and mysticism (as ex-
emplified by the graveyard and the activi-
ties which take place there) must be part of
modern life and Indonesian statehood, and
it demands that they be placed firmly at the
centre. 
The Tebu Ireng mosque is of the distinctive
Javanese three-tiered pagoda roof style. The
three tiers are said to symbolize Sharia,
Tariqah, and Hakikat (Law, Mysticism, and
Truth). At the entrance to this mosque stands
a large drum (beduq) used to call the faithful
to prayer. Local lore holds that when Hashim
Ashari built this mosque he said that, as long
as it stood, students (santri) would find knowl-
edge and baraka (blessing/power) at Tebu
Ireng. Because of the special nature of the
mosque, some people have been antagonis-
tic towards the building of additional mos-
ques for the pesantren’s use.
In addition to communal worship, the
mosque is used for the teaching of classical Is-
lamic texts (ngaji) including those of al-Ghaz-
ali. Besides regular lessons on these texts,
some of the leaders hold special sessions dur-
ing school breaks and the Ramadan. These
special sessions are open to pilgrims and reg-
ular students alike and start after salat Isyak ,
the last prayers of the day, and continue for
several hours, sometimes until midnight. 
To the west of the mosque is the graveyard
of Hashim Ashari and his family members. Sa-
cred geography places this graveyard be-
tween the believers and Mecca when they
pray. Because the dead are buried facing to-
ward Mecca, the placement of the graveyard
suggests that the great
kyai (ulama) buried there
are still leading the com-
munity in prayer. In Java,
this pattern is rare for most
pesantren leaders, but is
common for great saints
including the Walisonggo
(the legendary nine saints
who brought Islam to
Java). The graveyard is an
important source of baraka
as it can linger in the body
and is transmitted to the
area around the tomb. Pil-
grims will take a copy of
the Qur’an that has been at
the graves, absorbing
baraka, and leave a re-
placement copy. 
The mosque-graveyard
complex forms the physi-
cal and symbolic centre of
the p e s a n t r e n. This com-
plex is, then, representa-
tive of traditional Java-
nese Islamic piety. It re-
flects three dimensions of
piety: S h a r i a h, scholarship,
and mysticism. It clearly
demonstrates that these
three dimensions must be
balanced; that one cannot
exist without the other.
The leaders of Tebu Ireng
reject the idea that that it
is possible to transcend
Shariah by mystical prac-
tice and therefore no
longer be required to up-
hold it. They also reject the claim that Sufism
must be abandoned in order for Muslims to
modernize. Finally, classical scholarship must
continue to be an integral part of Muslim in-
tellectual life.
Secular, modern space
All of Tebu Ireng proper is wakaf ( l a n d
dedicated to religious purposes). By incor-
porating profane spaces within the sacred
complex, the landscape of Tebu Ireng is de-
claring what the relationship should be be-
tween Islam and modernity. With Islam as
central, Muslims may engage in all aspects
of modernity including education, medi-
cine, banking, and marketing. At Tebu Ireng,
these activities are located in spaces within
the orbit of the p e s a n t r e n, depicting that
such secular activities are acceptable when
kept within the range of balanced Islamic
practice. Surrounding the mosque-grave-
yard complex on three sides are student
dormitories where students sleep, study for
school, receive some n g a j i lessons, and
study for n g a j i. Southeast of the mosque are
the library and the fully computerized p e-
s a n t r e n office. The library at Tebu Ireng sub-
scribes to a wide range of magazines and
newspapers, which the students are encour-
aged to read in order to develop a broad
worldview. This is in sharp contrast to tradi-
tional p e s a n t r e n , which forbid any outside
reading material. The library is well used
and includes an historical archive that holds
the k i t a b and journals of Hashim Ashari (in
Arabic) as well as copies of every research
project conducted on Tebu Ireng. Another
reflection of this greater openness to out-
side material is a television in an open-air
courtyard which students are allowed to
watch on Thursday nights after t a h l i l a n
(prayers for the dead) at the graves. Just in-
side the gate are interest-charging banks.
These banks serve a number of functions in-
cluding wire transfers and savings and loans
for students, faculty, and neighbours. The
presence of interest-charging banks inside a
p e s a n t r e n is a controversial move toward
what some consider the dangerous side of
m o d e r n i t y .
To the west of the main complex are the
compounds for the ‘secular’ junior high and
high schools called Sekolah Mengenah Per-
t a m a (SMP; First Middle School) and Sekolah
Mengenah Atas (SMA; Upper Middle School),
respectively. Outside the high school, a large
sign proudly boasts that the school has biol-
ogy, mathematics, and computer laborato-
ries. Further west is the Madrasah Aliyah
compound and the campus of Institut
KeAgaman Hashim Ashari (IKAHA), which
was originally established as Universitas
Hashim Ashari (UNHASY) in the 1970s. 
Tebu Ireng’s involvement in state projects
is partially demonstrated by its educational
evolution. Next to the schools is a helicopter
landing area, said to be used for visiting
government dignitaries. The presence of
such a facility, whether regularly used or
not, makes a statement about the relation-
ship between the u m m a t (Islamic communi-
ty) and the government, as does its place-
ment at the edge of the complex. Good rela-
tions with the government are critical but
not central.
Between the schools and the mosque-
graveyard complex is the general kitchen. By
May 1995, all students ate here, a change that
reflects aspects of modernity. In traditional
pesantren, students cooked for themselves, or
in cooperative groups; this was seen as part of
the training in kemandirian (self-sufficiency).
However, since students are no longer cook-
ing for themselves, this part of the traditional
training in kemandirian has been lost. More-
over, since general education has reduced
the amount of time for religious education,
Tebu Ireng and many other pesantren have
sought to regain this time by preparing food
for the students. 
Across the road from the north gate is a
new losmen (small simple inn). Although the
building and the land are owned by Yusuf
Hashim’s daughter, the establishment is
staffed by Tebu Ireng santri. This five-room
inn is designed for those visitors to the pon-
dok who want a more quiet and comfortable
environment than the crowded free gue-
strooms in the pesantren. The inn reflects a
change in pesantren clientele. Many who stay
there are fairly wealthy parents from Jakarta,
Surabaya, and other urban centres. It also re-
flects a trend in which the family of kyai run
businesses that cater to the needs of santri
and their parents. However, detractors argue
that any such support services should be run
by the pesantren’s neighbours, thus con-
tributing to the economic development of
the village. 
This brief treatment of the sacred geogra-
phy of Tebu Ireng, a p e s a n t r e n in East Java,
has shown how a summary of the landscape
provides a model for reality. The pilgrim en-
ters the p e s a n t r e n, all of which is w a k a f, and
immediately sees a bank, a telecommunica-
tions office, and a library. He proceeds past
student housing to the mosque-graveyard
complex and performs a number of rituals
there. As he leaves, he passes through the
back gate and encounters government cur-
ricula schools and a helicopter-landing pad
for government visitors. As he moves through
this landscape, he sees a model for how a
Muslim should live in the modern world. This
model requires traditional piety and mysti-
cism, as an important part of Islamic practice
that includes both religious and non-reli-
gious scholarship, and good relationships
with the existing government, even if it is
non-Muslim. ♦
Ronald A. Lukens-Bull, PhD, is assistant professor
o f Anthropology, Department of Sociology,
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Grounds of Tebu Ireng
1. Mosque
1b. Graveyard
2. Student Affairs Office
3. The kyai’s house
4. Small store and Bank Rakyat Indonesia
5. Overnight guest room
6. Security office
7. Staff dining room
8. Stage (with TV)
9. MAK dormitory
10. General bathing room






17. Junior high school







25. Pesantren office and library
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Ur ba n Tr a nsfo r ma ti o n
D AR W I S  K H U DO R I
Muslim societies are confronted with the problem of
conciliation between ‘permanence’ as taught by reli-
gious tradition and ‘changes’ as imposed by modern-
ization. One facet of modernization of the Muslim
world is habitat. This term encompasses all human
creations and starts from the fundamental need to
inhabit. This latter is manifest at various levels, rang-
ing from house to city. 
The city of Ismailia, founded in 1862 and
managed by the Suez Canal Company until
it was nationalized in 1956, was appropriat-
ed and managed afterwards by the Egyptian
Government up to the present day. The fol-
lowing will look at how the Egyptians (un-
derstood as: Orientals, Arabs, Muslims, Tra-
ditionals) appropriate and develop a habitat
conceived and formed by the French (un-
derstood as: Occidentals, Europeans, Chris-
tians, Moderns).
The problematic of modernization
The modernization of the Muslim world is
problematic, because it is provoked, at least
it was at the beginning, by an external force:
modernity of the West. In the Arab World,
the signs of this issue seem to be more obvi-
ous when compared to the non-Arab Mus-
lim world. This may be explained by the for-
mer having made its civilization sacred dur-
ing many centuries to such extent that all
the elements of this civilization (systems of
politics, economy, society, space) seem to
be derived from a sacred law, namely ‘Islam-
ic’. At least in theory, all the elements of civ-
ilization coming from outside which might
enter into the sacred space of Islamic civi-
lization (dar al-islam) have first to be exam-
ined. If found to be suitable, they become Is-
lamized, or at least subordinate to the sa-
cred law of Islam; otherwise the penetration
of the foreign elements would be consid-
ered as a violation/profanation/seculariza-
tion of the sacred space of Islam. The prob-
lem is that the rigour of examination is not
always homogenous in time and space (it
depends on the existing political regime,
the role of u l e m a, Islamic thought, etc.) and
the elements to be examined are not always
simple (political models, technical projects,
economic enterprises, etc.). Moreover, there
are elements which enter by force (e.g.
Bonaparte’s expedition in Egypt and the
French occupation of Algeria) or by charm
(e.g. that of Ferdinand de Lesseps and the
attractive image of a civilized Europe). In
this way, the guardians of the sacred space
(such as the Vice-Roy Mohammed Said and
the Khedive Ismail in the case of Egypt) have
proven unable to resist.
The case of Ismailia can be seen in light of
the choices made in response to moderniza-
tion. The city of Ismailia is a ‘modern’ work,
designed by the engineers of l’Ecole Poly-
technique or l’Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées
educated in the rising spirit of rationalism,
positivism and functionalism at the begin-
ning of 19t h century. There is no mythical,
symbolic or religious reference in its design.
The city was considered as an object of de-
sign whose form was shaped according to
geometric rules. The habitat was conceived
according to scientific and hygienic consid-
erations – although certain aspects of de-
sign escape the conceptual reasoning of the
designers, such as the choice of the geo-
metrical form of layout and the architectural
language of buildings. Moreover, behind
that spatial concept, there were utopian
ideas of Modern Man and Society (inspired
by the Enlightenment, the French Revolu-
tion, Saint-Simonism, and 19th century
Utopians), for example: é g a l i t é in the spatial
layout of the different quarters and the
rights to different cultural expression; l i b e r t é
in religion; and f r a t e r n i t é in such domains as
those related to social work, including
schools, hospitals, and religious buildings.
The reaction of the Arab society of Ismailia
to that modernity is particularly notewor-
t h y .
I s l a m i z a t i o n
Modernization, as carried out by the im-
portation of elements of foreign civilization,
was felt as a threat, or at least a disturbance,
to the Islamic unity of community (u m m a)
and territory (dar al-islam). Although this
was tempered for a long time by Western
presence, it was expressed for the first time
(in the case of Ismailia) in the epoch of
Nasserism. It is under Nasser that the Egypt-
ian Government constructed the first state
mosque of Ismailia (called Al-Ismacily) in the
northern part of the city. But it was under
Sadat, and subsequently Mubarak, that the
signs of Islamization became more obvious.
The number of mosques increased rapidly
and continuously, the most outstanding of
which is the newest state mosque, under
construction since the end of the 1980s. It
stands exactly in the middle of the old city
centre, which was previously dominated by
a Catholic church founded by the Suez Canal
Company. The size, position and name of
this mosque merit attention. It is gigantic,
with twin towers whose height surpasses
that of the church. It is located beside Midan
Jumhuriyya (previously Place Champollion),
the previous living centre of Europeans. It
carries the name Abu Bakr As-Siddiq (the
first caliph successor of the Prophet Mo-
hammed). 
These points show the distinctive spirit of
the epoch of Sadat-Mubarak, as compared
to its preceding epoch. While the epoch of
Nasserism is characterized by ‘Arabism’ (the
name of the mosque refers to the ancestor
of the Arabs) and ‘secularity’ (by maintain-
ing the European character of urban centre),
the epoch of Sadat-Mubarak is character-
ized by ‘fundamentalism’ (the name of the
mosque refers to the fundamental epoch of
Islamic history) and ‘Islamity’ (by Islamizing
the European character of the urban cen-
t r e ) .
S e c u l a r i z a t i o n
Modernization provokes, however, not
only ‘Islamization’, but also at the same
time, ‘secularization’. Until 1930, for exam-
ple, the construction of Arab houses in Is-
mailia still expressed more or less the tradi-
tional way of life of Arab society in accor-
dance with religious tradition. The spatial
organization shows a clear separation be-
tween the family space and that of visitors
(exactly the same case as in s a l a m l i k a n d
h a r a m l i k in traditional ‘Cairene’ houses in-
fluenced by the Ottoman tradition). There
are always two doors: one leads to the s a l o n
(borrowed French term used in Arabic, re-
ferring to a normal living room) for visitors,
the other leads to the s a l a or f a s a h a (a kind
of central hall) which distributes the flow
into the corridor and rooms belonging to
family members. The s a l o n is completely
separated from the rest of the house; visi-
tors have no view into the house. An inter-
esting phenomenon in terms of formal lan-
guage is at hand. The rich Arabs of Ismailia
constructed houses in the same style as cer-
tain Europeans (Greeks, Italians, and French).
This is mostly evident in their façades, char-
acterized by a wooden balcony, supported
by columns standing on the sidewalk, and
protected by an inclined roof covered with
ceramic tiles. But there is a clear difference.
While the balcony of European houses is
open, that of the Arabs is covered with
m u s h a r a b i y y a, the famous dense wooden
grill enabling inhabitants to see outside
without being seen (see photo 1). Today,
and mainly since the epoch of Nasserism, all
those traditional rules are broken. There is
no longer any clear separation between the
space for visitors and the space for family.
The s a l o n no longer forms an autonomous
space. Rather it is integrated into the house,
enabling visitors to communicate, or to see,
at least, the other parts of the house. The
house has only one door, through which
both visitors and family members enter. In
terms of formal language, the balcony is still
there, but is not covered: the m u s h a r a b i y y a
has disappeared. From the balcony, one can
interact with a passer-by on the street (see
photo 2). In other words, in constructing
houses, people do not refer anymore, or
perhaps never have, to the orthodox teach-
ings of Islam. They separate housing culture
from religious tradition. This implies secu-
larization, at least in the field of habitat. ♦
2. Popular
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Southe ast  As i a
J OS E P H  E R R I N G T O N
Social, political, and economic turmoil now make it
easy to forget that just two years ago Indonesia
stood out amongst ethno-linguistically plural na-
tions for its successful nationalist and developmen-
talist dynamic. And as recently as the mid-1990s, I n-
donesian modernization seemed to be unimpeded
by religious tension. 
L a n g u a g e ,
R e l i g i o n ,
a n d Identity 
in IndonesiaPresident Suharto and his New Order gov-ernment received international praise foreconomic progress among a diverse, p e a c e-
fully coexisting citizenry of Muslims, Bud-
dhists, Protestants, Catholics, and Hindus.
But over the last two years bloody civil un-
rest, mostly along ethno-religious lines, has
arisen out of conditions of economic r e c e s-
sion and political uncertainty. Some see par-
allels between this unravelling of Indone-
sia’s social fabric, and the strife in the Balka-
ns following the end of the Cold War. With
the demise of Suharto’s authoritarian state,
by this line of reasoning, ‘age-old’, ‘primor-
dial’ ethno-religious hatreds have been al-
l o w e d to emerge. But current events can
also be plausibly read as effects and even
continuations of the less praiseworthy as-
p e c t s of New Order rule.
Fear and violence which now feed each
other in many parts of Indonesia have clear
antecedents in the massacres of hundreds
o f thousands which occurred in the dark
days of 1965, and which underwrote the le-
gitimacy and style of New Order rule. Some
o f the most vicious clashes are now occur-
ring in areas where state transmigration and
development programmes have created
c o m m u n a l conflict across lines of ethno-re-
ligious difference; some ethnic r e s e n t m e n t s
which have fuelled riot, murder, and rape,
date from the colonial era, and were in turn
exploited rather than effaced under New
Order rule. 
If there is more than one diagnosis of the
current trouble, there is likewise more than
one way to think about possible Indone-
s i a n futures. Here I consider the future of
ethno-religious pluralism in Indonesia with
an eye to the unobvious but constitutive
r o l e of languages in the Indonesian national
project. This may seem a distanced way of
addressing the kinds of atrocities which c o n-
tinue to be committed with impunity.
Nonetheless, language is integral to the
nexus of religious and national identity,
w h i c h will continue to be crucial for any
brighter, less bloody Indonesian future. Re-
lying heavily but not exclusively on my
o w n experiences in Central Java, I sketch
the linguistic grounds of ethnicity, national-
ism and religion in Indonesia with special a t-
tention to the ambiguities of identity which
l i n g u i s t i c pluralism has allowed.
From its inception in 1965, the New Order
government operated and legitimized itself
through a far-reaching, top-down pro-
gramme of national development (in In-
donesian, p e m b a n g u n a n n a s i o n a l) . C r u c i a l
here are just two dimensions of this vast en-
terprise: the establishment of Indonesian
(b a h a s aI n d o n e s i a) as the national l a n g u a g e ,
and of monotheism as the common at-
tribute of state-sanctioned religious identi-
ties. 
Indonesian language in the
Indonesian nation-state
Before independence, the language now
called Indonesian counted as an artificial
language for administration in the Dutch
E a s t Indies, a non-native variety of Malay
which was spoken natively in several other
dialects by a few million subjects in
t h e colonies. But since 1965, knowledge and
use of Indonesian across Indonesian territo-
ry has exploded. At a 1990 conference,
t h e Indonesian Minister of Education and
Culture asserted, not implausibly, that 83
percent of citizens over the age of five k n e w
Indonesian, and that by 2010, all Indone-
sians would speak the national language. So
Indonesian is a national language s p o k e n
natively by relatively few Indonesians. Most
know it as a second language lacking pri-
mordial links to a distinct group of n a t i v e
speakers. This paucity of native speakers
m a k e s Indonesian less a non-native lan-
guage – that is, a language native to some
‘other’ group in the country – than an un-
native language, that is, devoid of ante-his-
torical roots in some ethnic, religious, or ter-
ritorial identity. 
The New Order also zealously promoted
Indonesian-ness through the five principles
(the Panca Sila) which count together as
a summary ideology of official Indonesian
nationalism. Most relevant here is the first
principle, which establishes monotheism as
both a condition of citizenship and a para-
meter for religious tolerance. In effect, it rec-
onciles national unity with religious plural-
ism through an obligation that citizens a c-
knowledge one of five authorized, (puta-
tively) monotheistic religions: Islam, Protes-
tant and Catholic Christianity, Hinduism(!),
and Buddhism. In fact, the vast majority
o f Indonesians – 90 percent of the popula-
tion, or more than 180 million – count as
Muslims at least for official statistical p u r-
poses. Current ethno-religious strife is
throwing into relief the longstanding dis-
crepancy between Muslims’ demographic
d o m i n a n c e in the populace on one hand,
and Islam’s official coequality with four reli-
gions of far fewer adherents on the other. As
a result, there have been ambiguous, some-
times conflicted understandings of the
rights and obligations of Indonesians as
members of an Islamic community (u m a t)
and citizens of a secular nation-state (n e-
g a r a). Here I am concerned with the instru-
mental and symbolic roles which languages
have played in these vexed political and cul-
t u r a l arenas. Indonesian, I suggest, has
helped foster official religious tolerance by
assimilating religious doxa and practice, v i a
religious language, to the institutions of the
State. This is a double development that I
sketch here with an eye to Islam, but also to
the peculiarly Indonesian version of Hin-
duism which has highly Sanskritized Old Ja-
vanese as its vehicle. 
Language and religious
c o m m u n i t y
In his influential account of the rise of na-
tionalism, I m a g i n e d C o m m u n i t i e s, Benedict
Anderson suggests that secular/national l a n-
guages (like Indonesian) contrast in impor-
tant ways with sacred/esoteric languages of
religious discourse (like Classical Arabic or
Old Javanese). He links the rise of national-
ism to the spread of secular literacy in na-
tional languages. These differ crucially from
what he calls ‘Truth languages’, which are
v e h i c l e s of sacred texts and discourse, im-
bued with religious truth, and t r a n s m i t t e d
through restricted literacy. The ascendance
o f standard national languages, Anderson
argues, makes all languages c o m p a r a b l e
and intertranslatable, including those which
a r e privileged as vehicles of sacred dis-
course and transcendent t r u t h s . I n d o n e s i a n ,
as one such national language, can be con-
sidered in this regard with an eye to Islamic
reform movements, which have become in-
creasingly salient in current Indonesian pol-
i t i c s . Under the New Order, groups like
Muhammadiyah were restricted in their ac-
tivism to efforts to purify Islam of local syn-
c r e t i s m s and heterodoxies, and did so
through educational systems which p r o v i d e
direct, knowledgeable access to the Koran.
T h i s scripturalist movement has made
Islam’s Truth language focal, but taught it in
a modern educational framework through
Indonesian. The national language, as the
medium of instruction, thus takes on a si-
multaneously privileged and symbiotic role
i n relation to Arabic and the Islamic project.
If Indonesian’s un-native, non-ethnic origins
enhances its status over and against a m u l t i-
plicity of local, ethnic languages, it also
gains value as a ‘neutral’ linguistic mediator
of religiously based knowledge.
A similar but more striking instance of this
c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y between national and reli-
gious identities involves marginal h i g h l a n d
Javanese communities, where peasants re-
sponded to government requirements that
they acknowledge an authorized religion by
collectively espousing Hinduism. Though
a s s o c i a t e d primarily with Bali, Hinduism on
that island is universally recognized to have
its antecedents in pre-colonial Java. The
State actively supported these rural Hindu
communities by making Hindu texts and
doxa required subjects of study in local
s c h o o l s . Because they are taught in Indone-
sian, the national language becomes the
means of access to standardized, public ver-
sions of formerly esoteric, sacred Old Ja-
vanese texts. The paradoxical result is that
the national language mediates between
t h e s e villagers and the ancestors they imag-
ine to have been the original practitioners
of Hinduism in Java, and original users
o f the sacred Old Javanese Truth language.
Their assertion of a distinctly local religious
identity is thus bracketed or muted by t h e
intervention of an un-native, national medi-
um of religious i n s t r u c t i o n . The broad point,
then, is that the Indonesian language
helped to mute political and cultural ten-
sions under the New Order that arose from
the condition of religious pluralism and re-
q u i r e m e n t s of national unity. When Indone-
sian’s role as mediator between religious af-
filiation and national identity is foreground-
ed, it becomes easier to gauge that lan-
guage’s enduring salience for the national
project. Indonesian survives as an infra-
structural means to reduce or elide felt dif-
f e r e n c e s between religious and nationalist
modes of community.
Speculation on multiple political and cul-
tural saliences of language might lack clear
relevance to ongoing, deadly conflict; but i t
might help to envision a polity in which a
national language facilitates not just reli-
gious diversity but a civil society, and t h e
sort of public sphere which the New Order
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y suppressed. As other New
Order successes come to seem hollow and
illusory, Indonesian’s enduring viability may
o b t r u d e if it subserves an Indonesian ver-
sion of public citizenship, and a public dis-
course in which the demands of faith and
country are neither completely divorced,
nor entirely congruent. Perhaps I n d o n e s i a n
will be among the New Order’s best and
most lasting legacies: a medium for public
discourse within and across lines of political
and religious difference, a national mode
o f discourse never supported by an authori-
tarian state which successfully fostered a ve-
hicle for it. ♦
Joseph Errington, Department of Anthropology,
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NU vis-à-vis Negara, Pencarian Bentuk, Makna, dan
Isi was published by the LKiS, in Yogyakarta, and is
an updated translation of Andrée Feillard’s book
Islam et Armée dans l’Indonésie Contemporaine
(L’Harmattan, Paris, 1995).
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So uthea st As i a
A N D R É E  FE I L L A R D
Andrée Feillard toured Java last March to give lec-
tures in four cities for the launching of her book on
the Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia’s largest traditional-
ist Muslim organization. She also visited several
u l a m a, politicians, and student groups in East Java.
She gives here a short account of her journey in the
troubled province where 254 people were mysteri-
ously murdered from September to November 1998.
At the time of her trip, interreligious and interethnic
violence was high in Ambon. 
Pre-election Visit
to East Java’s
U l a m a
Wednesday, 3 March 1999
My first visit outside Surabaya is to see Kiai
Hasyim Muzadi in Malang, a likely successor
to Abdurrahman Wahid, alias Gus Dur, the
Nahdlatul Ulama chief, to be replaced at the
next NU congress in November. In the hall of
the brand new, sparkling white p e s a n t r e n, I
wait for the recitation of the soft Sufi w i r i d
t o be finished. Sitting on a bright green car-
pet, surrounded by a dozen teachers and
s a n t r i s, the 56-year old Kiai Hasyim holds a
t a s b i h in his right hand, ready for the tough-
est questions. He is a popular, humorous
local MP (1972-1983; 1986-1987) and now
also a respected k i a i with an innovative
touch (he opened a p e s a n t r e n for the stu-
dents of general universities in 1991). Kiai
Hasyim is a no-nonsense man: ‘Formalist
Islam’, he tells me, ‘has proven its incapacity
to rule the country.’ This rather direct judge-
ment of Habibie’s ten-month old regime
goes hand in hand with his concern about a
possible disintegration of Indonesia. But I
find his assessment of the violence in the
Moluccas reflects a rare equanimity: ‘Accord-
ing to our NU office in Ambon, there is a
Christian fear of Islamization. There is also the
economic factor and the political factor. The
Jakarta elite is playing around, people think
there is a scenario’. The Banyuwangi assassi-
nation campaign, which he compares to
Bosnia’s, was in his opinion a political cam-
paign in favour of the status quo, but which
produced the reverse effect: NU’s political
party, the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB),
which was at first terrorized, afterwards
gained more popularity. His confidence is
shattered more by money politics (in favour
of the PPP) than by NU’s small splinter par-
ties. Finally, he concludes, the 38 military
seats in the MPR will be the determining fac-
tor. But, whatever happens, Kiai Hasyim
seems convinced that ‘formalist Islam’ is
bound to be a big failure, a disintegrating
factor for the archipelagic nation. Like every-
one else I meet during this trip, he reacts
most coolly to the possibility of an alliance
with Amien Rais, a pluralist ‘for just two days’,
he notes ironically.
Gus Dur told me later in Jakarta that Hasyim
is indeed, so far, a favourite candidate to suc-
ceed him. Hasyim Muzadi may be more of an
organizer, and Gus Dur more of an intellectu-
al, but Hasyim seems to approve of Gus Dur’s
choice of ‘substance’ and ethics rather than
‘formalism’, and he smiles, visibly amused,
pointing out that Gus Dur is now being
dubbed a ‘krislam’ (an acronym for Christian
and Islam). 
Thursday morning
Prof. Tolhah Hassan, the rector of NU’s uni-
versity (UNISMA) receives me warmly. I find
him most concerned about the situation in
Ambon, which he feels is less a religious than
an ethnic problem. During a trip in East
Nusatenggara (NTT), east of Bali, he saw huge
discrepancies between the living standards of
‘settlers’ and the ‘original population’. There
the shops were owned by Buginese or Ja-
vanese, and locals had less access to universi-
ties. Eight years ago, he started a grant pro-
gramme for students to come and study in
Malang (there are now about 20 students in
town). Such sensibility about ethnic problems
linked to the transmigration programme is
new to me in Java. 
Downstairs, a number of students wait for
me. They speak of a regular weekly meeting
of political parties aimed at preventing ani-
mosity from degenerating into violence, a
bid to prove to the armed forces that ‘we are
ready for democracy’. On the way to the
Malang PMII (NU’s student organization)
headquarters, one student tells me of the in-
creased popularity of Shiism among some
students, synonymous with ‘free-thinking’
and the power to change things. At the
headquarters, many of the 40 or so PMII stu-
dents question the wisdom of creating the
PKB, which they fear will bring the NU back
to the ugly politicking of the 1970s. All but
two of them will vote PKB. They are mostly
proud of NU’s ‘progressive’ and no longer
want the NU to be called ‘traditionalist’,
which they deem unfair. ‘Progressive tradi-
tionalists’? They loudly agree, optimistic
that t h e y are the future of Indonesia, while
the ‘others’ are the partai setan (satanic par-
ties) ‘using Islamic symbols for political
gains’. 
Friday morning
Back in Surabaya, the PKB chief for East
Java, Choirul Anam, is busy and as placid as I
have always known him to be. His soft tone
hardly reveals his solid optimism about
PKB’s prospects: ‘We will score higher than
you would expect’, he tells me in confidence
of the PKB and the PDI, always linking the
two. But he too points to the crucial role of
the armed forces seats. On the Banyuwangi
massacres, Choirul comments: ‘One objec-
tive was to create disorder, so that the army
would step in to restore order, but it failed.
And now, it is Ambon’s turn.’
Friday evening
Some 30 km to the east of Surabaya, I
spend the night at Kiai Choiron’s p e s a n t r e n
in Bangil. Besides the many NU p e s a n t r e n,
there is a rare ‘reformist’ p e s a n t r e n of the
Persis (Persatuan Islam) and a p e s a n t r e n o f
Shiite reputation, the Yayasan Pesantren
Islam (YAPI). PAN’s Amien Rais recently visit-
ed the district, but his convoy was stopped
by protesting Muslim youths. It was Kiai
Choiron who opened the doors of his p e-
s a n t r e n for Amien, despite threats that his
school would be set on fire. ‘The majority
here votes for PKB’, explains Kiai Choiron,
‘whereas PAN will find voters in the Persis
and Shiite p e s a n t r e n.’ Sitting on a wooden
bench in the yard of the newly extended p e-
s a n t r e n, Kiai Choiron says there is practically
no PKB cooperation with PAN. I remember
that during my research in 1991, differences
between NU and Muhammadiyah were
minimized. This time, it is the reverse. 
Saturday morning
Kiai Choiron kindly lends me his car to
drive to Jember, some 200 km to the east in
Banyuwangi’s direction, where Kiai Muchith
Muzadi, the right hand of NU’s former r o i s
a a m, Kiai Achmad Siddiq, is waiting. I had
first visited Jember in 1988. All along the
road, red PDI flags alternate with PKB or PPP
green flags, while the yellow Golkar flag ap-
pears only once in a while. The thin 74-year
old k i a i who studied in the famous Kiai
Hasyim Asy’ari’s p e s a n t r e n from 1937 to
1942 is an ‘intellectual’ k i a i whose unasser-
tive ways hide a solid influence on the NU.
Kiai Muchith recalls the high points of 1998,
Gus Dur’s political choices, and the usual
role of the supernatural in NU’s decisions.
He calls Gus Dur a kiai moral, as compared to
‘normative’ k i a i s. He adds: ‘PAN is in the
process of adapting from the modernist
p o l a (way of thinking) to a pola like NU’s’, he
comments, ‘but Muhammadiyah still has
difficulties in rejecting sectarianism, and ac-
tually NU also has [such difficulties], but be-
cause of Gus Dur’s charisma, there is a
breakthrough in this direction.’ For four
hours, in his small noisy sitting room, Kiai
Muchith speaks in confidence. He has been
asked by local Protestant priests to distrib-
ute s e m b a k o (basic food items) in their
place, as some Muslim radicals see it as a
material incentive for conversions. But the
elderly yet dynamic k i a i preferred to have
the students’ organizations, including NU’s
PMII, do it: ‘I have to be careful’, he explains.
A constant advocate of tolerance, he rebuffs
the widespread fear of Java’s k r i s t i a n i s a s i. 
Sunday morning
Back in Bangil, I have a long conversation
on the phone with Ustad Zahir, the rising
teacher in the Shiite YAPI p e s a n t r e n, an ar-
ticulate young man, a passionate admirer of
Khomeini’s achievements. Like some other
Nahdlatul Ulama k i a i I have met, Kiai Cho-
iron is increasingly tolerant of Shiism. Walk-
ing through the large yard to the road, Kiai
Choiron mumbles that he does not regret
that the NU finally set up its own political
party: ‘With Golkar and PPP, we were always
the losers.’
My trip in East Java comes to an end. I
meet Choirul Anam again in Surabaya. He
tells me of his efforts to convince the small
Islamist party, Partai Keadilan, the party of
justice, to accept NU’s pluralist line. PK re-
cruits mostly among general university stu-
dents, and has Internet connections to the
Refah and Hamas. ‘I say to them that God
decided men should have different reli-
gions, so it is not for us to try and change
this, our duty on earth is to apply religious
values and ethics.’ ‘Do they accept your ar-
gument?’ I ask. In a tired voice, Choirul an-
swers: ‘It is difficult for them, the indoctrina-
tion is too strong over there.’
In just over five days, ten months after the
fall of Suharto, I have discovered an Islamic
community increasingly divided by politics,
but at the same time hopeful that change is
at the doorstep after 32 years of manoeu-
vring to protect the k i a i s and the p e s a n t r e n.
I have also seen the seeds of pluralism,
planted by Gus Dur a long, long time ago,
now burgeoning in the midst of inter-reli-
gious strife while one essential question
looms among u l a m a s and activists: Has God
decided whether Indonesia should remain
one single country? ♦
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Nearly one hundred years ago the Dutch scholar C.
Snouck Hurgronje, writing in the Netherlands Indies,
published his article ‘Islam and phonography’ in
which he described a contemporary interest in
recordings of suras of the Qur’an made available for
the phonograph.1 At the time, this innovation caused
both interest and debate among Muslim scholars as
to whether the use of this medium was Islamic, al-
though it soon became accepted. The phonograph
was later succeeded by the audiocassette. Now there
are many interactive products available for the com-
puter-literate Muslim – from various indexed and
hyper-linked Qur’ans accessible through the inter-
net, to CD-ROM packages designed for users who
wish to learn to recite the Qur’an at home. Perhaps
the most astounding aspect of the CD-ROM is its ca-
pacity to join the visual and aural experiences of the
Qur’an. Yet, like its bakelite predecessor, the CD-
ROM has evoked a modern debate over the applica-
tion of such technology and the Islamic qualifica-
tions of its creators.2
A Visit to Jakarta’s 
Bayt al-Qur’an
In Jakarta today, one is made aware of
modern technologies (i.e. aural and visual).
In terms of access to them, however, there
exists a dividing line between the wealthy
and the poor – in much the same way as the
elevated toll roads of Jakarta divide the elite
suburbs with their satellite dishes, from the
crowded slums and their minarets. In the
streets one often hears, as in most other
Muslim countries, recordings of the Qur’an
made by famous readers in one of the ap-
proved recitations. Bookshops popular with
the middle classes – like the ‘Gramedia’ and
‘Gunung Agung’ chains – regale their cus-
tomers with the latest in interactive soft-
ware replete with translations into Indone-
sian, hyper-linked suras and floating graph-
ics. Not all of these programmes are assem-
bled officially by the u l a m a, but are rather
the creations of software designers and en-
gineering students, some of whom are at-
tached to particular ideological schools. In
many ways these designers are repeating
the process of interpretation and presenta-
tion performed by individual calligraphers,
publishers and printers. Some are perhaps
unconsciously applying their own regional
or supra-regional Islamic imagery to the
margins of any given medium; for it is in the
margins of the Qur’an that a freedom to
decorate is granted, whilst the text itself re-
mains eternal and immutable. This is also
relevant for the internet where presentation
is often equated with accessibility. A well-
designed interactive product complete with
evocative images will always generate more
visual interest than a bare text.
Museum and presentation
It is this marginal experimentation that I
observed most recently whilst being shown
through another relatively recent aspect of
modernity in Indonesia: the Islamic muse-
um, or more particularly the Bayt al-Qur’an
of Jakarta’s Taman Mini.3 Here one walks, as
it were, from the margin of the Qur’an into
the margins of the Islamic world and on to
what some Muslims would find marginally
Islamic. I say this not to be glib, but rather to
raise some old questions. Can a cultural bias
be applied to the presentation of Islam and
in what sense is something Islamic? The
Bayt al-Qur’an raises both questions.
The visitor to the Bayt al-Qur’an is at first
struck by the new and spacious building at
the outskirts of Taman Mini. After passing
copies of the Qur’an displayed glass cases
and paying a modest fee, one enters the
first hall of the main exhibition. Here one
encounters various framed pages of the
m u s h a f (the text itself), each decorated in its
margins in a style intended to represent the
particular provincial culture of the artist.
Were all these pages to be compiled – and if
indeed there were enough – then perhaps
we would be confronted by a peculiarly In-
donesian Qur’an whose assembly mirrored
the national motto – ‘Unity in diversity’
(Bhineka tunggal ika). Yet this national unity
is, or perhaps was, underwritten by a politi-
cal ideology and not the majority faith of its
inhabitants. Until recently in Indonesia, the
various cultures were only allowed to ex-
press their differences in the supposedly
harmless margins of national culture: in art
and music. The political text of Pancasila4 r e-
mained immutable and untranslatable and
permeated every aspect of New Order In-
d o n e s i a .
The second hall of the Bayt al-Qur’an also
contains many images representative of a
pride in the historical Islamization of the
archipelago. If the first hall was concerned
with rendering the universal Indonesian,
then the second is about proving the histor-
ical credentials of that claim. There are thus
images and models of the court mosques of
Demak, Banten, Yogyakarta, and Solo, as
well as smaller s u r a u s (village mosques)
from the eastern archipelago. Clearly this is
not just a museum of texts as its name
would indicate. These are images of mos-
ques whose function is incontrovertibly a
part of Islamic practice and whose form
need not follow the established patterns of
the Islamic ‘centre’. Rather, the images free-
ly recall the ancient architectural styles of
the archipelago.
The third hall was for me the key to the en-
tire exhibit, displaying a collection of
Qur’ans and some of the core texts of the Is-
lamic sciences used throughout the Muslim
world – from exegeses to grammatical trea-
tises. Some are lithographed, others copied
by hand on European paper or locally-man-
ufactured bark paper. Few are dated. Here
the irrefutable beauty of the Arabic script is
on display and the undeniable calligraphic
unity of the u m m a is reinforced. In the back-
ground, yet another CD-ROM emits a recita-
tion that would incite a remarkably similar
reaction in Muslims throughout the world.
In this sense the third hall is not the pre-
serve of any one culture but displays the
universality of Islam as defined by its re-
vealed book and the sciences it has created.
What is Islamic here?
It is thus in the subsequent displays that
the coherence of the exhibition seems to
break down. Here are fabrics (batik and ikat)
and cultural artefacts – from ceremonial
daggers and Acehnese headstones to ob-
jects of everyday life. ‘What is particularly Is-
lamic here?’ the viewer might ask. Many of
the items on display could well have been
made or used by non-Muslims; but then
again so are many of the artefacts displayed
in Cairo’s museum of Islamic arts. What per-
haps matters here is that these objects rep-
resent for their users a totality of Islamic ex-
perience where daily life cannot be extract-
ed from faith. These objects are perhaps for
some Indonesian Muslims seen as a part of
their Islamic heritage, an impression that
would not be shared by, for instance, a Mo-
roccan or an Uzbek. 
But perhaps the strangest items on dis-
play in the fourth hall are two clay models of
the k a l a m a k a r a, a pre-Islamic hybrid crea-
ture which combines the attributes of a
horse, the g a r u d a ,5 and an elephant. In one
version, its prehensile trunk even grips a
Sivaite trident. This image also features in
the prelude to the display. In some respects
the foreign viewer is reminded of Buraq –
the magical beast said to have carried
Muhammad on his night journey: our guide
did indeed remark that this was the case.
However, she added that some visitors had
complained about the inclusion of such fig-
ures and also stated that there was no men-
tion of this journey in the Qur’an. Why
should such objects be displayed in the
home of the Qur’an? In their wisdom, the
curators have placed their Buraqs – even if
they were not intended to represent Buraq
– among the texts and images marshalled to
represent their imagined u m m a. ♦
Michael Laffan is a doctoral candidate at the School
of Asian Studies, University of Sydney and a tutor at
the Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National
University. E-mail: misr@coombs.anu.edu.au
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So uthea st As i a
I M T I Y A Z  Y U S U F
Thai Muslims and their co-religionists in Sri Lanka and
Burma provide three examples of Muslim minority
communities living in Theravada Buddhist majority
countries. Two main groups comprise the Thai Mus-
lim community: the ‘native Muslims’, or the Malays re-
siding in the southern provinces, and the ‘settled/nat-
uralized’ Muslims of different ethnic backgrounds re-
siding across the country – hence the ethnic, linguis-
tic, cultural and political variation within the Thai
Muslim community. The southern Muslims make up
the majority (approximately 700,000, or 80%) of the
total current Thai Muslim population (approximately
5-7 million). 
Aspects of Islam in 
Thailand Today
Islam is the second main religion in Thai-
land, with Muslims constituting the largest
religious minority. Thailand’s history of
Islam dates back to the Ayutthaya Dynasty
(1350-1767), when the country was still
known as Siam. The independent Malay
kingdoms to the south had not yet been in-
corporated. They were not to become part
of Thailand until 1902. Islam arrived from
various directions: the Malay-Indonesian
archipelago, Yemen (Hadhramawt), Persia,
India, Burma, China and Cambodia. 
The establishment of Islam in Malacca,
during the reign of Sultan Iskandar, led to
the spread of the early syncretic Islam in the
Southeast Asian archipelago, reaching Pat-
tani by 1387. The upper southern Thai
province of Songkhla marks the language
border between Malay and Thai-speaking
Muslims. There was minimal spreading of
Malay Islamic religiosity beyond Songkhla.
This was partly due to consolidation of the
‘orthodoxy of Singhalese (Theravada) Bud-
dhism, which had been introduced into the
Indo-chinese Peninsula by the Mons of
Burma and was disseminated further by the
T h a i ’1 already a century prior, following the
decline of Hindu-Sanskrit culture and Ma-
hayana Buddhism in the Menam and
Mekong basins. One may remark that the
encounter between Malay Islam and Thai
Buddhism was one of two religious ‘native
type’ orthodoxies founded on ethno-lin-
guistic distinctions.
The other arrivals of Islam into Thailand
were from various directions of the country,
made up mostly of immigrant Muslims of
different sectarian and ethnic backgrounds.
The central plains of the country comprise
Thai Muslims of Persian, Pakistani, Indone-
sian and Cham extraction. While those re-
siding in the northern provinces of Lam-
pang, Chiangmai and Chiang Rai are of Ben-
gali, Burmese and Yunnanese (Chinese) ori-
gin, having migrated to Thailand for eco-
nomic and political reasons (they were flee-
ing from religious persecution at the hands
of the communists in China and the nation-
alists in Burma.).2 There are also converts to
Islam either through marriage or religious
conversion. Most Thai Muslims are Sunnis,
yet there is also a small Shia community be-
longing to both the Imami and Bohras/
Mustali Ismailis sub-groups.
Apart from ethnic differences, there is also
linguistic diversity within the Thai Muslim
community. The majority of Muslims in the
south speak Malay, while those residing in
other parts of Thailand converse in Thai,
both at home and in public. They are no
longer familiar with the languages of their
a n c e s t o r s .
Islamic identity in Thailand
In Southeast Asia, religious identity is
often linked to ethnicity: Malays are Muslim;
Thais are Buddhist; and Chinese are either
Christian or syncretic Taoist/Buddhist. Al-
though ethno-religious constructs shape
identities, it can be said that in Thailand,
Muslims and Buddhists share nearly identi-
cal social manners, perspectives, formalities
and practices. They share the Southeast
Asian social demeanour and conventions of
moderation, compromise and mutual con-
sultation. Thai Muslims maintain, express
and symbolize their identity through reli-
gious institutions such as the mosque, p o n-
d o k or Madrasah and the office of the Chu-
l a r a t c h a m o n t r i /Shaikh al-Islam,3 as well as
through Islamic festivals celebrated at the
national level, including Maulid al-Nabi.
Islamic education in Thailand
Historically, the famous p o n d o k system of
Islamic education was instituted in Pattani
and is noted for its celebrated scholars such
as Ahmad bin Muhammad Zain al-Fatani
and Daud al-Fatani, who played a pivotal
role in the spread and development of Is-
lamic education in Southeast Asia. Their in-
tellectual influence has a left a lasting mark
on the development of Islamic scholarship.
Initially, the Thai state considered the edu-
cational programmes implemented by the
p o n d o k to be out-dated. Not recognizing
their moral-cultural relevance, the idea was
to streamline them along modern-secular
educational lines.4 Finally, upon Muslim
protest, the religio-moral aspects of this de-
mand for an integrated form of education as
a means of maintaining Muslim identity and
preparing the youth morally for modern
professional life were recognized. This led
to the setting up of Islamic Private Schools.
Contemporary Islamic education in Thai-
land is cultivated through both the p o n d o k,
which offers solely religious education, and
the combined educational programmes dis-
seminated by the Islamic Private Schools.
These latter are under the supervision of the
Ministry of Education. Both types of institu-
tions are manned by graduates of religious
seminaries and universities from Malay-In-
donesian Archipelago, al-Azhar in Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, India, Pakistan and
T u r k e y .
Thai Muslims on the political
s t a g e
The Thai Muslim minority participated in
the national political process during both its
democratic and non-democratic eras. This
engagement has earned Thai Muslims recog-
nition within the political system. Thai Mus-
lim politicians have represented different po-
litical parties in the various parliamentary
elections that have taken place in the coun-
try since its emergence as a constitutional
monarchy in 1932. This era also witnessed
the southern Muslim struggle against the
policy of ‘Thai-ization’.
Thai Muslim politicians representing Mus-
lim majority constituencies have long been
concerned about developmental problems
facing Muslims such as: educational amelio-
ration, economic progress, cultural-religious
freedom, and political recognition.
The political engagement of Thai Muslims
has also undergone transformation since
the recent rekindling of the democratic
process. Until 1988, Thai Muslim politicians
represented various constituencies on a
personal basis. But this is now changing.
The Democrat Party of Thailand, represent-
ing the middle class, has been the most
popular political party in southern Thailand
and has long been the main political voice
of Thai Muslims. However, several long-time
Thai Muslim politicians aligned with the De-
mocrat party have withdrawn, complaining
of the inadequate attention given by the
party to specific Muslim matters and of the
breaking of electoral promises. These disap-
pointments caused them to form in 1988 a
Thai Muslim political faction called the Wah-
dah (Unity), whose priority is to address de-
velopmental problems facing the Thai Mus-
lim community. It has been described as an
ethnic movement seeking to achieve the in-
terests of the Thai Muslims from within the
political system.5
The Wahdah sees itself as an independent
political group ready to support any politi-
cal party that promises to pay special atten-
tion to developmental issues and problems
facing Thai Muslims. Since its inception, it
has aligned itself with the New Aspiration
Party (NAP) or Kuam Wang Mai (Thai) also
known as Harappan Baru (Malay) estab-
lished in 1990. The Muslim members of the
parliament from the Wahdah have obtained
cabinet posts for the first time in the three
recently democratically elected coalition
governments since 1992. However, the po-
litical alignment of the Wahdah could
change in view of the implications that the
current economic crisis may have for the
next parliamentary election. 
Despite differing approaches according to
political party, the Thai Muslim members of
the Parliament and the Senate agree upon
the urgent need to address specific devel-
opmental matters such as the improvement
of the infra-structure and economic devel-
opment of the Muslim majority provinces
within the IMT-GT (Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand-Growth Triangle) programme. Other
important matters include facilitating travel
arrangements for Thai pilgrims to the Hajj,
obtaining legal permission for Thai Muslim
females to wear the h i j a b in public places
(which has been granted) and the establish-
ment of an Islamic bank as an alternative fi-
nancial institution. 
In the current Thai government led by the
Democrats, the Foreign Minister is Dr Surin
Pitsuwan, a prominent Thai Muslim member
of the Democrat Party. Mr Wan Muhammad
Nor Matta, member of the Wahdah and
deputy leader of the NAP currently in oppo-
sition, is serving as elected speaker of the
Thai parliament and is president of the Na-
tional Assembly. Muslim support for the
Wahdah faction is increasing in the south
and is gaining popularity among Thai Mus-
lims residing in other parts of the country.
The next elections will be a test of the polit-
ical popularity of the Democrat Party, the
NAP and other parties among the Thai Mus-
lims. 
Over the decades, the Thai Muslims and
Buddhists have come to understand and
recognize their ethnic and religio-cultural
identities. The enlightened of both commu-
nities have realized the need to move away
from rigidity and exclusivity. Yet there re-
main several development issues, in the
areas of education and economy of the
Muslim sector, to be addressed – both pub-
licly and privately. 
The inter-religious dynamic in Thailand re-
flects the need for dialogue and negotiation.
But most importantly, it reflects the ability
on the part of the political authorities to rec-
ognize the ethno-religious variety. ♦
The 300 years old Masjid Talok Manok
in Bacho district, Narathiwat, Thailand
A Surau ( Musalla / Prayer house) at
Natanjong, Yaring, Pattani district,
T h a i l a n d
An old Muslim house in Thailand
Masjid Saiburi, Pattani district,
T h a i l a n d
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A s i a
L I N D A  W AL DB R I D G E
Pakistan and Indonesia in terms of religious leader-
ship represent – in some respects – opposite situa-
tions. In both societies we find a significant ‘legalis-
tic’ vs. ‘Sufi’ divide, but the two forms of Islam are ex-
pressed and played out in different ways. Most im-
portantly, they have different relationships with
their governments that have produced drastically
different results. 
I n t e r - c o m m u n a l
Violence in Pakistan
and Indonesia
In January 1998, I attended a gathering of
Fulbrighters in Lahore – both Pakistani and
American. Just having returned from In-
donesia, where I had been teaching at a
government-run Islamic institute, I told the
others that I had been struck by how much
the government of Indonesia controlled re-
ligious matters. It set the curriculum for the
institutes, appointed faculty, and hired the
graduates to work in the bureaucracy as ex-
perts on Islamic matters. These graduates,
of course, would be expected to be mem-
bers of the ruling Golkar party. The govern-
ment did not permit people who had gone
through the centuries-old p e s a n t r e n e d u c a-
tional system to enter the government insti-
tutes unless they had gone to a government
school as well. The traditional p e s a n t r e n ( a
religious boarding school), which is a cross
between a dervish conventicle and an Indi-
an ashram – is a completely independent fa-
cility. It is run by a k i y a i, a Sufi-like figure
who holds his position through heredity as
well as through the recognition he receives
in society. These k i y a is were being heavily
pressured to conform to government poli-
cies and to be part of the Golkar party. 
When I finished my presentation, a Pak-
istani man in the room said that he wished
that the Pakistanis had someone trying to
control their religious leaders. He, with oth-
ers chiming in, said that Pakistan had just
the opposite problem: that the government
had no control over the m a u l a v i s and that
they were making a mess of the country.
They wished that the government could
rein them in, as they seem to have done in
I n d o n e s i a .
Not long after that meeting, violence
erupted in Indonesia. In Pakistan, inter-com-
munal violence continued to escalate. The
press regularly reported attacks by Sunnis
and Shi’a on one another’s mosques in the
Punjab. Indeed, I visited some of the
mosques that had been attacked. In the of-
fice of one, the filing cabinet was stocked
with guns and rifles, which were brought
out to protect the congregates gathered for
prayers. The Christian community of Pak-
istan also feels besieged as a result of death
sentences imposed on Christians accused of
blasphemy. While tensions between Mus-
lims and Christians have existed for deca-
des, these accusations and the violence as-
sociated with them are a phenomenon of
the late 1980s and 1990s. 
Why the violence?
While religious tensions are hardly the
only factor influencing riots and fighting in
Indonesia, religion certainly is of impor-
tance when assessing violence on the is-
lands of Java, Ambon, and Sumatra. In Java
and Ambon, clashes between Muslims and
Christians have taken many lives.
In Sumatra, the weakening of the regime
has unleashed decades-old resentments
over the issue of who defines and controls
Islam. 
In Karachi a Roman Catholic priest of Goan
descent told me, ‘[The province of] Sindh is
saturated with the culture of Sufism. Go be-
yond Karachi and you will find a lot of p i r s.
Sufis and p i r s have the highest regard for
the human being. They do not speak of the
supremacy of any religion, but they speak of
the unity of mankind.’ In his eyes and in the
eyes of so many other Pakistanis, including
the people listening to my presentation on
Indonesia in Lahore, it is not the p i r s or the
traditional religious leaders that are the
problem in society. Rather, it is the m a u l a v i s
who are causing the dissension, the clerics
who deliver Friday sermons and speak for
the narrowest of interpretations of Islam. Es-
sentially, the m a u l a v i s are fighting a proxy
war between Saudi Arabia and Iran – a war
that the Pakistani government does not dis-
c o u r a g e .
The situation in Pakistan
At an i m a m b a r g h a h in Lahore – a place
devoted to the remembrance of the Imam
Hussein – a man who had apprenticed him-
self to a dervish as a young boy, sat in the
midst of some of his devotees. Others
among his followers took me aside and told
me how the recently rebuilt i m a m b a r g h a h
had been destroyed by Sunnis a few years
ago. ‘It is the m a u l a v i s,’ they said. They ex-
plained that they were not singling out only
Sunni m a u l a v i s. They did not like any reli-
gious leaders who divided people and insti-
gated hatred.
In the city of Gujrat, the leader of the Shi’a
is not a man who studied at a m a d r a s a.
Rather, his father had been the Shi’ite head-
man of the area, and now the mantle of
leadership had fallen on his shoulders. He
too had little taste for m a u l a v i s and prided
himself on the peaceful relations that he
had helped to promote between Sunnis and
Shi’as of this town – though the two com-
munities lived in separate quarters.
In Pakistan, religious leaders of all vari-
eties function independently of the govern-
ment, though certainly the government is
very keen on having the support of Islamic
groups. Zia al-Haq, the military leader who
took over Pakistan in a coup in the 1980s,
tried to placate and thus control the leading
Islamic groups (principally the Jamaat-i Isla-
mi) by inaugurating laws that could be por-
trayed as being in keeping with the Shariah;
the h u d o o d (criminal) laws and the blasphe-
my laws being the most controversial. But
neither Zia nor the succeeding govern-
ments have been successful in completely
winning over the Islamic groups. While
Nawaz Sharif has made many overtures, the
Jamaat regularly protest his policies. Obvi-
ously, the government does not have a
great deal of say in the activities of the Is-
lamist groups, yet it will step on the rights of
minorities in order to try to placate even the
most radical organizations.
The situation in Indonesia
Indonesia presents a very different pic-
ture. I visited some of the p e s a n t r e n s, as I
was interested in observing the lives of the
students in these boarding schools. There
was enormous variety among the p e-
s a n t r e n s. Some did follow a government
curriculum with a full spectrum of courses,
while others maintained their traditional
role – a place where one memorizes the
Koran and the hadith and lives a life of
prayer. These are the places where the In-
donesian Sufi tradition is preserved. The in-
dependence of some of these boarding
schools from government control became
most obvious to me when I was visiting the
northern part of the island of Madura off the
coast of Java. On the birthday of the
Prophet, thousands of people – men in their
traditional sarongs and p e c c e s (the so-called
‘Sukarno hat’) and women covered in their
j i l b a b s – were making their way to the beach
where a huge sound system had been as-
sembled for speeches. In the villages nearby
were p e s a n t r e n s where serious young men
wandered about clutching hand-written
texts to their breasts. It was in places such as
these that resistance to Dutch colonial rule
had been organized and where further re-
sistance to tyranny could also be fostered.
Certainly I saw the potential for anti-govern-
ment activity much like that found in the
m a d r a s a s in Qom a generation ago. Of
course, the p e s a n t r e n s can also be leaders in
sectarian violence as their resentment to-
wards the government can be aimed at any-
one who seems favourable to it. Since it is
part of government policy to recognize and
protect the rights of five religious communi-
ties, the minorities tended to be subdued in
their criticism of the government.
On the other hand, those who were con-
sidered ‘the u l a m a ’ of Indonesia, the ones
who had completed their studies in reli-
gious law, etc., have posed no threat to the
government. In fact, in the face of the most
obvious corruption, these men have tended
to remain silent rather than be a voice of
protest. I spoke to a member of the Council
of Ulama, which is essentially a committee
that issues fatwas. It was the council’s job,
he said, to convey to the people the wishes
of the government rather than to advise the
government about the Islamic position on
an issue. One example is that of population
control. After initial resistance, the ulama
came around to the government’s thinking
and actively promoted birth control as a
sound Islamic idea. At this time of crisis,
most of these men may lack the prestige
necessary for constructive leadership. While
they might have received points for being
somewhat open-minded and tolerant of
peoples of other religions – at least those
that are legally recognized – they also have
not spoken out against the abuses of the
Suharto regime.
The two extremes
When the governments of Pakistan and
Indonesia have actively intervened in reli-
gious matters, they helped (whether inad-
vertently or not) to produce radicalism in
different sectors of their religious communi-
ties. While the Sufis of Pakistan continue to
have a more or less stabilizing effect on so-
ciety, the situation for their Indonesian
counterparts is more volatile. In both coun-
tries attempts have been made to co-opt
Islam for political purposes. While the In-
donesian government has successfully con-
trolled religious leadership, the government
of Pakistan, in failing to do so, has encour-
aged sectarianism. ♦
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community in Kosovo. After many years of
political unrest and ethnic tension, Serbs
have developed a strong sense of suspicion
– or even outright paranoia – of anyone who
appears not to be ‘one of them’.
The highpoint of the religious gathering
in Zoc̆ište was a circumambulatory proces-
sion three times around the church on the
morning of July 14, headed by priests and
flag-bearers carrying Serbian flags and a
banner with an image of the two patron
saints. During my visit, most Gypsies re-
mained to the side, clearly showing that the
whole event, in this particular place and
time, was to be primarily interpreted as a
demonstration of Serb presence in Kosovo –
amidst a ‘sea’ of Muslim Albanians. It was
part of a much wider ‘offensive’ by the Ser-
bian Orthodox Church to strengthen its
presence in Kosovo. It is not surprising that
during the war, which commenced in spring
1998, the monastery of Zoc̆i te became one
of its local arenas: on 21 July 1998, it was
taken by the Kosovo Liberation Army, the
This text has been drawn and adapted from
G e r Duijzings’s PhD thesis, Religion and the Politics
of Identity in Kosovo, University of Amsterdam,
M a y 1999; forthcoming, London: Hurst, 1999.
Dr Ger Duijzings is lecturer in Serbian and Croatian
Studies at the School of Slavonic and East European
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first Albanian attack on a Serbian Orthodox
monastery. According to Serbian sources,
the Albanians claimed the monastery as be-
longing originally to the Albanian Orthodox
Church. Seven monks and a nun, as well as a
few dozen Serb citizens who had taken shel-
ter in the monastery, were taken hostage.
Although they were later released, the
monastery remained under Albanian con-
trol for several weeks, until it was taken back
by Serbian forces. ♦
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So uth As ia
M A RC  G A B O R I E A U
There has been much speculation on the significance
of the Tablighi Jama’at, the workings of which re-
main secretive. The main controversy relates to its
stance on political matters. Since its foundation, it
has claimed to be completely aloof from politics.
However, doubts have been sporadically raised as to
the reality of this apolitical position, particularly in
Pakistan where some well-known members of the
movement were recently involved in the Afghan
problem and in internal politics.
Transnational Islamic
M o v e m e n t s :
Tablighi Jama’at
i n P o l i t i c s ?
Tablighi Jama’at, a transnational Muslim
proselytizing movement founded in India in
1927, has its headquarters in Nizamuddin, a
suburb of Delhi. From there it expanded
quietly all over the world from 1948 onward,
finally becoming conspicuous and influen-
tial by the end of the 1970s. It was founded
on six basic principles: the invitation (d a ’ w a,
or t a b l i g h) to Islam is not the affair of reli-
gious specialists, but the responsibility of all
Muslims who must devote their time and
money to it; one should not wait for people
to come to hear the preaching, but rather
preachers should travel to reach the people;
preaching is done by self-financing itinerant
groups; the mingling of all social classes is
obligatory within these groups; the primary
objective is to deepen the faith of those
who are already Muslims, proselytism to-
ward non-Muslims being marginal; and the
promotion of the unity of Muslims being a
primary objective, theological as well as po-
litical controversies are prohibited inside
the movement.
The secretive nature of the movement
makes it impossible to find direct evidence
of political strategies. There is nonetheless
an indirect means of doing so: reconsider-
ing its history, instead of focusing, as is usu-
ally done, on self-statements and on doctri-
nal literature, and trying to see if one can
read in this history indications of political in-
v o l v e m e n t .1 The historical literature con-
cerning Tablighi Jama’at is of two kinds, in-
ternal and external. From the founding of
the movement until 1965 – a time when the
movement was inconspicuous – the sources
are exclusively internal and consist in bio-
graphical (or rather hagiographical) litera-
ture in Urdu, mostly produced by an institu-
tion closely linked to the Tablighi Jama’at,
the Nadwatul-‘ulama. The literature is com-
prised of biographies of the founder,
Muhammad Ilyas Kandhalawi (1885-1944),
of his son and successor, Muhammad Yusuf
(1917-1965), and of their close associates,
particularly Muhammad Zakariyya (1898-
1982), who produced the edifying books
used in the movement under the collective
name The Teachings of Islam.2 For the period
after 1965, biographies are not available for
In’amul-Hasan, who ruled the movement
from 1965 to 1995. In’amul-Hasan died re-
cently and his biography has not yet come
out. However, the movement having be-
come by that time conspicuous, there are
external testimonies (unfortunately dis-
parate and not continuous) about its
spreading and workings. 
Origins and expansion
The first striking point of this history is
that the very foundation of the movement is
firmly rooted in politics. It emerged in the
decade of 1920-1930, which is crucial in In-
dian history: it witnessed a growing political
divergence of the Hindu and Muslim com-
munities, which ultimately led to the parti-
tion of the subcontinent between India and
Pakistan in 1947. This hostility was accom-
panied by fierce competition in proselytiz-
ing: Hindu revivalists of the Arya Samaj tried
to bring back Muslim descendants of con-
verts to their fold; and Muslims, in order to
win their backing and comfort the other
Muslims, created organizations for ‘preach-
ing’, a word which was rendered by the Ara-
bic term tabligh. All of these organizations
proved ephemeral, except the most recent-
ly created Tablighi Jama’at. One would be
tempted to say that it survived because it
was, unlike the others, apolitical. Upon clos-
er examination, however, politics always re-
mained in the background. It is not coinci-
dental that the only pamphlet that Muham-
mad IIyas ever wrote was addressed to the
politicians on the eve of partition. It would
therefore be more precise to say that – con-
trary to other Tabligh organizations – he
had a long-term political strategy which es-
chewed short-term political involvement,
and which ensured the durability of his
m o v e m e n t .
The world-wide expansion of the Tablighi
Jama’at was the main task of Muhammad
Ilyas’ son and successor, Muhammad Yusuf.
After the disturbances which followed the
Partition in 1947, he first consolidated the
movement all over the subcontinent. The
newly drawn border between India and Pak-
istan was ignored: as a transnational move-
ment, Tablighi Jama’at does not consider
borders to be significant. With this base
firmly established, Yusuf began to systemat-
ically extend his organization worldwide. He
established bridgeheads in the two areas
which he considered crucial for the world-
wide expansion of his movement (Arab
countries, from 1948 and Western countries
from 1950 onwards). Starting from 1956, he
established branches in the Afro-Asian
countries. Lately the movement has also
been active in China and Central Asia. In the
hagiography, this expansion is openly pre-
sented as a planned conquest of the world
in a wording and spirit reminiscent of the
medieval holy war or j i h a d: Tablighi Jama’at
is presented as a militant movement which
organizes people quasi militarily. It is able to
mobilize millions of people over the five
continents, as one can observe in the annu-
al meetings called i j t i m a’ or on special occa-
sions such as the funeral of In’amul Hasan in
Delhi in 1995. It evidently aims to build on
Muslim solidarity across borders, ignoring
the nation-states.
Tight organization
Tablighi Jama’at has a considerable hold
on those who enter its fold. It has remained
from the beginning very centralized: the
leadership has been jealously kept by the
lineage of the founder, with a Centre
( m a r k a z ) at Nizamuddin, from which author-
ity is delegated to chiefs (a m i r) in the coun-
tries, provinces, districts and towns. Local
leaders from all over the world come regu-
larly to the Centre for training. Members
who want to remain or even rise in the
movement must prove their commitment,
showing that they are not reluctant to
spend their own time and money for it. They
have to demonstrate the capacity to lead an
austere life according the model of the
Prophet and his Companions as described
in the edifying literature, which is circulated
and indefinitely commented upon at the
meetings. This hold on its members is so
complete that sociologist Felice Dasetto de-
scribed the movement as a ‘total institu-
tion’, and compared it to the ‘sects’ which
have multiplied in the contemporary world.
But to what end is this power? This is diffi-
cult to answer since the inner core of the
Tablighi Jama’at is not open to outsiders;
nor is it open to ordinary members who
have not risen in the hierarchy and pledged
their commitment. None of those having
reached this inner core have ever spoken.
Given its planned strategy of the conquest
of the world, which has been consistently
maintained, and the tight organization re-
maining in the hands of one lineage, it is dif-
ficult to believe that spiritual development
is the only aim. It would not be necessary to
keep such a tight grip on members if this
were the case. Given its secrecy, however,
its ultimate aim is difficult to discern.
Nonetheless, there are several indications,
especially in Pakistan and Bangladesh, that
Tablighi Jama’at is far from being indifferent
to politics. Prominent members have been
closely associated with the army and the in-
telligence service active in Afghanistan. The
president of Pakistan, Mohammad Rafiq
Tarar, is a Tablighi; he is believed to be the
main promoter of the new bill for the en-
forcement of the s h a r i ’ a. More generally, in
its origins and in its leadership, Tablighi Ja-
ma’at is closely linked with the Deobandi
school, which has always been highly politi-
cized and which currently backs the Taliban
movement in Afghanistan.
Although the final interpretation of the
significance of Tablighi Jama’at is not yet at
hand, scholars should not be too irenical
and manichaean, putting on one side purely
spiritual, peaceful and apolitical move-
ments (among which Tablighi Jama’at
would be the best example); and on the
other side the politically committed and
often violent Islamists which are represent-
ed, for example, in South Asia by the Ja-
ma’at-I Islami founded by Maududi (1903-
1 9 7 9 ) .
To my mind the dividing line is not be-
tween apolitical and political movements; it
is between two ways of conceiving politics.
On the one hand, with the Islamists, we
have a short-sighted conception of politics
in the framework of the nation-states, which
aims at conquering power by the shortest
route. On the other hand, with other schools
like the Tablighis and the Deobandis, there
is a far-sighted conception of politics. Going
beyond the narrow borders of nation-states,
they have not set fixed short-term ends.
Putting politics most often in parentheses,
they first build individuals and institutions,
which over time may exert a more lasting
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AB DU L  K A R I M  K H A N
In the current deafening criticism of Jewish, Christ-
ian, Hindu or Islamic fundamentalism and zealotry, it
is hard to believe that Islam can inspire its adherents
to social peace, democratic politics, economic jus-
tice, spiritual and secular education, protection
against domestic and communal violence, and a
broader humanitarian volunteerism. These were,
however, some of the cherished ideals by which the
Khudai Khidmatgars (Servants of God) lived.
The Servants of God 
in the North-West
Frontier Province of
British IndiaThe Khudai Khidmatgars were a PopulistParty of deeply religious Muslims amongthe Pukhtuns (Pathans) in the North-West
Frontier Province of British India (now in
Pakistan). The movement was founded in
1930 by Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1889-1986),
known among his people as the ‘pride of
the Afghans’, and as the ‘Frontier Gandhi’ in
India. They had sworn to rid themselves of
social ills and to serve humanity, irrespec-
tive of caste or creed at the local and nation-
al levels. Hence their name, ‘servants of
God.’ While the British colonial authorities
decried Abdul Ghaffar Khan as another trou-
ble-making Indian nationalist dreaming of
freedom, Mahatma Gandhi found in him a
paragon of non-violence and one who drew
his a h i m s a (non-violence) from the Holy
Q u r a n .1
Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a local khan, and his
close friends of different economic back-
grounds devoted their lives to the teaching
of Islamic social morality, Pukhtun national
unity, and humanitarian volunteerism. What
made the Khudai Khidmatgars unique
among the various Muslim movements in
the wider region were their chief hallmarks:
individual voluntary self-reformation; a life-
long commitment to serving humanity; re-
jection of violence, discrimination, sectari-
anism or polemical factionalism; protection
of non-Muslim minority rights; non-commu-
nalism and egalitarian political philosophy;
and the championing of women’s and chil-
dren’s rights. Detractors of the Khudai Khid-
matgars accused them of ‘un-Afghan’ be-
haviour, i.e. letting their women go outside
and take part in political activities.2
Jihad, for an individual member of the
movement, was waged against oneself; one
would thus strive to serve one’s parents,
spouse, children, relatives and neighbours.
New members were required to swear on
the Quran not to lie, gamble, beat their
wives or children, use drugs, quarrel with
neighbours, or carry guns. These simple ob-
jectives were the most difficult to achieve in
the Pukhtun culture, one of the most violent
in the region. What made people join the
movement so enthusiastically was the good
moral example set by the leaders, who unit-
ed people through the practice of Islamic
morality and turned them into ‘homo khid-
matiqus’ who would serve their fellow hu-
mans without seeking reward, and sacrifice
themselves for their comfort and safety.
Their motto was that the service of humani-
ty was the best worship of God. They suc-
ceeded in creating at the local level a cul-
ture of k h i d m a t - o - q u r b a n i (service and sacri-
fice) through two Quranic means: s a b r - o -
s a l a t h (patience and prayers). The Khudai
Khidmatgars summarized their mission in
the Quranic injunction of stopping evil and
spreading virtue.3
N o n - v i o l e n c e
Abdul Ghaffar Khan launched the Khudai
Khidmatgar movement primarily to unify
the Pukhtuns, whose Afghan tribalism had
maintained not only division but also great
tension. To him, their mutual violence was
their worst enemy – since more Pukhtuns
were killed by their own kinsmen than by
k a f i r s (infidels, British). A ‘non-violent
Pukhtun’ was simply an oxymoron. But the
Khudai Khidmatgars brought about a major
change when thousands of them swore not
to touch or carry any weapons of violence,
setting an example of what some critics
called extreme non-violence. In doing so,
some became open and easy targets for
their enemies and were murdered on ac-
count of previous unsettled scores. Their
seeking for and granting of forgiveness for
past feuds reflected their belief in God’s
love and His preference for forgiveness over
retribution as stated in the Quran. Abdul
Ghaffar Khan stressed the need of ending vi-
olence at home, in the family, and amongst
kinsmen and neighbours. According to Ma-
hatma Gandhi, non-violence with Abdul
Ghaffar Khan was not a policy but an article
of faith. ‘The more I see him the more I love
him’, wrote Gandhi to India’s viceroy Lord
Willingdon. ‘I know of the greatness of
Abdul Ghaffar Khan. He is a brave Pathan,
[…a] sincere and honest man and he walks
in the fear of God.’
Women’s rights
The Khudai Khidmatgars were Pukhtuns,
the major Afghan ethnic group living on
both sides of the Duran Line between
Afghanistan and present-day Pakistan.
Women’s rights were unheard of among the
Pukhtuns. But the Khudai Khidmatgars
placed women’s rights at the focal point of
their movement, which attracted female
writers and activists. They attempted to
raise awareness of the inferior status of
women in rural and tribal areas, where they
were sold into marriage, and deprived of
property and educational rights as imbed-
ded in Islamic law. The Khidmatgars began
by honouring women’s rights to education
and property at the level of domicile. Their
women’s rights agenda landed them in op-
position to the mullahs. The khans also op-
posed the Khudai Khidmatgars because the
latter championed peasants’ social and eco-
nomic rights as well. The hardest blow came
from the colonial authorities that saw the
movement as a threat to the British Empire
in this strategically important Frontier
Province – hence it was to be nipped in the
bud. Ultimately, however, their worst ene-
mies were the Pukhtuns’ own mass illiteracy
and ignorance that maintained their en-
slavement to social ills, such as generation-
long blood feuds and suppression of
women’s rights.4
Social reform
The Khudai Khidmatgars’ struggle for so-
cial reform, economic justice, communal
peace and brotherhood, and freedom from
colonialism, turned them into a national sal-
vation movement. Their steadfast and non-
violent braving of the worse kind of opposi-
tion of feudal lords, Muslim clergymen, and
British colonial authorities, further en-
deared them to the masses who voted them
twice into government. As the movement
turned massive in the early 1930s, the
provincial government started suppressing
the Khudai Khidmatgars, killing in the peri-
od of April-June 1930 approximately 100
and arresting more than one thousand peo-
ple in the settled districts. Tribal agencies
were bombed for the first time due to the
spreading of the movement into Afghan-
istan where it could become a problem for
the pro-British government of Nadir Shah.
Repression further popularized the Khudai
Khidmatgars, who now demanded more po-
litical reforms and liberating measures.5
In pursuit of their populist and non-com-
munalist agenda, the Khudai Khidmatgars’
provincial cabinets passed legislation that
abolished feudal privileges that the khans,
under the British patronage, had been en-
joying at the expense of the general popu-
lace. The legislation also relieved the social
and economic liabilities of peasants and
small landowners that had been suffering
under Muslim feudal lords and Hindu
usurers. Furthermore, it made office holders
accountable to the electorates and it de-
communalized such bodies through joint
electorates to promote mutual trust be-
tween Hindus and Muslims. The Khudai
Khidmatgars also opened up governmental
positions based on merit and competition.
This was done through a public service com-
mission, a practice that broke feudal mo-
nopoly over official bureaucracy.6 T h e i r
overall anti-feudalist agenda, combined
with their insistence on equality and dignity
for both Muslims and non-Muslims, placed
them in opposition to the Frontier Muslim
League. 
P a r t i t i o n
The Khudai Khidmatgars’ social pro-
gramme was halted by the worst Hindu-
Muslim communal massacres in mid-1947
that eventually led to the partition of India
on 14-15 August 1947. In that fateful sum-
mer of 1947, as retaliation against the Hindu
massacre of Muslims in India, Muslim gangs
attacked Hindus in the Frontier Province.
When the communal fighting intensified,
due to the British colonial authorities’ failure
to provide adequate safety, the Khidmat-
gars, with great risks to their own lives, pro-
tected thousands of Hindus in their villages.
Their dictum was that every majority must
protect its minorities. At the time of the par-
tition, the Khudai Khidmatgars, who held
the majority in the legislative body of the
Frontier Province, called for a separate state,
Pukhtunistan, in a province independent of
both India and Pakistan. They did not wish
to join either of the newly established
states. But the British imposed a referendum
upon them to join either India or Pakistan.
They rejected what they called an illogical
and unwanted offer, and boycotted the ref-
erendum, which eventually worked in
favour of Pakistan.7 On trumped-up charges
of anti-state activities, the Muslim League
rulers jailed many followers, often without
trial. The persecution forced Abdul Ghaffar
and other leaders underground or into exile.
Their struggle was then carried on by sever-
al political splinter parties in the Frontier
Province. Faced with martial law, this post-
partition generation did not flinch from re-
taliating in kind. Although the elderly Khu-
dai Khidmatgars condemned this, they sim-
ply could not control it. ♦
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Current histories of the Iranian Constitutional Revo-
lution (1905–1909) frequently begin with the basti-
nado of three Tehrani merchants, on 11 December
1905, upon the orders of Tehran’s governor. This in-
cident, we are told, led the two leading Tehran clerics
to stage a sit-in protest, demanding dismissal of the
governor and the premier, as well as calling for the
institution of a House of Justice. Some months later,
two men of religion were killed when government
soldiers attempted to break up a protesting crowd in
Tehran’s Friday Mosque. This set off a chain of events
that culminated in the issuance of the Constitutional
decree by Muzaffar al-Din Shah on 5 August 1906. By
telling a different story of these same revolutionary
years, I question how these particular events have
come to form Iranian collective memory of that revo-
lution, while others have been merely forgotten.
Writing History as if  
Women and Gender
M a t t e r e d
The story concerns young girls and
women who, in 1905, had been sold by
needy peasants to pay taxes in a bad har-
vest year. Others had been taken as booty in
a raid of a village settlement by Turkoman
tribes. Neither of these events was extraor-
dinary for its time and place. Yet, happening
as they did within the political context of in-
creasing agitation against the central gov-
ernment, they became woven into a much-
narrated tale of outrage and grievance.
They became a ‘story’, the Story of the
Daughters of Quchan. From their pulpits,
Muslim preachers lamented the fate of the
girls. Social Democratic militants used the
story as a tale of injustice of the rich and the
tyranny of rulers. 
The many retellings of this story within
the literature of grievances against the old
regime contributed to popular mobilization
against autocracy and in favour of a consti-
tutional regime. These recitations also pro-
vided much opportunity for the construc-
tion of a sense of ‘nation-ness’, of ‘Iranian-
ness’, through a shared sense of grief that
the teller and the audience, the writer and
the reader, would experience in the events’
repeated public remembrances. In these
performances, both the themes of the story
and its modes of performance were drawn
from the familiar Karbala’ narrative. While
the recitations, remembrances, and collec-
tive weeping over the tragic fate of Husayn
and his companions worked (and continues
to work) to produce a sense of shared reli-
gious tragedy that crafted a sense of a
Shi’ite community, recitations of the Story
of the Daughters of Quchan provided a text
for ‘national narration’, producing a sense of
belonging to a national Iranian community.
Not only in public display of grief over
common loss, but through the production
of a sense of national solidarity and power,
the story was effective in creating a sense of
national togetherness. As the Daughters of
Quchan became the daughters of the na-
tion, our daughters, daughters of Iran, ‘we,
Iranians’ became more meaningful.
The dissemination of this tale acted as
such a powerful focus of national imagina-
tion that shortly after the opening of the
new parliament in the fall of 1906, relatives
of some of the captive women demanded
that the parliament hear their grievances
and act to punish those responsible for the
crime. Upon the initiative of the Majlis (the
Iranian Parliament), the newly re-constitut-
ed Ministry of Justice formed a commission
of investigation and put a number of people
of high station on trial for their responsibili-
ty in what had become a truly national af-
fair. The investigations and the trial were
the first under the new regime. They thus
became constitutive of many of the new ju-
dicial institutions. The verdict issued by the
Minister of Justice was brought back to the
Majlis, setting off a new round of parliamen-
tary debates and power struggles. The in-
vestigations, the trial, and their subsequent
political repercussions provided the con-
testing terrain upon which some of the cen-
tral institutions and political concepts of the
constitutional regime took shape. 
How did a familiar tale of rural destitution
and the story of yet another Turkoman raid
become a uniquely outrageous story, travel-
ling not only the length and breadth of the
country at a crucial historical moment, but
also in between the many genres of revolu-
tionary literature? And how, through these
travels, did it contribute to the crafting of a
sense of ‘nation-ness’ among Iranians? How
did the fate of ordinary peasant girls and
women provide the scenario for contesta-
tion over the most critical political themes
of the revolution and the shaping of the
new constitutional order? I argue that in the
Constitutionalist discourse, acts of oppres-
sion or cruelty against women and children
were recited to produce condemnation of
autocratic rule. A power that oppressed the
most helpless and weak was immoral and
intolerable. It deserved to be overthrown.
Both in the narratives of grievances against
the autocracy, and in the rhetoric of mobi-
lization for a constitution, women were
cited as oppressed and dishonoured by the
vices of autocratic government. Men were
called upon to act against these vices, to rise
up against autocracy and form a constitu-
tional government, to establish the will of
the nation and to re-establish moral order.
In most such narratives, oppression and cru-
elty were linked with transgressions against
women’s sexual integrity (defined as men’s
honour). This linkage produced a multiple
sign that political, moral and social oppres-
sion had gone beyond the limits of toler-
ance and it was time for ‘great change’.
The Story of the Daughters of Quchan was
by far the most frequently cited narrative of
its kind. In this one tale, transgressions
across many politically explosive bound-
aries were transcribed into a remarkable
story, which included the class tension be-
tween peasants and aristocrats, the ethnic,
sociological, and sectarian boundaries be-
tween Turkish Sunni raiding tribes and Per-
sian Shi’i settled peasants. It also dealt with
the selling of young virgin girls (the sexual
honour of the family) to outsiders who were
said to have taken them across the Russian-
Iranian border (thus betraying national hon-
our) and sold them to Armenians of Ashkha-
bad (thereby transgressing religious hon-
our). Through its narration in a variety of
genres of revolutionary literature, this sin-
gle act was transcribed as signifying a multi-
plicity of national, moral, and religious loss.
Yet, in the later historiographies of the Con-
stitutional Revolution we are hard put to
find a trace of the Daughters of Quchan. In-
stead, the two other episodes mentioned
earlier are invariably cited as the events that
sparked the revolutionary upheavals. When
I first came across the story in primary
sources of the Constitutional period some
ten years ago, I was deeply puzzled by my
own unfamiliarity with it. I had only the
faintest recollection of having briefly en-
countered the story many years earlier in
my first reading of the history of that revolu-
tion by Ahmad Kasravi. Nor had I come
across the story in the more analytical polit-
ical histories written by such major histori-
ans as Firaydun Adamiyat. The other events,
however, were in every single history of
Iranian Constitutionalism. Like many Irani-
ans, I had come to remember them as the
originating events of the Constitutional
Revolution. A story that had magically
moved and captured me in 1989 was simply
not part of my cultural memory of that Rev-
olution. How was this to be understood?
Why were the Daughters of Quchan forgot-
ten? What does this massive erasure of their
story from Iranian national history tell us
about the political culture of modern Iran,
the constitution of the national memory,
and modernist historiography? 
Some events become subjects of history
because of how they constitute an impor-
tant part of national memory. Unlike such
events, the Story of the Daughters of Quchan
is marked as a ‘scene of forgetfulness’, a site
of national amnesia. But this amnesia could
not have resulted from a lack of the story’s
political and cultural significance for its con-
temporaries. Rather, it is the larger plot of
later histories that has marked it as too in-
significant to be included. Particular events
acquire significance through their conse-
quent effects and subsequent narration by
historians. In other words, it is the conse-
quent developments and the subsequent
historiography that deem certain events im-
portant, others trivial. The broad outline of
the narrative of the Constitutional Revolu-
tion has become fixed as a revolution made
possible by the alliance of progressive cler-
gy and bazaar merchants, united by their
common opposition to foreign cultural and
economic intrusions, and led by enlight-
ened intellectuals. Once this outline be-
came accepted as the frame story of Consti-
tutionalist historiography, those events that
could be memorialized as the symbolic rep-
resentations of that outline found an eternal
place in subsequent historiography. Re-
membering the punishment of merchants
and murder of men of religion as the events
that sparked off the Constitutional Revolu-
tion became the memorialization of the crit-
ical alliance of the clergy and bazaar mer-
chants. Without any place accorded to ei-
ther women or peasants in such a plot, how-
ever, there was hardly any reason for the
Daughters of Quchan to be remembered. In
other words, the urban-centredness and
male-centredness of the plot of this subse-
quent historiography, as well as the central
place allocated in it to the alliance of the
clergy and the bazaar, have crafted the par-
ticular opening of the narrative.
The act of remembering the Story of the
Daughters of Quchan then is a recuperative
effort: recuperation of women into the na-
tional narrative and of gender into histori-
ography. It is a proposition for writing a dif-
ferent kind of history of modern Iran that is
interested in many issues thus far consid-
ered unimportant, mundane and quotidian,
which are more often than not gendered
through and through. And their very gen-
dered-ness tells us a great deal about the
political culture of society. This is not simply
a desire for a more accurate history of the
Constitutional Revolution. More important-
ly, it is an attempt at reconfiguration of na-
tional memory, at producing a counter-
memory, counter to a cultural setting hos-
tile to a central presence of women in its im-
portant cultural texts and in its political
memory. ♦
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In comparison to other Ottoman Arab provinces, lit-
tle has been written on Ottoman Iraq, and still less on
Basra, historically Iraq’s main outlet to the sea. To
the vast majority of Arab historians, Basra only re-
tains its importance because of its dominant contri-
bution to the intellectual and religious debates of
early Islam. Its later development as a key trading
port for the Ottoman Empire is largely glossed over
by those scholars still riveted by the ‘golden age’ of
Islamic thought. And yet, Basra’s social, demograph-
ic and intellectual evolution in the 18t h and 19t h c e n-
turies largely set the pattern for the province’s inter-
action with Istanbul and the larger region through-
out the rest of the Ottoman period. 
Culture and Identity
i n the Work of 
an Historian of
Ottoman Basra
The socio-economic and cultural changes
that the province of Basra underwent in the
latter part of the Ottoman era were of such
enduring importance that they are now
seen as influencing the governing paradigm
used to explain the formation of present-
day Iraq. The transformed socio-political
cast of the population, the revival of sectari-
an movements over a decade and a half, the
politicization of frontiers and the diminu-
tion of regional affiliation are all elements
that figure in the historical development of
Iraq as a modern nation-state. And these
features were all central to the growth of
Basra’s societal make-up at the turn of the
2 0t h century. 
In the last quarter of the 18t h c e n t u r y ,
Basra was in sorry shape. Plagues, financial
mismanagement, reverses in trade and Per-
sian invasions had cut into its once thriving
economy and disrupted its role as a port of
transit between central Iraq, Iran, Syria, the
Gulf and India. However, even though the
export trade suffered, Basrawi merchants
retained a firm grip on the inland trade
amongst the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf
coast and the Indian subcontinent. Horses,
dates, grain, textiles and other finished
goods were circulated and bought and sold
throughout the region. As a result of this
networking, a number of influential mer-
chant families from Basra itself, as well as
from Najd (northern Arabia), al-Hasa (east-
ern Arabia), Kuwait and Muhammara
(south-west Iran) managed to hold on to
their strong links with Bombay, despite in-
creased British commercial competition.
This was to come to an end in the 1860s,
when the opening of the Suez Canal gave a
boost to exports from Iraq, Arabia and the
Gulf, and British shippers captured the vast
volume of regional trade. Both develop-
ments seriously affected the regional mer-
chant class and shook its foundations. 
The fall – and partial recovery – of the re-
gional economy (through the revitalized
land trade) mirrored the vast social and in-
tellectual changes occurring in Basra from
the latter part of the 18t h century. Two im-
portant developments were to have an en-
during influence on Basrawi society. One
was the increasing conversion of southern
tribesmen from Sunni to Shi’i tenets, largely
instigated by activist scholar-preachers
from Najaf and Karbala interested both in
defending the shrine cities from Wahhabi
fundamentalism and spreading the teach-
ings of the ‘righteous’ faith. The second was
the attempted revitalization of Sunni
schools and Sunni education under Sultanic
aegis, as Abdul-Hamid II gradually came
round to the view that the wayward
province of Iraq had to be reformed by
means of the more systematic inculcation of
Sunni precepts. To understand the implica-
tions of this evolution, it is important to re-
alize that Basra was composed of two
worlds: Basra the port, a bustling arena
where the inhabitants of the rural districts
mixed and conducted business with mer-
chants from all of the towns in the region;
and Basra the periphery, where the tribes
held sway and frequently came under the
influence of the two Shi’i shrine cities, Najaf
and Karbala. A growing scholarly literature,
both in Arabic and English, has detailed
these two intertwined developments (the
most important being the works of Abdul-




The most interesting aspect of the conver-
sion movement and the challenges that it
posed to the Ottoman authorities both in
Basra and in Istanbul is the way it was inter-
preted in the local histories of the period. By
far the most engaging version is that of
Shaykh Ibrahim al-Haydari, a contemporary
of the movement who wrote his history in
the latter part of the 19t h century. An ‘ortho-
dox’ Sunni scholar whose family had deep
roots in both the Hanafi and Shafi’i legal tra-
ditions, al-Haydari wrote a local history that
gave free rein to his Baghdadi-bred cyni-
cism, especially with regard to the move-
ment of conversion from Sunni to Shi’i prin-
ciples among the tribes of southern Iraq. Al-
Haydari’s chronicle is one of the most de-
tailed sources for this development; and
even while he uses disparaging terms to de-
scribe these mass conversions, he nonethe-
less records the names of tribes, the dates of
their religious-ideological shift and the ram-
ifications these changes had on the
province of Basra. 
Among the most important reactions that
this movement caused was the at times en-
ergetic, though somewhat uneven cam-
paign launched by Sultan Abdul-Hamid II to
build new schools, educate more Sunni
scholar-preachers and re-establish firmer
ties with Sunni notables in Basra province.
Al-Haydari’s book dovetails neatly with this
exercise. Throughout his history, he details
the decline of Basra’s glory and the growing
ignorance of its population due to the lack
of schools and, more importantly, the failure
of the Ottoman leadership to remedy the
situation. And he notes that the original
Basrawis were Sunnis but had lapsed into
Shi’ism because of the lack of official guid-
ance and concern. 
Part of al-Haydari’s problem must have
stemmed from the diminution of the posi-
tion of the intellectual class in Iraq as a
whole. The mid to latter part of the 19t h c e n-
tury is known to have been a period of in-
dignity for many scholarly families of Ot-
toman Iraq; their livelihoods came in for re-
newed inspection by the centralizing gover-
nors of Baghdad and Basra. Even al-Hay-
dari’s family itself was stripped of certain
hereditary posts in the u l e m a hierarchy. It
may be therefore be surmised that al-Hay-
dari’s book was also written as a barely dis-
guised appeal to the Ottoman Sultan to re-
voke decades of neglect of the Baghdadi in-
tellectual class, and to restore the Sunni reli-
gious aristocracy to favour once more. 
Ideology and Identity
Yet another anxiety in al-Haydari’s book,
and one intimately linked to the Shi’i prob-
lem, was the increased weakness of the Ot-
toman Empire in the face of its regional and
international foes. A staunch Ottomanist, al-
Haydari viewed with dismay the many Euro-
pean attempts throughout the 19t h c e n t u r y
to carve up the empire. He was especially in-
dignant with regard to creeping British an-
nexation in Bahrain and Yemen. This led him
to reassert a sometimes fictive Ottoman
sovereignty on districts that had been at
best a no-man’s land, such as Muhammara
(now south-west Iran) and its adjoining vil-
lages. In so doing, he traced the beginnings
of an idealized Iraqi identity, couching it in
an Ottoman context and lacing it with
strong Sunni overtones. Thus, at times he
completely disregarded the sovereignty of
districts that adjoined Basra, preferring to
regard them collectively as Ottoman territo-
ry, even though these same districts had
come under different jurisdiction. At the
same time, he used the term ‘al-Iraq’ on sev-
eral occasions to include these same areas,
awarded to Iran by international treaty. Al-
Haydari’s book is therefore one of the first
works of history in the period to affix an Ot-
toman-Iraqi-Sunni identity on what had his-
torically been a fluctuating frontier region.
Multi-tiered as it was, this identity perfectly
expressed the flexibility and practicality of
‘belonging’ and affiliation in what had been
for centuries a regional world. 
The permutations of identity aside, al-
Haydari’s work also redraws the configura-
tions of the regional commercial class in
Basra, showing that many of these long-dis-
tance merchants had homes (and business-
es) throughout the region and yearly plied
their occupations in areas as diverse as Najd
or Bombay. By the end of the 19t h c e n t u r y ,
however, this merchant class had lost the
war to European shipping concerns. Trade
was re-routed to British India and Europe by
means of British commercial firms (many
with ‘native’ agents in Baghdad and Basra)
and British ships. Al-Haydari’s book is there-
fore a bittersweet look at the regional mar-
ket in its heyday, when Kuwaiti horse deal-
ers fielded the best mares in the India trade
and Basrawi date merchants sold their prod-
uct at regional fairs. It explains the dynamics
of culture within the context of a constantly
changing economic picture. It portrays
socio-cultural ferment within a readily un-
derstandable context where intellectual
change is perceived as a reflection of eco-
nomic disruption, and the loss of one’s
livelihood correspondingly injects an ur-
gency into the reformulation of an individ-
ual’s worldview. ♦
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Most recent scholarly publications on and interests in
political Islam in Lebanon cover primarily Hizbullah,
the leading fundamentalist movement in Lebanon.
A number of smaller movements, in particular within
the Sunni community, have attracted less attention.
Like their Shi’ite counterparts, most of these groups
surfaced during the war years, in particular after the




The political landscape of Lebanon in the
late 1990s differs markedly from that of a
decade earlier. For instance, the new leader-
ship of Hizbullah were well able to prepare
the party for the new and difficult stage of
post-militia politics. Many positive steps have
been taken in terms of relations with the
Lebanese state, whose legitimacy the party
endorses. Hizbullah leaders now hold meet-
ings with various Lebanese political factions,
including bitter enemies of yesterday, like
the Phalangists and the Communists. They
have even met with representatives of the
Lebanese government and its army. This
would have been inconceivable until recent-
ly. Among the various Sunni fundamentalist
groups, support for the reconstruction of the
country and the State, too, has increased. But
due to their limited size and failing popular
support, some of these movements find diffi-
culty in participating in post-militia politics.
Al-Ahbash 
The Sunni political groups include al-Ah-
bash, Harakat al-Tawhid, and al-Jamaca al-Is -
lamiyya. Recently Al-Ahbash has begun to re-
ceive scholarly attention. The group, legally
known as Jamciyyat al-Masharic al-Khairiyya
al-Islamiyya (Association of Islamic Philan-
thropic Projects), is a small Sunni group of the
traditional fundamentalist thought. Its head-
quarters are in the area around the Burj Abi
Haydar mosque in Beirut. Al-Ahbash is spiritu-
ally headed by al-Shaykh cAbd Allah al-
Habashi, a former mufti from Ethiopia. The
group is involved with theological issues and
is anti-Shi‘ite and very secretive. For the last
few years, al-Ahbash has become very active
against Islamic fundamentalist movements in
Lebanon, and one of the presidents of the as-
sociation, Shaykh Nizar al-Halabi, was assassi-
nated in 1995 by a militant fundamentalist
group. The group seems to be supported by
Syria, which wants to further Syrian political
objectives in Lebanon. 
Al-Ahbash opposes the basic doctrines of
modern fundamentalist movements, which it
accuses of neglecting the Prophet’s tradi-
tions. It harshly criticizes other Islamic move-
ments and accuses their leaders, such as
Sayyid Qutb and Hasan al-Banna, of unbelief
(kufr). The group conceives itself as a moder-
ate Islamic movement that is concerned with
ethics. Its current president is Shaykh Husam
al-Din Qaraqira, a graduate of
an Islamic seminary in Syria.
Al-Ahbash’s activities became
more apparent when one of
its members was elected to
the Lebanese parliament in
1992. Al-Ahbash lost that seat
during the 1996 elections, and
the assassination of its leader
by the Islamic Band of Helpers
(cUsbat al-Ansar al-Islamiyya)
reduced its activities. The
group has an elaborate struc-
ture that includes schools,
centres, sports, and scouts. It
is unclear as to who the
sources of al-Ahbash funding
are, especially given its spend-
ing on activities in many parts
of the world. 
The Islamic Band of Helpers
was unknown until 1995
when it was condemned for
assassinating the head of al-
Ahbash, Nizar al-Halabi. Three
of the assailants were execut-
ed. The leader of the group,
the Palestinian Ahmad cAbd
al-Karim al-Sacdi (nicknamed
Abu Muhjan), is still free in one
of the Palestinian camps in
southern Lebanon. This group
is not active publicly; its mem-
bers live away from Lebanese
society. It is nonetheless ac-
tive in Palestinian camps. 
The group was founded by
Shaykh Hisham Sharidi in
1985 and was allied with
Palestinian organizations that
opposed Yasir Arafat. It set up
a training camp east of Sidon.
When Sharidi was killed in
1991, Abu Muhjan became
the a m i r (commander) of the
group. The group takes a very
strict position against those
who do not follow exactly the
s u n n a (way) of the Prophet. It believes that
all political systems are living the life of pa-
ganism (j a h i l i y y a). Al-Ahbash is targeted as
its foremost enemy because of its justifica-
tion of un-Islamic governments and of its
very strong opposition to Islamic fundamen-
talism. 
Harakat al-Tawhid al-Islami
Harakat al-Tawhid al-Islami is the most im-
portant radical Sunni movement in the north-
ern town of Tripoli. It was founded in 1982,
and its leader is Shaykh Sacid Shacban, a for-
mer member of al-Jamaca al-Islamiyya(Islam-
ic Group). He was able to assert his power
over the city in 1983 against Syria’s wishes.
Shacban, who comes from a lower-middle-
class family, has been successful in attracting
the classes of the poor in Tripoli. Shacban had
been a member of the pro-Saudi Muslim
Brotherhood before setting up his movement
in 1982. It was the outcome of unifying three
fundamentalist groups: Soldiers of God (Jun-
dullah), al-Muqawama al-Shacbiyya (Popular
Resistance), founded by Khalil cIkawi, and the
Movement for Arab Lebanon (Harakat Lub-
nan al-cArabi), founded by Dr cIsmat Murad.
However, the first two groups split from the
Islamic Unification Movement by the summer
of 1984, denying Shacban an important
power base. Al-Muqawama al-Shacbiyya
formed al-Lijan al-Islamiyya (Islamic Commit-
tees), and the Movement for Arab Lebanon
formed Lijan al-Masajid wa al-Ahya' (Commit-
tees for Mosques and Neighbourhoods). 
Shacban believed the civil war could end
only if sharica (Islamic Law) were applied in
Lebanon under an Islamic government. He
was very antagonistic of the communists,
who were subject to the deadly massacres of
his movement in Tripoli. The movement con-
trolled the city for a few years and imposed
strict Islamic laws on the people. But when
Syrian forces entered the city, the movement
was defeated. In recent years, Shacban has be-
come a close ally of Iran, and he has improved
his ties with Syria.
A l - J a m aca al-Islamiyya
The last Sunni group treated here is al-Ja-
maca al-Islamiyya. This fundamentalist group
was established in 1964 in Tripoli by young
members of cIbad al-Rahman (the Worship-
pers of the Merciful). According to one of its
leaders, cAbd Allah Babati, the split took place
because some younger members wanted to
be involved in politics. The movement was
led by the influential Sunni fundamentalist
thinker Fathi Yakan, Judge Faysal al-Mawlawi,
and writer Muhammad cAli al-Dinnawi. It
called for an Islamic society and state whose
bases were derived from sharica. This call led
to its advocating and using political violence
and radicalism, and to the establishment of its
own military wing in 1976. 
The group fought during the civil war on
the side of the leftist-Islamic coalition in
Tripoli. While it opposes secularism and com -
munism, it considers Islam to be the best so-
lution to the Lebanese crisis. Later on, howev-
er, some of its members, like Yakan and
Zuhayr cAbd al-Rahman al-cUbaydi, became
members of the secular, though confessional,
Lebanese Parliament. The group still calls for
the abolition of confessionalism. 
During the Israeli invasion of 1982, the
group launched military activities against the
Israelis. However it is not, for the time being,
trying to set up an Islamic state in Lebanon,
because it believes that the Islamic state
should be a natural outcome of a particular
environment, which Lebanon lacks because it
is composed of groups that have different re-
ligions and sects. Its participation in the elec-
toral process has reduced its original claims
and led to its moderation. ♦
A D V E R T I S E M E N T
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Y O U S S E F  C O U R B A G E
At all four corners of the earth: the Balkans (Kosovo,
Bosnia), Indonesia (Moluccas, East-Timor), Africa
(Sudan), as well as the Holy Land (Nazareth), Islam and
Christianity seem to be in a position of mutual rejec-
tion. Hence, the representation, which currently pre-
vails over Europe, of a perpetual conflict. However, this
vision maintained by events that indeed highlight reli -
gious conflicts, remains in a state of partiality and par-
tialness. We thus see Islam reigning undivided over the
societies south of the Mediterranean, all the while for-
getting that in the Arab world as well as in Turkey, reli-
gious uniformity – currently the norm – does not date
back to the beginning of time. Between the 7th century,
which witnessed the warriors of Islam leaving Arabia,
and the preceding century, the relationship between
the two religions was not just conflictual. On more than
one occasion and in more than one place Christianity
would come to know unexpected recoveries.1
C h r i s t i a n i t y
a n d I s l a m :
Demography in
t h e Middle East
In order to estimate the changes in the rela-
tionship between Christianity and Islam, it is
important to banish a priori the ideologies
and the explanations while having recourse
to guides as impartial as possible. In this re-
spect, demography is a particularly efficient
tool to gage the relative variations of the two
groups by means of five processes: 1) conver-
sion of individuals, families or entire groups,
2) massacres, which remained exceptional
until the early 20th century (Armenians in the
Ottoman Empire), 3) immigration and emi-
gration, by coercion or by free choice, differ-
entiated on the basis of religion, 4) inter-mar-
riage, between Muslim men and Christian
women, which leads to a second generation
of uniquely Muslim children, and 5) birth and
death rates of different magnitude leading to
diverging rhythms of growth amongst Chris-
tians and Muslims.
The existing data demonstrate that for
Islam to be durably installed in the Arab Ori-
ent, nine long centuries were to be necessary,
from the Hegira to the end of the Mameluks. It
is thus not an instantaneous religious muta-
tion as many imagine. The conquest of souls
was accelerated by the theological and na-
tional rivalries which undermined Christianity
from within. The status that Muslims reserved
for the People of the Book had demographic
effects in the opposite sense: it allowed for
Christian communities to perpetuate them-
selves, but stimulated conversions at the
same time. The Christian nucleus which sub-
sisted to the east of the Mediterranean re-
vealed itself incompressible, which was not
the case for the Maghreb, where the dynas-
ties threatened by the Christian reconquest
(Almoravides and Almohades) and spurred
on by the zeal of neophytes, drove the last
survivors of autochthonous Christianity to
conversion. 
The native Christianities were more than
once victim to East-West confrontation,
which overwhelmed them. The shock of the
Crusades naturally opposed Christianity and
Islam but it also placed face to face the Chris-
tians of the East and Christians of the West,
who had little in common. Intimidation and
humiliation imposed by the crusaders and
their Latin clergy quickly transformed the
mistrust into a rupture. This more than two
century-long intrusion of the West was to
have after effects, one of which being the
appearance of a fundamentalist Islam mis-
trustful of difference. It imposed itself on the
Christianity of the East, reducing it in terms
of population and spiritual influence. The
spirit of the Crusades did not vanish all of the
sudden. When, in 1830, Charles X sent his
troops to tackle the coasts of North Africa,
autochthonous Christianity had been gone
since several centuries prior. Reviving the
spirit of the Crusades, half a millennium after
the fall of Acre (1291) the monarch still re-
tained the objective of reconquest, for the
benefit of the ‘true’ religion, of the ancient
lands of Christianity. The failure of the colo-
nial venture was patently obvious in terms of
religion, but paradoxically, not at all for lan-
guage: nearly 40 years after independence,
the imprint of the French language contin-
ues to become more profound. 
Because they had conquered the Christian
Balkans before the East and the Arab
Maghreb, by means of frequent marriages
with Christian, Greek, or Armenian princess-
es and ordinary women, the Ottomans ar-
rived with much experience in inter-denom-
inational dialogue. The special treatment
they reserved for Christian minorities, no-
tably in permitting them to regroup them-
selves into nations (m i l l e t), gave rise to a re-
vival – which was as spectacular as it was un-
expected – of Christianity. The Ottomans,
contrary to the generally accepted notion
that was widespread since the creation of
the first nation-states in the Balkans (Greece,
Serbia) and followed by those of the nation-
al entities in the Middle East, sought to con-
trol – not to denature – the populations of
the immense empire they had built. For the
first time since the Byzantine Empire, Chris-
tianity of the East found itself again in an im-
mense area of trade. In Anatolia, the Ot-
tomans permitted the recomposition of a
territory where Christianity had paid the
price of a religious and political anarchy, vir-
tually having disappeared. On the contrary,
under the reign of the Ottomans, the pro-
portion of Christians in Turkey (within the
current borders) and in the northern Middle
East (Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Israel, Iraq)
was tripled: from less than 7% at the end of
the Mameluk or Seldjoukide epoch to 20-
21% before World War II. Istanbul counted as
many Christians as Muslims in its 1881 cen-
sus. On the other hand, further away from
the heart of the empire, Egypt did not take
part in the re-Christianization movement.
The reasons for this exceptional rise in
Eastern Christianity up to the beginning of
the 20t h century reside in the quasi-disap-
pearance of conversions to Islam (some-
times even acting in the opposite sense, as
did the Chebab emirs in the Lebanese
mountains). It also resides in the rarefaction
of mixed marriages, and immigration of
Christians encouraged by the Ottoman lead-
ers from the Balkans or even Western Europe
towards Arab or Turkish cities (Aleppo or Is-
tanbul, for example). Still more decisive was
the differential demographic growth which
worked in favour of the Christians: stronger
stability of marriage favouring greater pro-
creation, a phenomenon which seems to go
back far in time, for the 9t h-century writer Al
Jahiz had already noted that thanks to their
monogamy the Christians ‘filled the earth’.
In Lebanon and in Turkey, censuses attest
the superiority of the Christian birth rate. In
turn, the differences in mortality increased
the gap between the two religious groups,
the Christians being traditionally exempt
from military service, whose duration was re-
duced to 12 years of service only in 1812. The
hundreds of armed conflicts in Ottoman his-
tory accentuated an exceptionally high
death rate among Muslims, who were al-
ready vulnerable in times of peace. Epi-
demics, indeed, were far more lethal
amongst Muslims than Christians, due to dif-
ferences in the practices implemented to
deal with them. Lastly, the development of
training and modern medicine, both linked
to the institutions of the m i l l e t, would con-
tribute to the relatively early decrease in
mortality amongst Christians.
The end of the Ottoman Empire strongly
marks the end of Christianity in its Turkish
component and its decline or eclipse in its
Arab component. In the Ottoman Empire, or
more precisely, under the Young Turks and
then under the Kemalist Republic, nearly
3 million Christians were to pay the shock of
nationalisms and the birth of modern Turkey
with their lives or by their exile. There were
1.2 million Armenians in 1914 and only
7 7 thousand left in 1927; 1.5 million Greeks
before the 1914-1918 war, of which only 136
thousand were to survive in Istanbul and just
10 thousand in Anatolia 13 years later. In the
Arab world, on the other hand, it was not
massacres or exile but rather a differential
demography that was to mark the receding
numbers of Christians. The proportion of
Christians within the total population had
culminated around 1914 with 26% in the
whole of the Near East: 59% in Lebanon
(Greater Lebanon), 11% in Palestine, 10% in
Syria, 8% in Egypt and 2% in Iraq. Today,
Christians have fallen below 10% (9.2 % in
1995): 40% in Lebanon, 6.4% in Syria, 5.9% in
Egypt, 3.8% in Palestine (West Bank of Jor-
dan, East Jerusalem and Gaza), 2% in Israel,
1.5% in Iraq. This spectacular drop which
brings Christianity back to the pre-Ottoman
era owes nothing to conversions, which re-
main extremely rare, or to forced population
displacement, nor to massacres (apart from
such cases as the Nestorians and Chaldeans
in Iraq in 1933 and in Lebanon from 1975-
1990 where all the communities paid a com-
mon toll with human lives). It does perhaps
have a little to do with mixed marriages. The
international migrations, on the other hand,
contributed to a strong recomposition of the
population: long-distance emigration to-
wards America, Africa or Australia of Christ-
ian populations – more than that of Muslims.
From a regional point of view, the emigra-
tion of Christian Egyptians, Syrians, Palestini-
ans, and Iraqis to Lebanon, where Christians
were well represented, accelerated the re-
duction of their presence in the countries of
departure, all the while allowing Lebanon to
conserve an important Christian minority.
However, it was principally the trends in fer-
tility, reversed in disfavour of the Christians
at the eve of the 20t h century, which were
decisive in the decrease in Christianity. Hav-
ing entered earlier than the Muslims in the
process of demographic transition and hav-
ing opted for smaller families, the Christians
would paradoxically pay the price of this
early modernization process with a decrease
in their relative numbers: a phenomenon
which worsened over the generations.
Today, however, the differences in fertility
according to religion are fading. Muslims are
entering, just the same, into the current of
demographic transition. ♦
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Christianity of the East by Rite and Country (in thousands) 1995
C h u r c h E g y p t L e b a n o n S y r i a I r a q J o r d a n I s r a e l P a l e s t i n e T u r k e y A l l
countries
Copt (all rites) 3 2 3 8 . 9 1 . 9 0 . 0 1 . 8 1 . 2 0 . 8 2 . 8 0 . 0 3 2 9 8 . 0
Greek Orthodox 4 . 4 2 9 4 . 8 5 0 3 . 0 0 . 8 8 1 . 4 3 3 . 0 4 1 . 6 1 3 . 9 9 7 2 . 9
M a r o n i t e 2 . 5 4 9 0 . 9 2 8 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 3 0 . 3 0 . 0 5 2 9 . 0
Greek Catholic 4 . 7 2 5 5 . 2 1 1 1 . 8 0 . 7 2 2 . 1 4 3 . 9 4 . 4 0 . 0 4 4 2 . 8
Armenian Apostolic 7 . 6 1 9 6 . 4 1 1 1 . 8 2 5 . 0 3 . 5 1 . 3 2 . 9 6 8 . 3 4 1 6 . 8
Chaldean Catholic 0 . 5 4 . 9 6 . 7 3 9 0 . 3 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 6 . 8 4 0 9 . 2
J a c o b i t e 0 . 2 1 4 . 7 8 9 . 4 3 7 . 2 2 . 2 0 . 1 2 . 5 3 9 . 9 1 8 6 . 2
L a t i n 3 . 8 2 . 9 1 1 . 1 5 . 2 3 4 . 9 1 3 . 2 1 5 . 2 5 . 7 9 2 . 0
P r o t e s t a n t 2 0 . 9 2 0 . 2 2 0 . 1 5 . 8 4 . 4 4 . 5 4 . 8 5 . 2 8 5 . 9
Syrian Catholic 1 . 3 1 9 . 7 2 2 . 4 5 5 . 5 0 . 0 0 . 1 0 . 5 1 . 7 1 0 1 . 2
N e s t o r i a n 0 . 0 4 . 9 1 6 . 8 8 7 . 7 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 9 0 . 0 1 1 0 . 3
Armenian Catholic 0 . 6 1 9 . 7 2 4 . 6 5 . 5 0 . 4 0 . 1 0 . 3 5 . 1 5 6 . 3
Total Christian 3 3 3 6 . 4 1 3 2 6 . 2 9 4 5 . 7 6 1 5 . 5 1 5 0 . 1 1 0 4 . 3 7 6 . 2 1 4 6 . 6 6 7 0 0 . 6
Percentage in
p o p u l a t i o n 5 . 7 4 3 . 8 6 . 4 2 . 9 4 . 2 2 . 1 3 . 8 0 . 2 4 . 0
Source: Youssef Courbage and Philippe Fargues, Christians and Jews in Islam, London/New York, Tauris, 1997, p.209
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Northern Somali Orature, c. 1899-1980
( P o r t s m o u t h : Heinemann, forthcoming).
6 . S i t t a a t session led by Luula Saalih, recorded by
Muhammad cAbdillahi Rirash and cUmar Maca l l i n
for Radio and Television Djibouti in 1988. The song
texts, as are all texts quoted in this article, were
transcribed and translated by Lidwien Kapteijns
and Maryan cUmar Ali.
7 . S i t t a a t session led by Luula Saalih, Djibouti,
2 October 1989.
8 . This is an invocation often used in Sufi devotional
p r a c t i c e .
9 . S i t t a a t session led by cAsha Muhammad
( f r o m Hargeisa), Djibouti, 13 November 1989.
Ea st Af r i ca
L I D W I E N  K AP T E I J N S
When a Somali woman is about to give birth, older
women often arrange a ceremony to call blessings on
the mother-to-be, in which they sing s i t t a a t2 – s o n g s
of praise for the leading women of early Islam, espe-
cially Faduumo (Fatima), daughter of the Prophet.
Although there is no doubt that this genre of songs is
old – it may even have a relationship to non-Islamic
Oromo songs for the goddess of fertility – scholarly
references date back only to the late nineteenth cen-
tury and do not include song texts.3
Somali Women’s
Songs 
for the First Ladies
o f Early Islam 1There are three reasons why s i t t a a t d i dnot receive scholarly attention during the
colonial period (c. 1885–1960). Firstly, the
Orientalist paradigm in Islamic studies gave
preference to what were regarded as foun-
dational core texts from the ‘Islamic heart-
lands’, written, of course, in Arabic by men.
African women’s devotional oral poetry in
Somali, not Arabic, was marginal to this type
of Islamic studies. Secondly, it was part of
especially British colonial strategies towards
Islam to promote an Islamic elite (e.g.
judges) trained outside of Somaliland in Is-
lamic centres of learning that were solidly
under British rule, such as Cairo, Aden or
Khartoum. By insisting on ‘upgrading’ local
Islam, the colonizers undermined represen-
tatives of popular local Islam.4
Finally, irrespective of colonial
policies towards Islam, the
new educated elite in all the
Somalilands (French, British,
and Italian), even if undoubt-
edly Muslim, were deeply in-
fluenced by secular European culture and
European languages. While its nationalist
project included an articulation of the So-
mali pastoral tradition as cultural authentic-
i t y ,5 older women’s religious songs did not
fall within its purview. 
The group of s i t t a a t singers with whom I
became familiar in Djibouti in 1989, held
small weekly semi-private devotional ses-
sions in their leader’s home. They also per-
formed on special occasions, for example to
call upon the Sittaat (the first ladies of Islam)
to bless a woman about to give birth, or on
a much larger scale, to celebrate a religious
holiday (such as the Prophet’s birthday).
When s i t t a a t are sung, women sit in a circle
on mats on the ground, while the leader
beats a round, low and wide drum with a
stick. The atmosphere is festive as between
songs the women pass around herbal tea,
orange sherbet, coffee, popcorn (s a l o o l) and
Turkish delight (x a l w a d), as well as bottles of
perfume and incense burners. The singing
always begins with praise to God, the
Prophet, and the a w l i y a (those saintly indi-
viduals of Islamic history who continue to
inspire many Muslims today), including the
twelfth-century founder of the Qadiriyya,
cAbd al-Qadir al-Jilani.
Once the women begin to address the Sit-
taat, Xaawo (Eve), the ‘mother of the believ-
ers’, is the first to be praised. 
After Eve, the s i t t a a t address the Prophet’s
mother (Amina), foster-mother (Halima),
wives and daughters. It is with the songs for
Faduumo (Fatima) that the session reaches
it climax, for these are the songs that are be-
lieved to bring about the Prophet’s daugh-
ter’s actual presence in the women’s midst.
Some women get up and dance, at times
carrying incense burners with burning coal
on their heads; others are overwhelmed by
emotion and are lovingly covered with
shawls and sprayed with perfume by friends
trying to calm them.
In the s i t t a a t Somali women explicitly as-
sert the common bond and plight of wom-
anhood in two ways. First, the singers ad-
dress their common problems as wives,
mothers and providers in the urban slums of
underdeveloped and French-dominated
Djibouti. Second, as women, they appeal to
the women of early Islamic history, asserting
the values central to their own self-image,
those of good wife- and motherhood. They
praise Xaawo (Eve) as humanity’s first wife
and mother, Khadija as the Prophet’s loyal
and most beloved wife, and Faduumo (Fati-
ma) as the Prophet’s only daughter (as well




The values that the women singing the
s i t t a a t assert are mostly dominant values
that appear to reinforce the status quo.
They do not complain about difficult hus-
bands, but pray for help to get along with
them; they do not complain about unem-
ployed or disobedient children, but pray
that their children will not go astray. As I
watched the participants in these sessions
– middle-aged and older women, some
widows, others divorcees, many the moth-
ers of grown (often unemployed) children,
and almost all compelled to still provide
for themselves as well as others – one as-
pect struck me as an act of resistance to
their status quo. For these women, howev-
er old or run down by life, insist vocifer-
ously and explicitly on their own daugh-
terhood in relation to the Sittaat in heav-
en. Using metaphors such as ‘teaching a
child how to walk’, and being allowed to
hold onto their ‘mothers’ skirt hems’, they
ask their heavenly mothers for the love,
care and teaching daughters receive from
their mothers. By expecting and asking
that the Sittaat in heaven take care of
them in infinite and intimate detail in this
life, on the Day of Judgement, and in par-
adise, Somali women challenge in song
the harsh age and gender-based realities
of their daily lives. 
In Djibouti, Somali intellectuals and schol-
ars such as Muhammed cAbdillahi Rirash
and cUmar Macallin (who introduced me to
the s i t t a a t), have begun to reverse the colo-
nial marginalization of Islamic Somali ora-
ture and to record and preserve it as part of
the Somali cultural heritage. However, as
they undertook this project in the 1980s,
other middle-class men (merchants, shop-
keepers, teachers and civil servants) adopt-
ed a lifestyle of intensified Islamic piety and
looked upon Islamist movements further
East for guidance. While deeply critical of
any colonial or neo-colonial Western influ-
ences, the latter share with the erstwhile
Orientalists a focus upon a relative small
number of foundational Islamic texts. As
they have resolutely turned their backs on
local Somali expressions of Islamic devotion
and wisdom, they appear, for the moment
at least, to have contributed to the increas-
ing marginalization of Somali Islamic ora-
ture. ♦
God, we begin with God’s bissinka [the phrase ‘in the name of God,
the Merciful, the Compassionate’]
God, we begin with my heart loving you.
God, we begin with the blessing of Prophet Muhammad
God, through the merit of Faduumo, daughter of the Prophet,
w e seek succour.6
Madaad, madaad,8 Faduumo, daughter of the Prophet
Give us that for which we call upon you
Ecstasy has me in its grip, my body is burning
Madaad, madaad, Faduumo, daughter of the Prophet
Give us that for which we call upon you.9
That you take and welcome us, daughter of the Prophet, for that we clamour
That you come and teach us how to walk, daughter of the Prophet, for that we clamour. 
You child of the Prophet, most obedient of women, give us that for which we call upon you.
[ … . ]
Lady Faduumo, lead us with your light
Lady Faduumo, make us as you are
Lady Faduumo, give us your musk to smell
Lady Faduumo, spread your bed for us
Lady Faduumo, bring us in the presence of the good Muhammad
Lady Faduumo, help us climb your ladder
Lady Faduumo, spread your wrap as our bedding
Lady Faduumo, wrap us in your silk. [….]
Teach us how to walk, look upon us as your children
Merciful God, don’t keep Faduumo away from us
May she take us by the hand on the Day on which One is Sorrowful
Make us their [the Sittaat’s] companions, Compassionate God
May we all live in one home with their mothers and daughters
May we all eat together with the Sittaat and the Prophet’s family
May we come to live in paradise.
Before you, [the name] ‘mother’ did not exist
Before you, ‘mama’ did not exist
Before you, respected one, people did not say ‘mother’
to each other [ … ]
Mother, Eve, don’t sleep, spread a bed of silk for us
Mother, Eve, don’t sleep, weave your ropes for us.7
Lidwien Kapteijns is professor of History at Wellesley
College, USA. E-mail: lkapteijns@wellesley.edu
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East  Af ri c a
B E A T R I C E  N I C O L I N I
Near the coast of equatorial Africa, separated from
the continent by a canal some 50 kilometres long, is
the island of Zanzibar (U n g u j a). It is the largest of the
coral islands of the eastern coast of Africa and forms
part of a coral reef that extends from the near island
of Pemba (a l - k h u d r a, the green, or emerald island), to
the north, as far as the island of Mafia to the south. It
constitutes a type of extraneous coastline to the con-
tinent. The city of Zanzibar is situated to the west of
the island and its port, one of the best of Africa, al-
lows deep anchorage for the docking of the ships.
Zanzibar has always been strategically important
due to two fundamentally important points: its prox-
imity to the continent and the monsoons. The regular
recurrence of these latter allows continuous contacts
with India, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf; while
the closeness of Zanzibar to the coast places it in an
ideal position for commerce between the interior of
the African continent and the Indian Ocean. 
Religion and Trade 
in the Indian Ocean:
Zanzibar in the 1800s
Notwithstanding a marked heterogeneity
of its population – a polyethnic and a multi-
religious society – south-eastern Zanzibar is
inhabited principally by Bantu-speaking
people known as Hadimu (Wahadimu),
while the Tumbatu (Watumbatu) are found
in the northern part of the island. The
Wapemba tribe, however, inhabits the is-
land of Pemba. These groups are Sunni Mus-
lims of the Shafi’i school, despite strong
connections to animism (during times of
political and economic uncertainty witches,
sorcerers, and an aggressive dwarf with one
eye named Popobawa played a crucial role
in Zanzibar). Both the Hadimu and the Tum-
batu are dedicated to fishing, agriculture
and animal breeding, whilst the Hadimu
women are entirely responsible for the
manufacture of cord made from coconut
fibre in villages in the south of the island.
According to James de Vere Allen, the
spread of Islam in East Africa occurred
around circa AD 1050-1150.1 Islam undoubt-
edly made a tremendous impact upon the
people of Zanzibar. During the late 13t h- 1 4t h
centuries, due to an increasing number of
merchants, travellers and immigrants com-
ing from southern Yemen, from Hadramawt
and from other non-Shiite areas, a solid
Sunni-Shafi’i community emerged. 
The mercantile power of
Z a n z i b a r
At the beginning of the 1800s, the links
between the East African Coast and the Indi-
an Ocean opened up a great deal of com-
mercial contacts, which then flourished.
With this in mind, the hegemonic accession
of the Omani tribe of Al Bu Sacidi (Ibadhi) to
Zanzibar can be seen as highly symbolic.
During the 19t h century, the island of Zanz-
ibar represented one of the four terminals of
Oman-Arab mercantile powers of the Al Bu
S acidi tribe, together with the port of Maskat
in Oman, the ports of the Asiatic coastal
strip of Baluchistan, Makran, the mercantile
centres of the coast of West India and the
coasts of East Africa. There were clear power
connections among the Baluch of Makran,
the Arabs of Oman, the mercantile commu-
nities of West India and the Africans of Zanz-
ibar: the Omani were the political leaders,
the Baluch the military force, the Indians
were brokers, financiers, bankers and tax
collectors, and the Africans were slaves. The
Al Bu Sacidi and in particular their most glo-
rious exponent, Sacid bin Sultan Al Bu Saci d i
(1791–1856), proposed a division of power –
thanks also to their ethnic-religious superi-
ority, as one is Ibadhi only through birth and
not conversion. This division would not be
without conflict, although the Ibadhi sul-
tans were highly tolerant, and it has to be
remembered that the centrality of Islam, to-
gether with the power of magic and ritual of
the Zanzibar tribes, decreased since the
early 19t h century. Inevitably, the presence
of Omani governors (l i w a l i) with their
Baluch mercenaries, and of Indian mer-
chants was bitterly resented by the local
p o p u l a t i o n .
The Asiatic community of Baluch warriors
represented strength, the s h a w k a h. They
were Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi school
and, those coming from Makran, Zikris; as
they were famous for their tactics and
courage, the Arabs always considered the
Baluch more trustworthy than the Arab
mercenaries. Another essential and decisive
factor for the extraordinary development of
Zanzibar in the 1800s was the even more ac-
tive presence of the Indian mercantile com-
munities. The b a n y a n, considered by the
Arabs as m u s h r i k u n (polytheists), were ab-
sorbed into and protected by the institution
of a m a n (protection). The first Indian mer-
chants to trade in Maskat and in the Persian
Gulf were the Bhattia (from b h a t t i, s u b h a t t a,
Hindu warriors from the Vaishnavi caste),
originally from Rajahstan. Another group of
Bhattia was the Kutchi, also comprised of
Hindus who enjoyed great privileges in
Maskat and who were exempt from paying
taxes to the Arabs. Together with this group
of Hindu merchants were the K h o j a s (k h w a-
j a h s), Ismailites. They were described by ex-
plorers and English merchants of the 1800s
as being slight of figure, with a lighter com-
plexion than that of the Arabs, with long
moustaches, no beards and a Chinese pony-
tail at the base of their shaved heads. The
richness and elegance of their clothing, as
distinguished by silk tunics with long, or-
nate sleeves, was a sure sign that manual
work was foreign to them. Socially isolated
from the Arabs, they observed a strict en-
dogamy and were principally devoted to
boat construction. The Ismailite Indians
were numerically the largest group in East
Africa. Yet at the beginning of the 19t h c e n-
tury, it was the Hindu merchants who main-
tained and intensified an undisputed finan-
cial hegemony. Islam in Zanzibar was often
used as a political weapon, defining hierar-
chical differences and ethnic origins. But, it
should be stressed that profit, not power,
was what counted.2
Consequently, the Omani dynasty of Al Bu
S aci d i respected the Hindu merchants’ wide-
ranging connections in the western Indian
Ocean, which allowed them to enjoy the
functions of both mediators and lenders in
the various Indian mercantile communities
present in Zanzibar, and also to benefit from
their widespread presence within Swahili
society. It was this emergence of a political-
ly powerful elite, in contact with native pop-
ulation that gave rise to the commercial
splendour of Zanzibar. The lucrative trading
of the West Indian Coast constituted all
types of merchandise and spices, which in
most cases were valuable. 
Slavery in Zanzibar
The most important ‘product’ brought by
the Arabs in Africa, however, were slaves.
Bearing this in mind, the growth in the de-
mand for sugar cane from the Mascarene is-
lands and for ivory and cloves from East
Africa fired the continual demand for slaves
on the plantations (s h a m b a) in Zanzibar and
for manual labour for the transportation of
goods. This caused a widespread migration
of slaves from the interior of the African
continent towards the coasts and the is-
lands. Slavery did not only occur as a result
of direct capture, but also resulted from mis-
leading contracts between the tribes of the
interior – among others, the Yao and
Nyamwezi – and the slave merchants. Fur-
thermore, there were the recurring periods
of drought along the Mrima coast, opposite
the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. Slaves
that came from areas not influenced by the
Swahili culture were not Muslims (Islam was
the religion of all free Swahilis within the
Arab dominion); these slaves were the prop-
erty of their owners. They represented a
closed caste not yet absorbed into the
coastal population, either having been
transported in their childhood within the
borders of Zanzibar or born into slavery. The
most privileged were naturally the domestic
slaves. The demand for slaves came from
various quarters: from Arabia, foremost,
where the cultivation of dates demanded a
high influx of man labour at zero cost; from
India, where they were used on oases, on
sugar and tea plantations; from Central Asia,
where they started the practice of cotton
cultivation; from various areas of the Ot-
toman Empire; and from America. Another
‘speciality’ was the eunuch, especially ap-
preciated in the Ottoman Empire. The organ
mutilation was carried out in totally unhy-
gienic conditions, resulting in a survival rate
of one in ten of those eunuchs transported
from Africa.
Zanzibar, however, remained undisturbed,
almost non-existent to the Europeans, until
the French arrived at the close of the 18t h
century. The influence of the French in
Zanzibar was exerted through commercial
treaties and agreements with the Arabs pre-
sent on the island concerning trade in slaves
and African ivory – both flourishing and lu-
crative commodities. Very soon, however,
fascination for the blank spaces on the
world map, together with the archetype of
the ‘exotic island’ which Zanzibar represent-
ed (rich in spices, perfumes, luxuriant vege-
tation, with drinking water, fruit and good
money-making prospects through the com-
mercial trading of slaves, ivory and spices
and other commercial temptations) opened
the door to a new world scene. The centre of
this scene was to take the shape of Anglo-
French rivalry for strategic control and polit-
ical-commercial supremacy over the Indian
Ocean – a rivalry that developed from the
predominance of Great Britain, which virtu-
ally transformed the waters of the Indian
Ocean into an English lake. Britain’s impact
on Zanzibar during the 1800s undoubtedly
interfered with the social and religious com-
position of the island; its strategy was based
on commercial-political control of local
mechanisms of power, mainly through the
banning of slave trade. The power of Al Bu
S acidi in Zanzibar in the 1800s was in-
evitably destined to decline. ♦
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C entr al  Af r ic a
X A V I E R  L U F FI N
Today, mentioning Burundi evokes directly the con-
flicts which opposed Tutsis and Hutus in 1993 and
1995-6, just as in Rwanda. The Muslim community in
Burundi does not exceed two to five percent of the
population, but their history and their behaviour in
the last tragic conflicts between Hutus and Tutsis de-
serve to be analysed. 
Muslims in Burundi 
Discretion and
N e u t r a l i t y
Muslims in Burundi live mainly in cities
such as Gitega, Rumonge, Nyanza, Muyinga,
and Makamba. The largest Muslim commu-
nity lives in the capital, Bujumbura, espe-
cially in the neighbourhoods of Buyenzi,
Bwiza and the quartier asiatique ( o r i g i n a l l y
created for the Indian and Arab traders by
the colonial Belgian rulers), where the main
mosque is situated. The Islamic Cultural
Centre, built by the Libyan government
under the Bagaza presidency (1976-1987), is
also located there. 
The Muslims in Burundi have miscella-
neous origins. Besides a small number of
converts from among the ‘original’ Burundi-
ans – Hutus and Tutsis – an important Con-
golese population settled in Bujumbura,
which lies some kilometres away from the
border with Congo. The large Rwandan
community also includes numerous Mus-
lims. The W a r a b u – Kiswahili for ‘Arabs’ – are
Omani and Yemeni traders who have lived
in Burundi or in other neighbouring East
African countries since several generations.
Most of them have forgotten Arabic: they
speak Kiswahili and the national language
Kirundi, or even French. Other Arabs from
Sudan, Mauritania and Lebanon have come
more recently to trade in the capital. Muslim
B a h i n d i, a name given to the Indians and
Pakistanis, also settled in the country long
ago and are often confused with the
W a r a b u.
Besides those communities, West Africans
arrived in the country in the last decades.
Originally, they were traders coming from
Mali, Senegal and Ivory Coast, importing
clothes and fabrics or dealing with gold ex-
tracted from Congolese mines. Most of the
West African traders left the country when
conflict broke out in 1993, although some
still have small shops in the central market
or in Bwiza. 
Diverse Origins
Islam was introduced by Arab and Swahili
traders. Since the early 19t h century, cara-
vans coming from the Indian Ocean coast
penetrated as far as Ujiji (today in Tanzania),
on the bank of Tanganyika Lake looking for
ivory and later for slaves. Around 1850, they
created a colony at Uvira, on the Congolese
edge of the lake. Both cities became the
meeting points of the caravans and traders
– Arabs as well as Africans like Swahili,
Banyamwezi, Bamanyema – began to ex-
change their products with Nyanza and Ru-
monge, coastal cities located in Burundi.
Little by little, Islam penetrated the coun-
try. In 1885, the governor of Ujiji, Mo-
hammed Bin Khalfan (called R u m a l i z a i n
Kirundi, ‘the one who takes everything’), de-
cided to extend his power to the North, aim-
ing to reach more ivory and slaves. Bin Khal-
fan was a member of the Barwani’s, a fa-
mous Omani family that had settled in East
Africa. He multiplied his incursions on the
Burundian coast of the lake – although he
never succeeded in penetrating the country
in a long-lasting way – firmly defended by
King Mwezi Gisabo.
In the 1890s, when the first missionaries
arrived in what is now Bujumbura, they
found some W a n g w a n a, a name given at
this time to the Muslim Africans in Central
Away from Politics
During the tragic conflicts between Hutus
and Tutsis in 1993 and 1995-6, Muslims
stayed out of the clashes. In Buyenzi, a man
remembers that ‘during the events, our
neighbourhood was called ‘Swiss’, until the
army threatened to transform it in a new
Tchetchenia!’ In 1995, when the army did
away with the Hutu neighbourhood of Ka-
menge, its inhabitants fled directly to the
‘neutral’ Buyenzi, which is now overcrowd-
ed. In Rwanda, the situation was much the
same. This does not, however, mean to
imply that all Muslims completely withheld
from participation in the massacres. Certain
Muslims are wanted by the Burundian Jus-
tice for their participation and some are
now being judged in Arusha for participa-
tion in the Rwandan genocide. 
During the last years, conversion to Islam
in both Burundi and Rwanda has firmly in-
creased. Of course this could be due to a
general need for spirituality after such a
tragedy. There is also an observable new en-
thusiasm for Catholic and especially Protes-
tant churches. It is nonetheless obvious that
Islam attracts many for its having been neu-
tral during the conflicts. How can this neu-
trality be explained? Many Muslims say it is
due to the fact that they identify themselves
as Muslims, and not as Hutus or Tutsis. This
idyllic point of view, however, is not always
true. Some Burundian Muslims emphasize
their ‘ethnic’ roots; others do not. A Muslim
clerk of Bujumbura stated that the newly
converted insist more than the others on
their ethnicity and he does not hide his fear
of this new phenomenon. 
Issa Ngendakumana is a Muslim and a for-
mer minister, currently residing in Belgium.
He remembers very well that he understood
his ethnic origin only in 1972, when the
army killed thousands of Hutus. Before this,
he never wondered whether he was a Tutsi
or a Hutu. According to him, this was not
due to his religion: at the time, a lot of peas-
ants did not really care whether they were
Hutu or Tutsi. Ngendakumana stresses that
most of the Muslims are of foreign origin
and so they do not identify with this dual vi-
sion of society. He also recalls that Muslims
do not participate in political life. And it is
the politicians who emphasize the so-called
difference between Hutu and Tutsi. To date
there have been only five Muslim ministers,
and this, only since the nineties.
How can the distance from power be ex-
plained? A local Muslim journalist in Burun-
di asserted that his co-religionists were ex-
cluded from schools, and thus were exclud-
ed from political activities. Some have taken
a Christian name in order to pursue their
studies. Again, Ngendakumana placed that
assumption into perspective: ‘There has
never been a real discrimination toward
Muslims at school, even if we can observe
much less education among Muslims. But
schools in Burundi have been first created
and managed by the Catholic Church. Thus,
Muslim students didn’t feel at ease in these
i n s t i t u t i o n s … ’
This leads to another part of the explana-
tion. The Catholic Church cannot be sepa-
rated from Burundian (and Rwandan) con-
temporary history. It may be positively or
negatively perceived, but it is never seen as
a neutral observer. Catholicism was im-
planted in Burundi and Rwanda as a tool of
colonial power, and it has developed theo-
ries which reinforced the difference be-
tween Hutu and Tutsi. After the indepen-
dence, it maintained the role at times of an
ally, at others as an opponent of the govern-
ment. The churches were used by some
priests to exhort or to justify their crimes.
But Islam is never associated with political
events in the area. On the other hand, the
few Muslims who took part in the massacres
generally acted as individuals, never as be-
lievers using their faith to exterminate their
brothers. A last point to put forward is that
Muslims are traders and live in towns. They
are not directly involved in land possession
and exploitation, both key elements in the
understanding of the conflict in an over-
crowded and agricultural area. Whatever
the reasons, the behaviour of Burundian
Muslims is worth mentioning. It is a proof
that the ‘ethnic’ scission is not a fatality in
B u r u n d i . ♦
Quartier asiatique
Africa. The presence of Islam in the city then
increased with German colonization: a large
part of the a s k a r i s – indigenous soldiers in-
cluded in the colonial troops – were Mus-
lims, while Indian and Arab traders has-
tened to the city, wishing to profit from the
developing site. The Germans also incorpo-
rated many Swahili and Banyamwezi into
the police and the administration. Kiswahili
became German East Africa’s official lan-
guage, alongside German of course. When
World War I broke out, the majority of Bu-
jumbura’s population professed Islam. At
this time, the Burundians preferred to live
inside the country, far from the lake. A local
tradition even held that the King could not
look at the Tanganyika Lake, for if so he
would die. The Burundians started to settle
down in this city with the Belgian coloniza-
tion, which began in 1919. But even then,
the phenomenon was slow to increase: in
1957, Burundians constituted not much
more than 27 percent of Bujumbura’s popu-
lation. Besides them, there were more than
80 so-called ‘tribes’ speaking 34 different
languages and using Swahili as their lingua
franca. And Muslims still constituted 35.6
percent of this mixed population. The Bu-
rundian Muslims are Sunnis. However, a
small Shiite mosque is located in the q u a r t i-
er asiatique, mostly frequented by Indians
and Pakistanis. There are also some Ibazi –
Swahili for Ibadites – coming mainly from
Zanzibar and Oman. 
In Burundi, Muslims have a close relation-
ship with Kiswahili, a Bantu-language con-
taining an important vocabulary from Ara-
bic. It is even rare to meet a Muslim who
does not speak this language. In the same
way, ‘Swahili’ is the term commonly used to
say ‘Muslims’ in Burundi, and the Muslim
neighbourhood of Gitega, the second city of
the country, is called the quartier swahili.
Prayers are uttered in Arabic, as is the read-
ing of the Koran, although believers use
Kiswahili translations of the m a s a f i ( f r o m
Arabic m u s h a f) and the j u z u (Arabic j u z ’) of
the Holy Book as well. Recently, a local intel-
lectual translated some prayers into Kirundi,
which were published in Kenya with Saudi
funds. It should be said that Kiswahili does
not belong to the Muslims alone: most of
Bujumbura’s inhabitants understand it. It is
even used for mass in some churches, and
television and radio programmes are broad-
cast in this language.
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West  Af ri c a
G E E R T  M OM M E R S T E E G
‘May God give him a long life. May God give force to
his mother’s milk. May God make him strong so he
will join our ranks. May God let him lead the live of a
Muslim. May God give him a good life when he will
stay in our town and may He give him a good life
when he will settle elsewhere.’ When seven days old,
a baby is blessed by a Qur’anic teacher. After he has
first announced the name of the newborn child, the






of Djenné proclaimed his conversion to
Islam, 4200 u l a m a were present, as written
by the West African historian es-Sa’di in ap-
proximately 1650. Although the writer, him-
self once imam of the town, may have exag-
gerated, clearly Islam was significant in the
city at that time, and it remains so today.
Djenné is now a small town with about
13,000 inhabitants of ethnically diverse ori-
gin – mostly Marka/Sonray, Fulani and Bozo.
It is of only minor economic importance to
the region. But Djenné’s famous mosque
(placed on UNESCO’s world heritage list)
and its many Qur’anic schools still reflect
the glorious days of the past. 
The town has some 35 schools for elemen-
tary Qur’anic education as well as a dozen
schools for ‘secondary’ education where
law, Arabic grammar, rhetoric and literature,
theology, the traditions of the Prophet and
Qur’anic exegesis are taught. Teachers at
these schools are known as a l f a ( d e r i v e d
from the Arabic al faqîh) in Songhay, or
The town in which an infant is welcomed
in this way is the ancient town of Djenné,
situated in the Inner Niger Delta in the re-
public of Mali. Djenné was once an impor-
tant commercial centre. Although the town
was never as famous as its ‘sister’, the leg-
endary city of Timbuctoo, during its heyday
in the 15t h and 16t h centuries Djenné played
a important role in the trans-Saharan trade.
It was here that the salt merchants from the
desert in the North met the gold traders
from the South. Islam was part of urban life
in Djenné from an early date. When at the
beginning of the 13t h century, the 26t h c h i e f
m ô d i b o (from the Arabic m u ’ a d d i b) in Ful-
fulde. Young children are entrusted to an
a l f a for instruction in reciting the Qur’an.
Older students seek his guidance in their
pursuit of Islamic knowledge. In French, the
language of the former colonizer, the teach-
ers are known as m a r a b o u t, a term which is
employed throughout Muslim West Africa.
Marabouts, as my research assistant Bou-
bakar Kouroumanse once told me, ‘teach
how to follow God and marabouts know
how to ask God’. In this concise way, he re-
ferred to the two kinds of knowledge mara-
bouts possess. A distinction is made be-
tween so-called ‘public’ knowledge and ‘se-
cret’ knowledge. Public knowledge is asso-
ciated with the praxis of education at the
Qur’anic schools and secret knowledge is
applied in ‘maraboutage’ – the complex of
magico-religious practices of which amulet
production and divination are the most sig-
n i f i c a n t .1
Marabouts and the individual’s
w e l l - b e i n g
Marabouts play an important role in the
life of the individual in Djenné. This be-
comes especially clear at the critical stages
of life – birth, circumcision, marriage and
death. At an infant’s naming ceremony a
marabout announces the child’s name and
blesses it. At the time of their circumcision,
young boys are provided with amulets to
protect themselves against evil and dan-
gers. When the boys return to their families,
after a fortnight of seclusion, a marabout
pronounces benedictions for them. A mar-
riage is contracted by a marabout and, final-
ly, it is a marabout who leads the last
prayers over a corps and directs the reading
of the Qur’an or the Dala’il al Khairat – a pan-
egyric in honour of Muhammad – at the
condolence gatherings to facilitate the af-
terlife of the deceased.
The individual’s well-being, however, is
not only taken care of at the critical stages
of life. In everyday existence, marabouts
also render a variety of services to ensure a
person’s health, to offer security and to
guarantee spiritual and material welfare. By
means of divination, supererogatory pray-
ers and amulet production they may con-
tact and employ the hidden powers of the
supernatural world for the benefit of their
c l i e n t s .
The following fieldwork experience was a
revelatory incident in this context. During
one of our weekly visits to a marabout, I was
asked to read a letter for him. He handed me
the letter, which he had received that day,
and I began to read the short French text.
Each time when I had read a couple of
words I took a short pause to allow
Boubakar to translate into Songhay. The let-
ter was sent by a man from Bamako (the
capital of Mali) and contained a request for
the marabout’s help in obtaining a job at a
certain company. The man literally asked
the marabout to ‘pray’ for him to get the
job. When I read this aloud, Boubakar,
slightly hesitating, translated the French
p r i e r with the Songhay d y i n g a r; the verb
which stands for performing the s a l â t. At
that moment the m a r a b o u t burst out laugh-
ing and said: ‘D y i n g a r? G a r a I suppose he
means!’ 
Gara is the Songhay term for what is called
in Arabic d ucâ ’: a ‘prayer of request’ or ‘per-
sonal invocation’. The difference between
d y i n g a r and g a r a is essential. As a follow-up
to the incident in which the marabout juxta-
posed the two terms, Boubakar and I (first
together and later on with some marabouts)
elaborately discussed the issue. In these dis-
cussions, more than once reference was
made to the Qur’anic verse ‘Call upon Me
and I will answer’ (40:62) or to the h a d î t h
‘Petitions are the weapons of the believer’.
Given these sayings, so my interlocutors ar-
gued, it is possible to attain certain things
by asking God for them.
Blessings, amulets and
d i v i n a t i o n
Blessings pervade social life in Djenné.
Unremittingly, God is asked to take care of
His servants. ‘May God save us.’ ‘May God
protect you during your trip.’ ‘May God ap-
prove it.’ ‘May God give you strength.’ ‘May
God protect our town.’ These and numerous
other benedictions can be heard during
special occasions as well as in everyday life.
Everyone can call upon God and everyone’s
request may be granted by Him.
God, however, has many names by which
He can be invoked and some of these are
more powerful than others. Making a partic-
ular request to God using a powerful name
will bring about a quick and certain result.
Moreover, everywhere in His Holy Qur’an,
God has spoken powerful words. If em-
ployed properly, the inherent powers of
these words can be used for all kinds of pur-
poses. Dissolved in a potion of ‘holy water’
or written in an amulet, the powers ascribed
to Qur’anic words can be applied for differ-
ent curative, protective or causative purpos-
es. Yet, neither the special names and the
specific Qur’anic passages, nor the often in-
tricate techniques to apply them are com-
mon knowledge. These are the secrets in
which the marabouts are specialized. This
knowledge enables them to ask God to ren-
der a trader successful in his business, to
provide a woman with a long desired child,
to cure someone from a disease or to let a
woman fall in love with a man who has his
eye on her.
In West Africa, the legitimacy of amulets
is a matter of debate, as elsewhere in the
Islamic world. According to orthodox opin-
ions – in particular the Wahhabiyya – mag-
ical practices corrupt the Islamic religion.
The true believer has to refrain from them.
However, when amulets are defined as ‘re-
quests to God’, justification for them can
be found in the Qur’an and in the sayings
of the Prophet. Thus the activities of the
marabouts in this field acquire a religious
b a s i s .
Regarding the practice of divination, whose
status is comparable to that of amulets in
terms of ambivalence, the following may be
noted. When a marabout examines the ‘situ-
ation’ of a client, the outcome of the divina-
tion frequently includes instructions for the
client to give away a specific present in
order to favour the outcome of his or her af-
fair. In this sense, the act of charity, which is
in and of itself religious and meritorious, is
of an unequivocal purposive character. ‘Giv-
ing’ goes explicitly together with ‘asking’.
Not only the receiver of the gift will bless
the generous giver so that God may recom-
pense him or her, but also the marabout
will, subsequent to the divination, write an
amulet to ask God to approve the specific
request of his client.
In Djenné, the marabouts’ knowledge
covers the entire realm of well-being. The
various features of the human plight, from
existential problems to the uncertainties of
daily life, are dealt with. Their knowledge
concerns as much the religious rules the be-
liever has to follow in order to be rewarded
in the afterlife as it does the ways in which
prosperity can be obtained in the here and
n o w . ♦
Geert Mommersteeg is assistant professor at the
Department of Cultural Anthropology, Utrecht
University, Utrecht, the Netherlands.
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N o t e s
1 . In the second half of the eighties and the early
nineties I conducted anthropological fieldwork
among the marabouts of Djenné. See my PhD
thesis Het domein van de marabout. Koranleraren
en magisch-religieuze specialisten in Djenné, Mali
(Proefschrift Universiteit Utrecht) Thesis
Publishers, Amsterdam 1996. A popular version
appeared as In de stad van de marabouts,
Prometheus, Amsterdam 1998. A French
translation of the latter is anticipated.
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Michael Sells, author of The Bridge Betrayed:
Religion and Genocide in Bosnia (University of
California Press, second edition, 1998) is professor
o f Comparative Religions at Haverford College, USA.
N o t e s
1 . The full argument and documentation for the
following remarks are found in Michael Sells,
T h e Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2n d
edition, 1998) and at the Bridge Betrayed War
Crimes and Human Rights documentary page at
http://www.haverford.edu/relg/sells/reports.html 
2 . Translated by Milorad Ekmecic, ‘The Emergence of
St. Vitus Day’, in Wayne Vucinich and Thomas
Emmert, eds., Kosovo: Legacy of a Medieval Battle
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991),
p. 335. 
3 . Bishop Petar Petrovic II (Njegoš), The Mountain
W r e a t h, translated by Vasa Mihailovich (1986). 
4 . This essentialist view of Islam has been adopted
by the popular writer Bat Ye’or, who bases many
of her generalizations on the writings of Serbian
nationalists. Bat Ye’or, The Decline of Eastern
Christianity under Islam (Madison: Farleigh
Dickenson University Press, 1996), p. 239.
5 . See Andras Riedlmayer, ‘Bosnia’s Cultural Heritage
and Its Destruction’ (Philadelphia, 1994),
videocassette, and the photo essays on
t h e Community of Bosnia Web page:
h t t p : / / w w w . s t u d e n t s . h a v e r f o r d . e d u / v f i l i p o v
6 . Biljana Plavšic, S v e t , Novi Sad, September 1993,
cited and translated by Slobodan Inic, ‘Biljana
P l a všic: Geneticist in the Service of a Great Crime’,
Bosnia Report: Newsletter of the Alliance to Defend
B o s n i a - H e r z e g o v i n a 19 (June-August 1997),
translated from H e l s i nš ka povelja ( H e l s i n k i
Charter), Belgrade, November 1996.
The Ba l ka ns
M I C H A E L  S E L L S
The curse below was revived with a vengeance at the
6 0 0t h anniversary commemoration of the death of
Serb Prince Lazar at the battle of Kosovo in 1389. Re-
ligious nationalists in Serbia accuse not only the Ot-
toman Turks who fought Lazar, but also the Balkan
Muslims of today of being stained with the blood of
Christ-prince Lazar.1
Whoever is a Serb of Serbian blood
Whoever shares with me this heritage,
And he comes not to fight at Kosovo,
May he never have the progeny
His heart desires, neither son nor daughter;
Beneath his hand let nothing decent grow
Neither purple grapes nor wholesome wheat;
Let him rust away like dripping iron
Until his name be extinguished.2 
Balkan Islam and
the Mythology
o f K o s o v o
In a Passion play, the actors who kill the
martyr (Jesus, for example, or Imam Hus-
sein) exit the stage quickly to avoid being
pummelled by the audience. When an excit-
ed crowd rushes the stage to beat the actor,
time is collapsed. The crowd reacts not as an
audience watching a representation of a
past event, but as if they were actually living
the original event. While stage re-enact-
ment was not an important part of the Koso-
vo pageant of 1989, a similar collapse of
time was evident. The relics of Lazar were
transported around Serbia, arriving at the
monastery nearest the battle site on the
feast day of Lazar (Vidovdan). There they
were ceremonially unveiled for the first time
in history. Slobodan Miloše v ić then mount-
ed a stage on the battle site and, with a
backdrop of Kosovo symbolism and before
an excited audience of more than a million
people (some of them waving his picture
alongside images of Lazar) boasted of his
plan to revoke Kosovo’s autonomy. 
This time collapse was tied to other pow-
erful symbols: 1) the sacred space of the
‘Serb Jerusalem’ – as Kosovo, with its mag-
nificent monasteries of the medieval Serb
kingdoms, is called by Serb nationalists; 2)
the historical memory of atrocities suffered
by Serbs in World War II – a memory height-
ened by ritual disinterment in the late 1980s
of remains of Serb victims amidst calls for
revenge and the stereotyping of all Bosni-
ans, Albanians, and Croats as genocidal; and
3) false claims by Serbian bishops and acad-
emics that Albanians in Kosovo were en-
gaged in mass rape, systematic annihilation
of Serb sacral heritage, and genocide. Reli-
gious nationalists exploited the mythology
of Kosovo throughout the ‘ethnic cleans-
ing’. Paramilitaries wore shoulder patches
depicting the battle of Kosovo, sang songs
about the Kosovo battle, forced their cap-
tives to sing songs, and decorated them-
selves with medals named after heroes of
the Kosovo battle.
The nexus of primordial time, historical
memory, sacred space, and accusations of
present genocide – all brought together
around the 1989 Kosovo commemoration –
was inflamed further by a particularly viru-
lent form of Orientalism. In the 19t h c e n t u r y ,
Serbian nationalists made explicit the por-
trayal of Prince Lazar as a Christ-figure: a
Last Supper with twelve knight-disciples, in-
cluding one traitor, and a Mary Magdalene
figure. The most important work of 19t h c e n-
tury Serb nationalism was T h e M o u n t a i n
W r e a t h , a verse drama published in 1857 by
the Montenegrin Orthodox bishop known
as Njegoš. It opens with Serb bishops and
knights deciding to ‘cleanse’ Montenegro of
non-Christians. The Vlad (Prince-Bishop)
summons the Slavic Muslims and offers
them a last chance to convert. The Muslims
reply that Orthodox and Muslims are one
people and request a ‘godfather’ (K u m) cer-
emony through which blood feuds were
healed. When Serb elders reply that the cer-
emony requires baptism, the Muslims sug-
gest baptism for the Christian child and ritu-
al tonsure for the Muslim child. The inter-re-
ligious K u m ceremony is rejected and the
Muslims are driven away as ‘Turkifiers’ and
‘spitters on the cross’. The play ends with a
glorification of the Christmas extermination
of the Muslims, the annihilation of all traces
of their existence, followed by ritual com-
munion (without the confession obligatory
after all killings) for the Serb knights. In the
view of the Njegoš, the antagonism be-
tween Christian and Muslim is not only age-
old: it is eternal, built into the very structure
of the cosmos. The Mountain Wreath w a s
reprinted and disseminated in 1989. Later,
Serb nationalists celebrated the ‘cleansing’
of villages in Bosnia by posting on the Inter-
net verses from The Mountain Wreath c e l e-
brating ‘the extermination of the Turkifiers’.3
This concept of ‘Turkifier’ reflects Chris-
toslavism, the notion that a Slav who con-
verts from Christianity is transformed ethni-
cally into a Turk. Twentieth-century writers
(both Catholic and Orthodox) combined
Christoslavism with racial ideas. Conversion
was simultaneously a race-betrayal and
race-transformation that left one perpetual-
ly outside of the ‘people’ and placed one
alongside those with the blood of the
Christ-prince Lazar on their hands. Ottoman
rule was portrayed as one of unremitting
savagery in which the Ottomans ‘stole the
blood’ of Serbs and Serb culture and de-
stroyed the great monasteries of Kosovo.
Ironically, the latter claim is often made on
tours of the monasteries that in fact sur-
vived very well the five centuries of Ot-
toman rule.4
The monasteries also survived centuries
surrounded by Kosovar Albanians. Yet, mo-
tivated by repeated false claims that the
‘Turks’ (i.e. the Albanians) were destroying
the monasteries, Serbian militias destroyed
thousands of Islamic monuments in areas of
Bosnia they controlled, including major
masterworks of the 16t h century such as the
Ferhadiya in Banja Luka and the Coloured
Mosque of Foc̆a. In Sarajevo, the Serb army
burned the National Library (more than a
million volumes and a hundred thousand
rare books) and the Oriental Institute (with
over 5,000 manuscripts in Arabic, Persian,
Turkish, Slavic, and Aljamiado). One goal of
destroying the evidence of shared civiliza-
tion was to help establish as fact the Serbian
nationalist myth, which holds that Muslims
and Christians never were ‘one people’ and
are doomed to repeat age-old antagonisms.
Tragically, Western policy makers and espe-
cially UN commanders adopted the aggres-
sor mythology of inevitable age-old hatreds
to excuse their refusal to protect the victims
of ‘ethnic cleansing’ or to allow them to de-
fend themselves. In Kosovo, Serbian reli-
gious nationalists have been equally me-
thodical in effacing identity – from libraries
and mosques to wedding rings and identity
c a r d s .5
Bosnian Serb leader Biljana Plavšić, a bi-
ologist and former head of the Academy of
Natural Sciences in Sarajevo, announced in
1994 that:
[…] it was genetically deformed material
that embraced Islam. And now, of course,
with each successive generation this gene
simply becomes concentrated. It gets worse
and worse. It simply expresses itself and
dictates their style of thinking and behaving,
which is rooted in their genes.6
As shown by Plavšic´ and her formerly sec-
ularist and communist colleagues, the effec-
tiveness of the Kosovo nexus of religious
and historical mythologies is not dependent
upon self-conscious beliefs or sincerity. For
leaders like Plavšic´ and their followers, it
provides an alternative system of logic that
makes plausible their sudden conversions
and justifies their acts to themselves and
their audience.
A Bosnian refugee told me the following
story: When her Serb neighbours protested
against their participating in ‘cleansing’ the
Muslims, Serb paramilitaries shot them dead
in front of their son and then forced the son
into the army. The Muslim woman’s husband
was the K u m (godfather) of the Serb son.
Break the inter-religious K u m bond, which
presupposes that Christians and Muslims are
‘one people’, is the currently the goal, just as
it was in The Mountain Wreath. Proposals to
validate that goal and partition the Balkans
along religious lines, placing Balkan Muslims
in economically and politically untenable
enclaves (landlocked equivalents of Gaza)
would lead to further violence or – if the con-
sistent history of non-Christian ghettos in
Europe since 1096 is any guide – to an even
worse outcome. Meanwhile, the Bosnian
Muslim family has preserved the home of
their Serb friends for the return of the son,
for whom they are now searching. 
After years of propaganda, Njegoš- s t y l e
mythology, and complicity in genocide, Ser-
bian society has been radicalized. Serbia’s
most popular politician is Vojislav Šešelj, an
open proponent of annihilation of Kosovar
Albanians, and its most popular celebrity is
the indicted war criminal Arkan. Even so,
when the radical elements in a society are
defeated, a society can turn quickly to its
better values (witness the transformation of
formerly fascist states after WWII). The inter-
national community can support the many
who still refuse the ideology of religious
apartheid or it can betray them by ratifying
‘ethnic cleansing’. The stakes are high, both
for the moral universe we will inhabit and
for the already delicate relations between
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B a l k a n s
N A TH AL I E  C L A Y E R
AL E X A N D R E  P O P O V I C
Sufism has always marked the practice of Islam in the
Balkans, since the Ottoman conquest, especially
through the implantation of brotherhood networks.
With the withdrawal of the Ottomans, from the end
of the 17t h up to the beginning of the 20t h c e n t u r y ,
part of these networks disappeared, since a lot of
their members either perished in the wars or fled to
Turkey. Another part of these networks remained –
especially on the western side of the Peninsula – and
continued to regulate the religious as well as the so-
cial life of significant Muslim groups. However, in the
latter half of the 20t h century, the communist regimes
in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania en-
deavoured to weaken the religious institutions. In Al-
bania, they were even completely dismantled by the
authorities in 1967.
A New Era for 
Sufi Trends in
t h e B a l k a n s
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the new
political situation is fraught with ‘positive’
consequences for Muslims in the Balkans:
liberty of expression and of circulation, in-
tensification of contacts with the Muslim
world, and the possibility for foreign mis-
sionaries to come and proselyte. On the
other hand, these Muslims, and their Christ-
ian neighbours, are confronted with ex-
tremely troubled economic and social situa-
tions, and even with conflicts – sometimes
armed (e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo).
Religious practices, those of the Sufis in par-
ticular, are dependent on developments in
local history, as well as on the present polit-
ical and social context in each country or re-
gion. We will not give here a complete and
detailed panorama of the Sufi reality in the
Balkans of today (whose importance is quite
limited in comparison with the size of local
Muslim communities), but rather shall try to
emphasize the main characteristics of its
evolution – from the surviving ancient net-
works to the appearance of new ones. 
The weight of the past
In the eastern part of the Peninsula, in Bul-
garia, Romania and Greece (i.e. Western
Thrace), ancient Sufi networks have been al-
most totally destroyed in the 20t h c e n t u r y ,
except for the special case of the Alevi-Kizil-
bash communities, which in fact have their
own heterodox and syncretistic religion. On
the western side, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it
seems that the Sufi tradition, which despite
much suffering since the end of the Ot-
toman domination, survived mainly through
Mathnawi ‘lessons’, m e v l u d ceremonies and
the activities of a few Nakshbandi t e k k es and
Rifa‘i and Kadiri circles. This tradition has ex-
perienced a certain revival in the last years.
Did the Sufi members play a role, as such, in
the recent events? This we do not know, but
Sufism and Sufi networks could have been
utilized for certain political and ideological
reasons. In the other ex-Yugoslav provinces,
that is to say in Kosovo and Macedo-
n i a , where the bulk of the Muslim population
speaks Albanian (and not Slavic as in Bosnia
and Herzegovina), the Dervish brotherhoods
were, to a certain extent, less challenged
than those in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Especially
in the second half of the 1970s, a Rifa‘i
shaykh of Prizren had the possibility to give
a new impetus to the local t u r u q, by unifying
them within an organization, and by using
the funds offered by emigrant workers. Nev-
ertheless, in these regions, an interesting
phenomenon is the appearance of gypsy
networks, whose members are often in
search of a greater legitimacy within the
Muslim society. Although these networks
are linked with different t u r u q ( H a l v e t i y y e ,
Rifa‘iyye, Sa‘diyye, etc.), we have to admit
that the practice of rites tend to be homoge-
nized, with the i j r a h, a very spectacular ritual
of mortifications, becoming for all of them
the central point of the d h i k r.
The case of Albania differs greatly for two
reasons. There, the Sufi current, which con-
tinued to flourish even after the end of Ot-
toman domination, was totally smothered
during the communist period, as were all re-
ligious manifestations. The second reason is
that, one of the Sufi brotherhoods – the fer-
vent heterodox and syncretistic Bektashiyye
– became an independent religious com-
munity alongside the Sunni community.
When, at the end of 1990, religious practices
were re-authorized by the government, the
Bektashi community as well as the other
mystical brotherhoods tried to re-establish
themselves. Descendants of shaykhs first re-
built t ü r b es (mausoleums) in order to regain
legitimacy via the saints’ b a r a k a and there-
by to obtain believers’ donations for financ-
ing. Some of them then attempted to gath-
er small congregations and to perform ritu-
als. Certain new ‘shaykhs’ came to be
helped by Albanian Sufi shaykhs from Koso-
vo, as was the case for the Rifa‘iyye, or for
those from other regions. It is often like a
slow re-apprenticeship of practices and
doctrines, as can be witnessed in the Kadiri
t e k k e of Tirana, where in 1993 men and un-
veiled women performed the d h i k r in the
same circle, while two years later there was
already a clear segregation of men and
women during these ritual prayers; the lat-
ter wearing white veils for the occasion. The
i l a h i (religious hymns) had also been
learned and sung to greater perfection. 
Recent evolutions
However, besides the restoration or con-
solidation of ancient networks, three impor-
tant evolutions in the Balkan Sufi scenery
are noteworthy: first was the introduction of
new networks, via ‘missionaries’ who come
to the Balkans, as well as the young Balkan
Muslims who go to study in different Mus-
lim countries where some establish contacts
with Sufi groups; and second was the intro-
duction and development of movements in
the region, which can generally be consid-
ered as ‘neo-brotherhoods’, such as the Sü-
leymanjis or the Nurjus-Fethullahjis, both
having originated from Turkey and having
been issued from the Nakshbandiyye. For
example, the Süleymanjis are implanted in
Albania, where they have begun religious
classes and have opened a Turkish-Albanian
religious centre. The followers of Fethullah
Gülen, for example, extended their network
and activities in various countries such as
Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania.
They are publishing local editions of their
newspaper (Z a m a n) and have opened pri-
vate secondary schools – in some cases also
religious schools. 
The third important evolution is Shiite
proselytism, which is particularly effective
among Sufi milieus of the Western Balkans.
In fact, in the same way that they are trying
to introduce their doctrine in Turkey
among the Alevi groups, the Shiites are
working to diffuse Shiism in the Balkans, es-
pecially through the re-emerging Sufi net-
works. In Albania, for example, the Shiites
approached the representatives of the Bek-
tashis, the Halvetis, the Rifa‘is and other
Sufi brotherhoods (whose mystical knowl-
edge is as poor as their financial means).
They help them to publish Shiite-oriented
books and offer fellowships to allow for
young Albanians to study in Iran. In Kosovo
and Macedonia, Shiite groups from Iran as
well as from Western Europe get in touch
also with Muslims who are now convinced
of seeing in Shiism the ‘true Islam’ of the
third stage, which is to succeed Sufi Islam –
itself considered the second stage after
Sunni Islam.
It is difficult to know how the Sufi cur-
rents, which remain somewhat marginal
with respect to the mainstream of Islam,
will develop in the Balkan Peninsula in the
future. Already it is clear that they have en-
tered a new era. The Muslim community of
these regions is closer to the rest of the
U m m a than before. New trends are being
introduced, not only from the East as in the
past, but also from the Muslim diasporas of
Western Europe. The Sufi networks in the
Balkans will certainly carry out the same
transformations that were undergone in
other parts of the Muslim world concerning
the adaptation of their social role in mod-
ern society. Furthermore, internally, be-
cause of the important political changes,
they will have to re-position themselves vis-
à-vis the new Muslim religious (and politi-
cal) authorities. ♦
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R u s s i a
A L E X A N D E R  G .  S E L E Z N E V
According to certain legends still very much alive
today in the local collective memory, the first Muslim
missionaries came to the territory of Western Siberia
and began to disseminate the true belief in Allah
among locals in 1394-1395. Today, amidst condi-
tions of burgeoning ethnic, cultural and religious
self-awareness of the citizens of Russia, this legend
has taken on the character of a genuine historical
fact. The Siberian cities of Omsk and Tyumen – cen-
tres of dense Siberian Muslim populations – celebrat-
ed the 600t h anniversary of Siberian Islam as national
and religious holidays, which were accompanied by
festivals of traditional culture and scientific confer-
e n c e s .
The Northern-
m o s t Outpost 
of Islamic
C i v i l i z a t i o n
Islam is the official religion of an over-
whelming majority of Turkic language
speakers living in the south of Western
Siberia. More specifically, this population
professes Sunnism. There are three large
Muslim ethnic groups in the Siberian region:
Siberian Tartars (over 180,000 persons),
Western Siberian Kazakhs (over 160,000),
and the Volga-Ural Tartars (60,000 persons).
Siberian Islam draws its historical signifi-
cance from the fact that it constitutes the
northernmost outpost of Islamic civilization
in the world. Siberian Muslims are compact-
ly settled in national villages (Aul, Jurt) and
also live in large cities together with repre-
sentatives of various nationalities such as:
Russian, Ukrainian, German, Latvian, and Es-
tonian. The national culture of Tartars and
Kazakhs has been preserved in villages. It is
thus still possible to observe traditional
modes of cattle breeding, hunting, fishing,
as well as traditional dwellings, food, cloth-
ing, and art. Almost every Tartar and Kazakh
settlement has a mosque and Muslim priest
– m u l l a h. Western Siberia is an example of
the peaceful coexistence of different cul-
tures and religious systems: Orthodoxy,
Protestantism, and Islam. 
Islam entered the Siberian Khanate as an
official religion in the 1570s, the time of
Khan Kuchum. Archaeological findings tes-
tify that subjects of Islam in Western Siberia
in the 17t h and 18t h centuries are practically
non-existent. It is probable that Islamic
ideas did not spread among the population
groups in this period. However, in the mid-
1 9t h century a legend was recorded which
stated that in 797 of the Muslim Era (1394-
1395 AD), 366 horse-riding sheikhs and their
ally Sheibani-Khan, together with 1,700 sol-
diers, arrived on the banks of the Irtysh
River. There they fought a great battle to
spread the Islamic faith to the Siberian in-
habitants, consisting in the Khotan, Kara-
Kypcjak, and Nogaj. The Muslim missionar-
ies coming to Siberia were said to be disci-
ples of the mystic Hadji Baha ad-Din Naqsh-
band (1318–1389). 
Another version of this legend, still alive in
the national memory of Siberian Tartars,
holds that all 366 sheikhs were treacherous-
ly killed and then buried by disciples in spe-
cial sacred cemeteries – o s t a n a. Some mod-
ern surnames of Siberian Tartars and names
of their settlements stem from the word
sheikh (preacher), such as the surname
Shihkov, and the village Shykhcha. All
groups of Siberian Tartars have legends of
old religious wars, during which Muslim
missionaries destroyed old idols – q u r c h a k
(dolls). These legends are found in relation
to information about the Naqshbandi Sufi
order, one of the most widespread Sufi
brotherhoods in the 15 th century. The Naqsh-
bandi order was characterized by a high de-
gree of socio-political activity. The members
of the order played an important role in the
final establishment of Islam in Central Asia
and East Turkestan, as well as among Kirghiz
and Kazakh tribes. Intervening in secular au-
thority and contact with the various political
circles form the most important postulate of
this brotherhood.
Surely, the dissemination of Islam was a
very long, inconsistent and tragic process,
and undoubtedly cannot be reduced to any
one legendary event or historical episode.
However, the spread of Islam among Siber-
ian Tartars and Kazakhs meant important
changes in their political and ethnic struc-
ture. The nucleus of the Kazakh people was
formed in the 15t h and 16t h centuries within
the framework of the Kazakh Khanate. The
Siberian Khanate was transformed into an
independent state in the second half of the
1 6t h century, a period which saw the begin-
ning of Tartar’s ethnic groups. The distribu-
tion of Islam was the external expression of
these social and ethnic processes. For exam-
ple, the forming of Baraba Tartars (one of
the ethnic groups of Siberian Tartars) oc-
curred in the 17t h and early 18t h c e n t u r i e s .
Baraba Tartars practised shamanism in the
beginning of the 18t h century. However, al-
ready by the mid-18t h century, Islam had
spread extraordinarily quickly among this
group. Interestingly, the Chulym Turks (a
small group of Turkic-language speakers,
surrounded by Muslim and Christian popu-
lations) have maintained shamanism as the
main form of religious practice, not super-
seded by Christianity or Islam. 
The dissemination of Islam promoted the
establishment of a basis of Muslim culture
among Siberian Tartars and Kazakhs: The
norms of Muslim justice and morals, Muslim
rituals and holidays, and even Muslim
names became tradition for these peoples.
Muslim schools were founded to offer edu-
cation to the Kazakhs and Tartars, and to ac-
quaint them with Arabic and Persian lan-
guages. Furthermore, mosques were built in
Siberian cities and villages. 
In the 1920s and 1930s, the terror Stalin
exerted upon the Tartar and Kazakh peoples
was directed especially against the Islamic
preachers. It is interesting to note here that
the people of Siberia were long acquainted
with the regional religions up to the spread
of Islam. The medieval Central Asian state
associations – the Old Turkic Khanate I and II
(552–630 and 682–745), the Uygurian
Khanate (745-840) and the state of Yeni-
seien Kyrghyzs (6t h– 1 3t h centuries) – all
played an important role in the history of
these peoples. Shamanism served as the
ideological basis of the Old Turkic Khanates.
Manichaeism, however, was the official reli-
gion within the frameworks of the Uygurian
confederation of the peoples of Central Asia
and Southern Siberia, and then among the
ancient Kyrghyzs. Manichaeism constitutes
a religious-philosophical system, based on a
synthesis of Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, and
Christianity. Thus, the peoples of Siberia had
experience in interacting with ancient reli-
gious systems and with the world religions.
This experience is reflected in the ethnogra-
phies of Siberian Muslims. 
But shamanism has left the greatest mark
on Siberian Muslim culture. For example,
the term t e n g r e (meaning God, deity) has
been maintained among Kazakhs and al-
most all groups of Siberian Tartars. The
same word meant ‘supreme deity’ in the Old
Turkic epoch and in modern times it has
spread among the followers of shamanism
in the Sajan-Altai region. Other deities and
spirits known to Siberian Tartars and Kaza-
khs (j e r ’ - s u, Earth/water, u m a j, q u t, n a t i g a j) ,
were considered sacred by Medieval sha-
manist-Turks and Mongolians as well. The
traces of a fire cult, preserved among the
Kazakhs and Tartars, can be explained by
the influence of Middle Asian cultures. The
word Q u d a i (H u u d a i), signifying God, is Per-
sian in origin and is known to Western Siber-
ian Muslims and Sajan-Altai shamanists. An-
imistic beliefs are also connected with the
ancient shamanic beliefs. They are ex-
pressed in the form of hunting-fishing cults
of the spirits (i j a s y, e s e): the spirits of the
water (su ijasy), the forest (p i c i n, p i c h i n,
u r m a n - i s a s y), houses (oj ijasy), fire (ot ijasy)
and others. 
Shamanistic beliefs were preserved to the
greatest extent by Baraba Tartars. Ethno-
graphic sources at the end of the 17t h– e a r l y
1 8t h centuries, offer detailed descriptions of
Baraba shamans (k a m), shamanic practice,
attributes of a shamanic cult, and shamanic
rituals and customs. 
Shamanistic notions penetrate the whole
complex of Siberian Tartar’s spirit culture.
For example, Siberian Tartars’ burial build-
ings comprise frames (k i r t m e, s u k k y, o j) and
poles (b a g a n, o r m a), which have deep and
very ancient analogies among the non-Is-
lamic peoples. Poles on graves symbolize
the ‘world tree’, connecting in one unit: the
universe; the shamanic stairway, used by
shamans for contacting the upper spirits;
and the sex distinction of buried persons.
Frames on graves symbolize the house of
the deceased. On the other hand, Islamic
features (invitation of m u l l a h, non-partici-
pation of the women at the burial ritual) are
typical for the rituals of Siberian Tartars as
well. 
The formation of an original Muslim-
shamanist syncretism based on the organic
synthesis of Islamic and pre-Islamic beliefs
and cults of the Turkic-language population
of the Western Siberian plain. The strata in-
clude not only traces of the early religious
forms (e.g. shamanism), but also of relics of
pre-Islamic religious systems, which have
found expression in the worldviews of these
p e o p l e s . ♦
Funeral prayer,
Siberian Tartars
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Easter n Eur o pe
G E O R G E  G R I G O R E
Romanian principalities, once known as the ‘gates of
the Levant’, have a history of religious and ethnic di-
versity. In Romania today, the Muslim population
traditionally lives together with the Romanian ma-
jority (Christian-Orthodox) in an area called Dobrud-
ja, a territory bordered to the east by the Black Sea,
to the west and north by the Danube River and to the
south by the Romanian-Bulgarian frontier. 
Muslims in Romania
The Muslim community from Dobrudja,
which is Sunni, Hanafitic rite, is composed of
two major ethnic groups: the Tartars and
the Turks. Nowadays, Muslims from Dobrud-
ja or from abroad live in all the important
Romanian cities, being structured in more
or less stable communities. According to the
official census of 1992, there were 29,533
Turks and 24,649 Tartars registered, mean-
ing that the Turks as well as the Tartars rep-
resent each an approximate percentage of
0.1% of Romania’s 22,760,449 inhabitants.
Ottoman presence
The Muslim presence in Dobrudja is ex-
plained by the fact that this territory was
under the domination of the Ottoman Em-
pire for almost five centuries. The Ottomans
conquered Dobrudja in several stages. The
first stage is represented by the conquest of
the strategic points of Inisala and Isaccea b y
the Sultan Bayezid I (1389-1402). After a
short re-conquest of these territories by the
v o i v o d e of Wallachia, Mircea the Old, most
of Dobrudja was conquered by the Sultan
Mehmet I between 1419-1420. This marks
the second stage in the process of settling
Ottoman power in the region. The third and
last stage is represented by the conquest of
the fortresses Chilia and Cetatea Alba by the
Sultan Bayezid II (1481-1512) in 1484. As a
result, Dobrudja became a constituent of
the Ottoman Empire, belonging to the great
b e y l i r b e y l i k of Rumelia. Dobrudja had been
under unceasing Ottoman domination until
1877 when, after the Russian-Romanian-Ot-
toman War, Romania gained independence
as a state, subsequently acknowledging Do-
brudja’s annexation by the Treaty of Berlin
( 1 8 7 8 ) .
The first Muslims – a group of 10-12,000
Anatolian Turkomans led by Sari Saltik – set-
tled down in Dobrudja in 1263-1264. The fa-
mous Arab traveller, Ibn Battutah (1334),
made the first documentary attestation of
Tartars living in this area. According to the
discovered traces, the first groups of Tartars,
as part of the empire of the Golden Horde,
seem to have settled here during the time of
the Tartar leader Noghai (1280-1310), who
ruled over the northern side of the Balkan
Peninsula up to Dobrudja. The name of
Noghai assumed by a part of Dobrudja Tar-
tars must have its origins in the colonization
of that time.
Sultan Bayezid I brought Tartars to the
area of Babadag. Later on, Sultan Mehmet I
(1413-1421) colonized in Dobrudja both
Tartars and Turkomans from Asia Minor. An-
other stage of the colonization in Dobrudja
is connected with the Sultan Bayezid II who
invited Volga Tartars to settle in the south-
ern Basarabia (Budjak) and northern Do-
brudja. During several stages, Anatolian
Turks were colonized in Dobrudja. During
the 17t h and 18t h centuries, the Crimean Tar-
tars continually migrated to Dobrudja. This
migration grew to a considerable size at the
time the Crimea was annexed by the Rus-
sians in 1783, after the Russian-Turkish War.
After the Crimean Tartar emigrants had es-
tablished themselves in Basarabia, as a first
stage of the emigration process, they then
crossed the Danube and settled down in
Dobrudja in 1812. As a result of these suc-
cessive emigrations, there are three Tartar
dialects in Dobrudja: the Crimean dialect or
the steppe dialect (in Tartar: k r i m or sol tili,
70%), the Noghai dialect (in Tartar: n o g h a i
t i l i, 20%) and the seaside dialect (in Tartar:
yaliboyi tili, 10%).
In order to accentuate the element of
Islam in Dobrudja, the Ottomans brought in
other populations from all over the Empire:
Persians, Kurds, and Arabs. The latter, for in-
stance, consisted in 150 Syrian families of
f e l l a h s who were brought to Dobrudja be-
tween 1831-1833. All these populations
mingled with the Turks, being assimilated
within a short period of time.
Turks, Tartars, Albanians and
G y p s i e s
At the beginning of the 20t h century, as a
result of the deterioration of the economical
conditions, Turkish and Tartar populations
migrated massively to Turkey, so that many
villages were left entirely abandoned. The
number of religious shelters can also demon-
strate the decrease of the Muslim popula-
tion. Whereas in 1900 there were 260
mosques in Dobrudja, at the end of World
War II there were only 151 left. The decrease
has remained in process up to the present
day, the number of functional mosques
coming down to about 80. The number of
Muslim graveyards has also decreased from
300 to 108, which are still in use.
Apart from the Turks and the Tartars,
other Muslim ethnic groups can also be
found in Romania, such as the Albanians
who emigrated in great number after World
War I from many regions of the Balkan
Peninsula. According to certain studies,
there are approximately 3,000 Muslim Alba-
nians in Romania. They are fully integrated
into the Tartar-Turkish community, not only
by means of marriage, but also through the
bonds of custom and tradition and by the
sharing of mosques and graveyards. This
makes it very difficult to establish their
exact number. A fact that is worth mention-
ing is that the first translation of the Koran
to modern Albanian (written with Latin let-
ters), entitled K o r a n i (K e n d i m i n i) was pub-
lished by Ilo Mitko Qafezezi – an Albanian
from Romania – in 1921 in Ploiesti. 
Another Muslim group in Romania is com-
prised of Muslim gypsies living in Dobrudja.
These are local gypsies who converted to
Islam during the Ottoman domination, or
Muslim gypsies who emigrated from other
parts of the Ottoman Empire. Some of them
seem to have mixed with the vagrant Anato-
lian Turks who were present in Dobrudja,
becoming an ethnic group now called ‘Turk
gypsies’. Their number is not exactly known
as they generally declare themselves Turks
in the census.
After 1989, new Muslim ethnic groups ap-
peared in important cities of Romania such
as Bucharest, Iasi, Cluj, and Timisoara. Such
groups are the Arabs (who came mostly
from the countries of the Arab Mashriq like
Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine); the
Iranians; the Kurds (who came from north-
ern Iraq and south-eastern Turkey), etc.
Some of these communities have their own
mosques, schools (such as the Iraqi School
in Bucharest), bilingual periodicals (Roman-
ian-Arabic) such as Al-’Usbu’ Al-’Arabi ( T h e
Arab Week), and cultural and religious cen-
tres (especially in Bucharest). These new
communities have not joined the old Mus-
lim community in Romania, the two groups
living almost parallel lives. Very few of these
newcomers to Romania have obtained Ro-
manian citizenship and those that have,
generally did so through marriage; most of
them emigrate to Western Europe after they
have remained in Romania for a while,
which makes these communities very unsta-
ble. On the other hand, many Turks from
Turkey have joined the old Turkish commu-
nity in Romania and consolidated it. There is
also a small number of Romanians that have
recently become Muslims, yet have not
formed a unified community.
Culture and education
Dobrudja is a place with lots of vestiges of
the Ottoman domination period, such as
mausoleums and tombs of some Muslim
saints and Ottoman magistrates that can be
found at Isaccea, Cernavoda and Babadag.
In Medgidia are the ruins of one of the old-
est Muslim schools (m e d r e s a) in the region.
There are also some mosques, still in use,
which are real masterpieces of architecture,
such as Esmahan Sultan Mosque in Man-
galia (constructed in 1590); Ghazi Ali Pasa
Mosque in Babadag (constructed in 1522);
and Hunkiar Mosque (constructed in 1870)
and Anadolkoy Mosque (constructed in
1860) in Constanta. During the Ottoman
times, education was mostly religious. In
Dobrudja, the oldest m e d r e s a was built in
Babadag in 1484, by the order of the Sultan
Bayezid II. After 1878, the Romanian State
reorganized the educational system in Do-
brudja, secularized it and introduced the
Romanian language in schools. The theo-
logical seminary in Medgidia, which had
been moved from Babadag in 1903, was
abolished in 1965. School education in Tar-
tar and Turkish was gradually eliminated
after 1959, and the study of these languages
became optional. After the fall of the com-
munist regime in Romania in 1989, the Turk-
ish language was reintroduced as study lan-
guage for both Turkish and Tartar ethnic
groups in the schools with Tartar and Turk-
ish pupils. Furthermore, in 1993 the Muslim
theological and pedagogic secondary school
‘Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ opened its doors,
continuing the tradition of old seminary. ♦
Dr George Grigore is professor at the Arabic
Department of the University of Bucharest and
research fellow at the Center for Arab Studies,
Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: grigoreg@hotmail.com
There are two monthly publications, issued in
Constanta, worthy of mention: H a k s e s (in Romanian
and Turkish) and K a r a d e n i z (‘The Black Sea’; in
Romanian, Turkish and Tartar). In addition, the
Kriterion publishing house in Bucharest has been
printing books in Turkish and Tartar languages since
1980. In the High Institutions of the State, there are
two deputies in Parliament representing two political
organizations of the Turkish-Tartar community in
Romania, namely the Democrat Union of the Turkish
Muslim Tartars in Romania and the Democrat Union
of the Turks in Romania.
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N o t e s
1 . ‘Normality’ refers to everyday practices that are
sanctioned as normal in a given group. The
practices are ordered in discourses. ‘The view of
the Swedish majority society’ refers to values or
systems of values promoted as representative for
the majority of Swedes. In connection with
schools, this often reflects middle class values.
2 . There are at least 250,000 persons with a Muslim
background in Sweden (no unobjectionable
statistics are available). The largest groups are the
Bosnians, Iranians, and Turks. There are also
numerous groups from Iraq, Somalia, Palestine,
Kurdistan, and smaller groups from several other
c o u n t r i e s .
3 . Some changes have occurred during the last year.
Certain schools in Malmö have rescheduled to fit
in Ramadan.
S c a n d a n a v i a
J O N A S  O TT E R B E C K
The limits of normality in Swedish public schools are
defined by the majority society.1 Structures that are
somewhat invisible to participants in the school sys-
tem uphold a structural marginalization of Muslim
pupils and exclude them from normality. This is not
only a question about what is taught in class as sub-
jects or how questions about diet are resolved, it is
also about how symbolic Muslim identities are
viewed. This can be seen in the light of how time and
space are structured in school.
’A School for All’
Muslim Pupils
i n S w e d e n
In 1975, the Swedish government made a
declaration that from then on Sweden was to
be a multicultural society. A programme of
three goals was put forward. Equality, free-
dom of choice and partnership were the key-
words. Since then, Sweden has changed in
many ways, and institutions to support the
multicultural society have been created, be-
come obsolete, reformed or closed down.
The discussion on the role of multicultural-
ism has affected the curriculum of the
Swedish public school. Today the school is
described as nondenominational and multi-
cultural. The school is ‘for all’, no cultures or
religions being subject to discrimination. The
school is, however, not neutral. Certain key
values are to be honoured, for example equal-
ity and democracy. The school is also meant
to protect the freedom and integrity of the in-
dividual, and the teachings and atmospheres
there are to be characterized by pluralism, tol-
erance, openness and respect for the dignity
of each human being.
The idea of a nondenominational school
was put forth in the curriculum of 1962, and in
that of 1969 the instruction in ‘Religion’
changed its profile from Christianity to all reli-
gions (but with the main focus on Christiani-
ty). These reforms were not made to meet the
demands of immigrant parents. Instead they
mirrored the ideas of the Swedish majority
society, especially the Social Democratic Party
who then had political hegemony. Today the
situation is different. Actual pluralism exists in
the schools. The rest of this article will devel-
op the difficulties of implementing the
above-mentioned ideals in the everyday life
of schools.
The rhythm of the majority
In school there is a certain rhythm of time
for the day, week and year. It consists in pub-
lic holidays, feasts, working hours, etc. It cre-
ates ideas of what normal distribution of
time is. The rhythm reflects a Swedish secu-
lar worldview, but also a Swedish Christian
heritage. It includes Christmas celebrations,
Lucia, the Easter celebrations, a ceremony in
a local church at the end of the term, etc.
This idea of a normality of distribution of
time is one plausibility structure of the ma-
jority society and as such it is often taken for
granted. Parents, teachers and educators
from the majority culture presuppose this
normality and when they meet with other’s
opinions and traditions, they are forced to
relativize their own tradition. There is a wide
range of reactions, from protectionism to a
will to change. One common reaction is: ‘But
it is important for all pupils to get to know
the Swedish traditions to be able to partici-
pate in the society’. Besides presupposing a
fixed ‘Swedish culture’, this is a kind of pro-
tectionism. Other things that are likewise im-
portant to understand in Swedish society are
taught in class and not enacted as rituals. It
sanctions some pupils’ normalities; while
others that would like to see, for example,
other time normalities, are excluded.
The rhythm of the minorities
Muslim pupils are not just Muslim pupils.
They carry other identities apart from the re-
ligious: national, ethnic, gender, and class
background. Furthermore, they also carry
subcultural identities formed around musical
styles, consumer patterns, political engage-
ment, etc.2 At the same time, however, ‘Mus-
lim’ is a symbolic identity that connects a per-
son to discourses on ‘Muslim-ness’ among
both Muslim and non-Muslim groups.
In Swedish schools there are no special ac-
tivities in connection with religious feasts
other than traditional Swedish Christian
o n e s .3 Thus, Id al-fitr and Id al-adha are not
celebrated by a break in the normal time-
flow of the week. Teachers do not read from
a s i r a of Muhammad, or talk about the im-
portance of the pilgrimage to Mecca. In-
stead Muslim pupils (and their parents)
have to negotiate for the right to be free on
certain extra days every year. Slowly, prag-
matic solutions have developed. As late as
1993, the board of the Schools of Stockholm
sent out a recommendation, advising the
schools to give Muslim pupils some days off
for the Ids if they so desired. The paper sent
out by the board was called ‘Fundamentalis-
tic Muslims’ demands on the School’. The
choice of words signals that these demands
are made by ‘difficult’ persons excluded
from Swedish normality.
Some pupils want to try to fast during Ra-
madan. It is common for parents (if they
place importance on Ramadan) to encour-
age their children to try to fast a couple of
years before it turns into a religious duty.
This begins with a day or two and then in-
creases over time. The children get feed-
back and encouragement if they succeed in
fasting. It is part of growing up and of taking
on a grown person’s responsibility. 
One boy told me how he had to go to the
school nurse during Ramadan. He had stom-
ach-ache and head pain. The nurse suggest-
ed that he take a painkiller, but the boy said
that he could not because he was fasting.
The nurse then told him that it was not
good for the body to fast and that all it re-
sulted in was that pupils had difficulties fol-
lowing the lectures. She obviously became
irritated because her proposed solution
could not solve the problem.
This is only one example amongst many,
but it fits into a pattern where Muslims are
excluded from normality. The Ramadan
fasting period and its rituals do not fit into
the time flow at school (I am not arguing
that it should or should not). Significant
persons for the secondary socialization of
the pupils, like teachers and other staff at
school, generally do not confirm this kind
of normality.
To move in school space
At certain schools in Sweden there are quite
a few girls who wear the veil. As a female
pupil from Eritrea recounted: ‘When you go
out, there are a lot of people who stare at you
when wearing the veil. I mean outside of
school’. The girl felt that inside the school no
one cared if she wore a veil. But outside, she
frequently had to deal with conflicts. 
At another school with many Muslim
pupils, a teacher conducted an experiment
after a discussion that I had with her about
positive recognition. She noticed that a girl
had a new veil and remarked that it was
beautiful. The girl turned that teacher into
her new idol and followed her around for al-
most a week. As the teacher claimed, this
was probably the first time she had ever
heard a non-Muslim adult saying something
positive about her veil or even about her
faith. 
Amongst pupils I think the veil is seen
more as a part of normality than amongst
the adults at schools. For several teachers,
especially female, the veil symbolizes fe-
male oppression. They find it hard to accept
it as something normal to wear the veil. This
dislike may be well hidden, but is some-
times detected by the pupils. When the
above-mentioned teacher expressed some-
thing positive about the veil this came as a
surprise for the girl.
The school is connected to the larger soci-
ety’s understanding of time and space. In it,
the time and space normalities of the major-
ity society are enacted. Being Muslim (com-
mitted or not) means to have a symbolic
identity connected to time and space nor-
malities other than those of the majority so-
ciety. My point is that it is possible to see
that in the socialization process of Muslim
youth their symbolic identities as Muslims
are often denied in school. But it is not as
simple as it is sometimes presented: If the
schools meet the needs and demands based
on normative Islam, everything is fine. The
symbolic identities will still be a problem.
This is not about Islamic theology, nor is it
very much about the practice. It is rather
only about certain parts of the faith and
practice that have consequences on behav-
iour and symbolic identities that contrast
the time and space normalities of the major-
ity. If schools are to be multicultural and
‘schools for all’, this will have to be looked
into, especially since Islam as a phenome-
non is highly disliked by the general public
(we have good statistic material to prove
t h a t ) .
Some adjustments could easily be made.
An important part of this is communication.
Both the schools and the parents have to
take their responsibility. On the one hand,
parents could inform the school about reli-
gious feasts. On the other, schools could
buy a multicultural calendar (there are at
least two Swedish ones) with the dates of
the main religious celebrations. Clearly, a
well thought out strategy is necessary in
changing the everyday experience of time
and space normalities that tend to margin-
alize Muslim pupils into one which is truly
m u l t i c u l t u r a l . ♦
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Wester n Eur o pe
MO C H .  N U R  I C H W AN
The Surinam-Javanese community in the Nether-
lands is divided over the question of the prayer di-
rection; some perform their prayers facing the East,
but most turn to the West. The majority are k e j a w e n,
following the syncretic practices and beliefs of Java.
In this community the keblat (qibla) expresses a
unique diasporic experience and identity.
Prayer in the 
S u r i n a m - J a v a n e s e
Diasporic Experience
The main route of Javanese diaspora in
the Netherlands was through Surinam.
From 1890 onward, the Dutch colonial au-
thorities in the Dutch East Indies (now In-
donesia) recruited villagers from Java as
contract workers for the plantations in an-
other Dutch colonial land, Surinam. Most of
them were k e j a w e n Muslims. K e j a w e n I s l a m ,
which was dominant in Javanese villages, is
a syncretic Islam which incorporated old Ja-
vanese beliefs, including Hindu-Buddhist el-
ements. The Javanese arrived in Surinam
without persons learned in religion. It was
not until the beginning of the 1930s that –
partly through contacts with Hindustani
Muslims – some realized that the Kacba was
not located to the West, but to the north-
east of Surinam. Subsequently, a number of
Javanese Muslims started praying in that di-
rection. This small group, led by Pak Samsi,
encouraged people to change their direc-
tion of prayer to the Northeast, usually sim-
plified as East. Since then, this small group
has been called Wong Madhep Ngetan ( e a s t -
k e b l a t people). Later some became very crit-
ical of what was seen as the superstition and
religious innovation (b i dca) among the Ja-
vanese Muslims. Others did not openly criti-
cize the practice of praying to the West as
most of the Javanese Muslims continued to
do; hence they are called Wong Madhep
N g u l o n ( w e s t -k e b l a t p e o p l e ) .1
Javanese prayer in
t h e N e t h e r l a n d s
When Surinam became independent in
1975, a number of Javanese opted for the
Dutch nationality and migrated to the
Netherlands. At present, over 22,000 Suri-
nam-Javanese live in this country, concen-
trated in the cities of The Hague, Amster-
dam, and Rotterdam.2 The majority of Ja-
vanese in the Netherlands adhere to k e-
j a w e n Islam, although a number of reformist
organizations have gained some ground
within the community. The organizations of
k e j a w e n Muslims in the Netherlands are
generally cultural organizations, but sever-
al, like Pitutur Islam, carry religious names.
Unlike their counterparts in Surinam, they
do not have their own mosques. There are
several active organizations amongst the Ja-
vanese Muslims praying to the East. One
such organization is the Al-Jamica t u l
Hasanah, which shares its mosque in Rotter-
dam with the PPME (Persatuan Pemuda
Muslim Eropa) the Young Muslim Associa-
tion of Europe, an organization which enter-
tains relations with the large Indonesian tra-
ditionalist organization, the Nahdlatul Ula-
ma. Members of the reformist Rukun Islam
organization in The Hague are associated
with the main reformist movement in In-
donesia, the Muhammadiyah.
The k e j a w e n Muslims conceive the re-
formists as belonging to an ‘Arabic Islam’. In
their attempts to preserve their Javanese
identity, the question of k e b l a t occupies an
important position. The debate on the k e-
b l a t that began in Surinam has been contin-
ued in the Netherlands, but the debate is
not as heated as it was in Surinam. One of
the reasons for this is that mosques do not
serve as the centre of activities for the k e-
j a w e n Muslims in the Netherlands: there are
no k e j a w e n mosques in the country. Thus as
yet they are not confronted with the ques-
tion of the direction of mosque’s m i h r a b.
Despite praying towards the West at home,
when visiting a mosque, k e j a w e n M u s l i m s
follow others and pray facing East. This
small group argues that it is not the direc-
tion of west or east that is of prime impor-
tance, but rather the way one purifies his or
her soul. Religious devotion is regarded as
having no value when one hurts and of-
fends others. Some refer to the Qur’an (S 2 :
177): ‘Righteousness is not to turn your
faces towards the East or the West; the
righteous is he who believes in Allah, the
Last Day, the angels, the Book and the
prophets.’ The leader of the Sido Muljo, a k e-
j a w e n organization in Rotterdam, holds that
one can face in any direction, not just west
or east, because God is omnipresent. In a re-
cent radio broadcast, however, he stated
that to be a devout Muslim one should ap-
parently behave like an Arab and abandon
his or her Javanese identity. He pointed to
the practice of rendering certain prayers in
Arabic and to the fact that some Javanese
texts are written in Arabic script (p e g o n). 
The head of the Pitutur Islam pleads for
the continuation of the western k e b l a t:
‘Facing East is done according to the peo-
ple of Saudi Arabia. We heard that in In-
donesia our ancestors faced to the West, in
the direction of the so-called Kacba. That
was in Negari Jawi [the land of Java].’ 
A D V E R T I S E M E N T
Continued on page 43
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No r th Amer i ca
R I C H AR D  B R E N T  T U R N E R  
Mainstream Islam has deep roots in the African-
American experience, roots that reach back to the
history of slavery and early 20t h-century black Sunni
communities in the United States. How has the issue
of race in the United States affected the practices and
the community experiences of black Sunni Muslims





Malcolm X’s hajj in 1964 and Warith Deen
Mohammed’s transformation of the Nation
of Islam into an orthodox community in
1975, are two of the more recent visible
signs of the importance of mainstream
Islam in the African-American experience.
African Americans comprise about 42% of
the Muslim population in the United States,
which is somewhere between four to six
million; and Sunni African-American Mus-
lims are the predominant community in the
United States today. Yet, the involvement of
black Americans with mainstream Islam is
not a recent phenomenon. It reaches back
to the earliest days of the transatlantic slave
trade and has roots in early 20t h- c e n t u r y
African-American Sunni communities. 
Mainstream Islam and slavery 
Muslim slaves – involuntary immigrants,
who had been the urban-ruling elite in West
Africa, constituted at least 15% of the slave
population in North America in the 18t h a n d
1 9t h centuries. Their religious and ethnic
roots could be traced to ancient black Islam-
ic kingdoms in Ghana, Mali, and Sohghay.
Some of these West African Muslim slaves
brought the first mainstream Islamic beliefs
and practices to America by keeping Islamic
names, writing in Arabic, fasting during the
month of Ramadan, praying five times a
day, wearing Muslim clothing, and writing
and reciting the Quran. 
The fascinating portrait of a West African
Muslim slave in the United States who re-
tained mainstream Islamic practices was
that of the Georgia Sea Island slave, Bilali.
He was one of at least twenty black Muslims
who are reported to have lived and prac-
tised their religion in Sapelo Island and St.
Simon’s Island during the antebellum peri-
od. The Georgia Sea Islands provided fertile
ground for mainstream Islamic retention
thanks to their relative isolation form Euro-
American influences. Bilali was noted for his
devotion, for wearing Islamic clothing, for
his Muslim name, and for his ability to write
and speak Arabic. Moreover, available evi-
dence suggests that he might have been
the leader of a small local black Muslim
community. Islamic traditions in his family
were retained for at least three generations.
By the eve of the Civil War, the old Islam of
the West African Muslim slaves was, for all
practical purposes defunct, because these
Muslims were not able to develop commu-
nity institutions to perpetuate their religion.
When they died, their version of Islam,
which was African-American, private, with
mainstream and heterodox practices disap-
peared. 
Early 20t h-century mainstream
communities 
In the late 19t h-century, the Pan-Africanist
ideas of Edward Wilmot Blyden (1832-1912),
which critiqued Christianity for its racism
and suggested Islam as a viable religious al-
ternative for African Americans, provided
the political framework for Islam’s appeal to
black Americans in the early 20t h c e n t u r y .
Moreover, the internationalist perspective
of Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Im-
provement Association and the Great Mi-
gration of more than one million black
southerners to northern and midwestern
cities during the World War I era, provided
the social and political environment for the
rise of African-American mainstream com-
munities from the 1920s to the 1940s. The
Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam, a heterodox
missionary community from India, laid the
groundwork for mainstream Islam in black
America, by providing African Americans
with their first Qurans, important Islamic lit-
erature and education, and linkages to the
world of Islam. 
Black Sunni Muslims can trace their roots
in the United States, in the early 20t h c e n t u-
ry, to two multi-racial communities: the Is-
lamic Mission of America, led by Shaykh
Dauod Ahmed Faisal in New York City and
the First Mosque of Pittsburgh. Influenced
by the Muslim immigrant communities, by
Muslim sailors from Yemen, Somalia, and
Madagascar, and by the Ahmadi translation
of the Quran, Shaykh Daoud, who was born
in Morocco and came to the United States
from Grenada, established the Islamic Mis-
sion of America, also called the State Street
Mosque, in New York City in 1924. This was
the first African-American mainstream com-
munity in the United States. 
Shaykh Daoud’s wife, ‘Mother’ Khadijah
Faisal, who had Pakistani Muslim and black
Caribbean roots, became the president of
the Muslim Ladies Cultural Society. The Is-
lamic Mission of America published its own
literature, including S a h a b i y a t, a Muslim
journal for women. This influential commu-
nity spread mainstream practices among
black Muslims on the East Coast in the 1920s
and 1930s and has continued to be signifi-
cant to African-American Sunni Muslims for
the remainder of the 20t h century. 
The First Mosque of Pittsburgh, Pennsyl-
vania was established in 1945, by African-
American Muslims who wished to spread
the teachings of Islam; build mosques; es-
tablish the Jumah prayer in their communi-
ty; aid its members in case of death or ill-
ness; and unite with the Muslim communi-
ties in the United States. This mainstream
community was the result of a spiritual
metamorphosis after its previous associa-
tions with the heterodox philosophies of
the Moorish Science Temple and the Ah-
madiyya. In the 1950s, they established
Young Muslim Women’s and Young Men’s
Muslim Associations which provided social
services to the local community. Eventually,
the First Mosque of Pittsburgh issued sub-
charters to African-American Sunni commu-
nities in several other cities.
In the early 20t h century, there is strong
evidence of a vibrant multi-racial main-
stream Islamic community in New York City
which included black Americans, African,
Turkish, Polish, Lithuanian, Russian, Indian,
Albanian, Arab, Persian, and Caribbean peo-
ples. However, this multi-racial model,
which also developed among Sunni Mus-
lims in the midwestern United States, does
not suggest a race and colour-blind com-
munity experience, as immigrant Muslims
were noted for their ethnic, racial, and lin-
guistic separation from African-American
Muslims during this period. Finally, these
early African-American Sunni communities
were overshadowed by the successful mis-
sionary work of the heterodox Ahmadiyya
and later by the ascendancy of the Nation of
Islam in the 1950s. Mainstream Islam did not
become a popular option for African-Ameri-
can Muslims until the 1960s. 
Mainstream Islam in
contemporary Black America 
Large numbers of African Americans have
turned to mainstream Islamic practices and
communities since Malcolm X’s conversion
to Sunni Islam in 1964 and his establishment
of the Muslim Mosque, Inc. in New York City.
Like Malcolm X, African-American Sunni Mus-
lims see themselves as part of the main-
stream Muslim community in the world of
Islam and study Arabic, fast during the
month of Ramadan, and pray five times a
day. The dramatic growth of Sunni Islam in
black America is also related to the arrival of
more than one million Muslims in the United
States after the American immigration laws
were reformed in 1965.
Elijah Muhammad’s son, Warith Deen Mo-
hammed, has played an important role
within mainstream Islam in the United
States. He became the Supreme Minister of
the Nation of Islam after his father’s death in
1975. During the first years of his leadership,
he mandated sweeping changes, which he
called the ‘Second Resurrection’ of African
Americans, in order to align his community
with mainstream Islam. He refuted the Na-
tion of Islam’s racial-separatist teachings,
and praised his father for achieving the ‘First
Resurrection’ of black Americans by intro-
ducing them to Islam. But now the commu-
nity’s mission was directed not only at black
Americans, but also at the entire American
environment. The new leader renamed the
Nation of Islam the ‘World Community of Al-
Islam in the West’ in 1976; the ‘American
Muslim Mission’ in 1980; and the ‘Muslim
American Community’ in the 1990s. Minis-
ters of Islam were renamed ‘imams’ and
temples were renamed ‘mosques’ and
‘m a s j i d s ’. The community’s lucrative finan-
cial holdings were liquidated and main-
stream rituals and customs were adopted.
Although Warith Deen Mohammed’s posi-
tive relationships with immigrant Muslims,
the world of Islam and the American gov-
ernment are important developments in the
history of mainstream Islam in the United
States, his group has diminished in mem-
bers since the 1980s. 
Darul Islam, founded in Brooklyn, New
York in 1962 and having branches in many
major American cities, is probably the
largest and most influential community of
African-American Sunni Muslims. The Dar’s
practices and community experience focus
on the utilization of the Quran and hadith,
as such the members of the community do
not follow the teachings of a particular con-
temporary leader. Prestige and leadership
are based on knowledge of the Quran, the
hadith and the Arabic language. Darul Islam
is a private decentralized community, which
did not allow immigrants in its midst until
the mid-1970s. The Hanafi Madh-hab Cen-
ter, founded by Hammas Abdul Khalis in the
1960s, is an African-American Sunni group
that made headlines in the 1970s because
of its conversion of the basketball star, Ka-
reem Abdul Jabbar and the assassination of
Khalis’ family in their Washington D.C. head-
q u a r t e r s .
Although African-American Muslims pop-
ulate multi-ethnic Sunni m a s j i d s and organi-
zations across the United States, reportedly
there are subtle racial and ethnic tensions
between African-American and immigrant
Muslims today. Immigrant Muslims talk
about ‘a colour and race-blind Islam’ and
the American dream, while African-Ameri-
can Muslims continue to place Islam at the
forefront of the struggles for social justice,
as the United States enters a new century of
frightening racial violence and corruption.
Certainly, African-American and immigrant
Muslims have a lot to learn from each other
and need to present a united front on social
justice issues, as mainstream Islam’s appeal
and ascendancy in the United States in the
next century may depend on American
Muslims’ ability to claim a moral and politi-
cal high ground on those social justice is-
sues that have historically divided the
American Christian population. ♦
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The C a rr i b ea n
G U S T AV  TH AI S S
Beginning in the 19t h century, a wave of indentured
workers were brought by the British from India to
Trinidad to work the plantations which had been
abandoned by former slaves who had been freed by
the abolition of slavery in 1838. By 1917, the end of
indentureship, nearly 144,000 workers had been
brought to Trinidad. The majority came from the
North Indian areas of Agra and Oudh (Awadh), and
while most were Hindu, there were Muslims among




in TrinidadThe Muslims brought their devotionalpractices with them to the Caribbean and
they continued to commemorate the Mu-
harram rituals on the plantations. Workers
on the estates, including Muslims, Hindus,
Creoles and Chinese, donated funds for the
construction of the t acz i y a h s, which were
carried in processions. Competition (some-
times violent) often arose between the es-
tates for the most attractive t acz i y a h, or
Hosay as it was often called (a colloquial
pronunciation of Husayn). In Trinidad, as in
India, a t acz i y a h (also known as t a d j a h) is an
elaborately decorated, colourful simulacrum
of the tomb of Husayn which is conveyed in
p r o c e s s i o n s .1 In Iran, of course, t acz i y a h r e f e r s
to ritual dramatic performances or ‘passion-
plays’. 
The Muharram rituals quickly became the
main symbol of Indian nationalism in the
face of British colonialism and of a sense of
identity vis-à-vis Indian minority status in
the Black Caribbean. Despite their differ-
ences, however, the Creoles, Indians and
others joined together in the Hosay proces-
sions to protest various injustices, including
the reduction of wages on the plantations
and the concomitant increase in workload.
It has even been said that the Hosay gave
symbolic form to a growing working-class
consciousness throughout the Caribbean.2
Such activities began to cause anxiety be-
cause of the allegedly increasing tendency
to riotous behaviour. Throughout the 19th
century, great alarm was expressed by
British authorities and other colonists over
the threat to public order of the Muharram
rituals (as well as Carnival celebrations) cul-
minating in the Hosay massacre of 1884 (re-
ferred to by the British as the ‘Coolie Distur-
bances in Trinidad’).
Interestingly, despite the violence often
associated with Muharram rituals, the day of
cAshura itself (the tenth of Muharram) has a
somewhat ambiguous meaning in the Mus-
lim world. It is a day on which numerous rit-
uals of joy and happiness have been cele-
brated for centuries throughout the Sunni
world, especially in North Africa and Egypt.
On the other hand cAshura, for the Shi’a, is a
day for rituals of remembrance and mourn-
ing commemorating the tragic martyrdom
and self-sacrifice of Husayn at the battle of
Karbala in 61/680. Indeed, some medieval
scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya and al-
Maqrizi have even suggested that the joy-
ous celebration of cAshura among the Sunni
was a later ‘innovative’ attempt to insult the
Shi’a followers of Husayn ibn cAli, since such
joyful practices are not supported by au-
thentic h a d i t h.3 In India, many of the Muhar-
ram commemorations bring together both
sorrowful and festive features. 
Muharram and the
carnivalesque in Trinidad
Over the last century or so, what has been
the major tragic event in the Shi’a Muslim
ritual calendar has been increasingly trans-
formed into a ‘ f ê t e ’ with a carnival-like ambi-
ence, second only to the main carnival in
the festival schedule of Trinidad. The Shi’a
Muslim organizers deeply believe in the reli-
gious significance of this event while the 30-
40,000 spectators/participants have little
knowledge of its religious purpose. The
non-Muslim spectators/participants (Afro-
Trinidadians, Hindus, some Sunni and oth-
ers) treat it as a f ê t e, using terms borrowed
from carnival such as ‘bacchanal’, ‘jump-up’,
‘shake-up’, and ‘mas’, which are appropriate
to their definition of the situation. They
view the Muharram rituals in this way par-
tially because of the actions of the Shi’a
themselves who borrow aspects of Carnival
in the construction, style of public presenta-
tion and decoration. The Hosay is built in
the I m a m b a r a in the ‘y a r d ’ of the builder
and when they ‘come out’ onto the streets
on Tasuca and cAshura, the event is trans-
formed into public entertainment, into
street theatre. 
The Hosay/t acz i y a h structure varies in
height, averaging 10 to 15 feet and is totally
covered with brightly coloured tinfoil with
added variations depending on the design
in a given year, sometimes with strings of
coloured lights, flowers, mirrors, or coloured
cloth creating a dazzling display.4 The upper
section is decorated with domes of varying
shapes and sizes and other impressive deco-
rative features (Interestingly, while re-
searching the construction of the Hosay/
t acz i y a h, I noticed the builder was copying
the dome-style of St. Basil’s Orthodox
Church in Moscow from the cover of a N a-
tional Geographic magazine sitting on his
workbench). 
As the procession gains momentum on
the streets, it is met by more participants
who join in the rising emotional tension.
The battle drums evoke a feeling of great
excitement and are evaluated by the spec-
tators in terms of the ‘sweetness’ of their
sounds. Many of the t a s s a drums have iden-
tifying ‘names’ painted on them as do the
p a n or steel drums in Carnival. Some are tra-
ditional such as ‘Husayn’, ‘Karbala’, or
‘Hasan’, while others have such ‘names’ as
‘Conan’, ‘Rock and Roll’, or ‘Poison’. The lat-
ter is an interesting double-entendre in the
best tradition of Calypso, representing both
a significant word in the Muharram tradi-
tion, namely the poison associated with the
death of Hasan, as well as being the name of
a currently popular hard-rock group. As the
Shi’a chant ‘Hosay’, ‘Hosay’, ‘Hosay’, specta-
tors join in with slight, quickly spoken mod-
ifications such as ‘Hosay, I say’, ‘Hosay, I say’,
the rhyming patterns of which are bor-
rowed from the Calypso tradition in
Trinidad. 
Popular foods, soft drinks, rum and beer
are available from street vendors, unlike
water, which was traditionally available as a
remembrance of the thirst of the martyrs.
The Shi’a recognize that changes are occur-
ring over which they seem to have little con-
trol; but at the same time they say ‘We are
living in Trinidad where 45% of the popula-
tion is Negro and 42% is Indian, we must in-
tegrate. I’ve always maintained that the
t acz i y a h in itself is a form of togetherness. It
keeps us together’. This new multicultural
interpretation of the Hosay is also reflected
in the views of others. A Hindu Sadhu, for
example, understood the Hosay to be a ritu-
al remembrance of a conflict between two
brothers, Hasan and Hosayn, one of whom
had been a Muslim and the other a Hindu,
and ‘they died together battling over their
Faiths. People now make the tadjahs to
commemorate their deaths, and “to show
we should all live in unity together”.’5
Sunni Muslims in Guyana, Fiji and else-
where were able to have similar t acz i y a h e d-
ifices and processions banned in their coun-
tries as un-Islamic and a ‘mockery’ of a ‘pure’
Islam. The Sunni in Trinidad, despite pro-
tests for the past century, have not been
successful in banning the Hosay. One rea-
son for this is government recognition, es-
pecially in recent years, of the value of
t o u r i s m .
While the government acknowledges the
Sunni Anjuman Sunnatul Jamaat Associa-
tion as the official spokes-group for Muslims
in Trinidad, it nevertheless has turned to
tourism to gain needed foreign currency
and has not hesitated to exploit its ‘natural’
cultural resources – the cultural perfor-
mances and tourist ‘productions’ of its het-
erogeneous society. Carnival and the music
of the steel band or Pan are two of the most
important ethnic practices which have be-
come objectified and displayed as heritage
objects, distinctive of Trinidad as a national
entity. Thus, while Carnival is largely an
Afro-centric spectacle reflecting the very
essence of the Trinidadian colonial experi-
ence, the Hosay represents the Indian and
the broader multicultural unity of the coun-
try and hence a value to be exploited. In
many respects the t acz i y a h has become a
moving, processional exhibit, an objectifica-
tion not only of the architectural beauty,
colours and display of the t acz i y a h, but also,
to the government of Trinidad as well as to
the people themselves (the Shi’a and non-
Muslim participants), an embodiment of the
ethos of the f ê t e – the oneness and brother-
hood of a heterogeneous society.
To whom does the Hosay
b e l o n g ?
What is presently occurring in Trinidad is
an implicit process of negotiation, which is
defining and socially creating the reality of
Hosay. But who ‘owns’ the ‘rights’ to a reli-
gious ritual? It may seem a patently ridicu-
lous question, but the issue of authenticity
and multi-vocality lies at its very core. If vari-
ous religious and ethnic groups participate
in a ritual such as the Hosay and give it idio-
syncratic meanings, is it then not ‘theirs’, as
well as belonging to organizers and spon-
sors, who have a different meaning of its
‘truth’? In a very real sense the Hosay is an ar-
ticulation of socio-cultural differences and
similarities. In the discursive process, a ritual
and social world is given meaning, but one
which is always contestable and open to re-
articulation. It is a never-ending process of
negotiation. What t acz i y a h once was in India,
it is not today; and what it is today, it will not
be tomorrow, although in that process vari-
ous participants try to fix its meaning to re-
flect their view of the world. ♦
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F i e l d w o r k
H E L E N E  B A S U
Among the diverse practitioners of Islam in Gujarat,
the Sidi stand out for their unique combination of a
Sufi saint cult with the veneration of their African an-
cestry. Members of the small African Diaspora num-
bering ca. 6–7000 in Gujarat, trace their origins to
slaves from the hinterlands of the East African coast
captured and sold to India by Gujarati, Arab and Per-
sian traders till the late 19t h century. Today their de-
scendants, the Sidi, live in ramshackle houses in




F a k i r :
the African Diaspora
i n G u j a r a t
Amongst the regional Muslim population,
the Sidi belong to the poor who are exempt-
ed from undertaking the h a j j or giving alms.
Rather, they themselves are receivers of
z a k a t and other types of alms. Considering
the unsteady and low income men and
women derive – mainly from domestic ser-
vice – some resort to begging, which is at
times the only way to meet the daily de-
mands for food in the household. However,
individual begging outside a ritual context is
considered shameful, whereas gifts received
for group performances of dancing or other
activities related to the cult are seen as ex-
pressions of emotion and respect accorded
to the Sidi ancestors. Therefore, in times of
need, people seek to develop strategies of
begging that allow for avoiding the shame
and humiliation associated with standing at
the roadside with open hands. This latter ap-
plies typically to women who ultimately
have to feed men and children, even when
the men are unemployed or otherwise inca-
pable of supplying enough money. In addi-
tion, there are quite a number of households
run by women without a husband. During
my fieldwork (1987-1989), I often wondered
about the hundreds of little sources women
could mysteriously tap when a household
seemed at the verge of a major collapse. As
an instructive example of Sidi women’s inge-
nuity in mobilizing social obligations to give
gifts or alms, I would like to present the fol-
lowing case which also sheds light on how
the presence of the fieldworker may be used
tactically by the people studied in following
their own pursuits. 
Throughout my fieldwork I spent much
time in the village neighbouring the main
shrine of the Sidi, the d a r g a h of Bava Gor in
the South of Gujarat. The twenty Sidi families
of this village all basically see themselves as
religious virtuosos involved in f a q i r i , a l-
though they also grow some grain and do
odd jobs here and there. But whereas in the
past the income of the shrine was distrib-
uted equally amongst the resident Sidi
f a q i r s, nowadays it is in a process of expand-
ing its clientele and one family has managed
to control the d a r g a h and its income more or
less to the exclusion of the others. Amongst
the latter was Madina, a woman who was
around sixty years old when we first met.
Madina had no children of her own but lived
with her brother’s recently divorced daugh-
ter and her two daughters and one son be-
tween the ages of three to ten. In addition,
there was the old husband of Madina who
suffered from tuberculosis. Formerly, he had
been one of the main f a q i r s at the shrine but
then became ill and contributed nothing to
the household subsistence. They owned a
small plot of land on which the women grew
lentils, sufficient for about four to five
months a year. Madina and the younger
woman worked occasionally as domestics in
one of the nearby towns in order to feed the
children, the sick husband and themselves.
On jumma rat, holy Thursday, which was the
busiest day at the d a r g a h attracting up to
150 visitors (many of whom seek a cure from
possession), they sat with other Sidi women
near the tomb hoping for alms. 
The visit
Once Madina suggested I accompany her
to a ‘brother’ whom, she said, was a Hindu
but a stout follower of Bava Gor, filled with
sympathy for her and whom he treated as
his ‘sister’. She was full of praises for the
man’s generous and sympathetic ways and
insisted that I meet him myself. The next day
we left, Madina carrying a shabby bag that
looked rather empty. After having travelled
by bus some thirty kilometres, we walked
from the road through dry fields until we
reached the village. It took some time be-
fore Madina found her destination, the
house of Rambhai, which was larger com-
pared to the other houses in the street, but
by no means resembling a rich peasant’s
shelter. A middle-aged woman sat near the
door and looked apprehensively at the tall
and dark figure of Madina approaching. She
gave no sign of knowing her. Madina greet-
ed the woman with a broad smile and asked
for Rambhai. He was expected to return
from the fields at lunchtime. Only after Mad-
ina had introduced herself as a B a v a g o r v a l i
and me, the foreigner who, she said, wanted
to meet all sorts of people in villages and
therefore she had thought it a good idea to
take me to Rambhai, were we asked inside
the house and offered a glass of water.
While we waited, the woman busied herself
in the background and talked extensively
about this year’s bad crop due to the
draught (the rains had failed), the loss of a
buffalo cow and the general difficulty of
making a living these days. Madina agreed.
Finally, Rambhai turned up. Startled by the
strange foreigner sitting in his living room
next to an unmistakably poor Muslim
woman, recognizable from the long dress
Madina wore over her loose trousers, Ramb-
hai asked the other woman, apparently his
wife, who these visitors were and what they
wanted. She did not know either. Madina re-
minded him of his visit at the d a r g a h s o m e
four to five years back when he had brought
a female relative possessed by an evil spirit.
Didn’t he remember, Madina asked undis-
turbed, that she had looked after his relative
and that he, Rambhai, had called her sister?
It seemed, Rambhai had forgotten about it.
Still, he ordered his wife to prepare a meal
for us. 
A neighbour dropped in, a young man
who spoke a little English and said he was ‘B.
Com’. He explained to me that ‘these peo-
ple’ (the Sidi) are rather good-for-nothings
and beggars and I should be very careful as-
sociating with them but that they are very
powerful when it comes to evil spirits which
may harm ‘good people’ like himself and his
caste. This is, the young man clarified, be-
cause these Habshis are much closer to
demons and spirits than ordinary people.
Therefore, they may control them in a way
other people can not – and look, he said,
now roaring with laughter, at how black
they are, almost like demons! I looked at
Madina who sat somewhat behind the
young man and who, though she did not ex-
actly understand the words, smiled broadly
at me while making an obscene gesture
pointing with her finger to the lower parts
of her body. Then the meal was ready and
the young man disappeared. 
A sister’s right to a gift 
Meanwhile, I had become increasingly
confused about the whole venture of our
visit, not seeing any point in Madina’s want-
ing to come here in the first place. After
lunch, though, things became clearer. While
Rambhai fulfilled his obligations as host sit-
ting with us through the final cup of tea,
Madina produced a red string with some
glittering silver paper at one side from her
bag and confidently announced that now,
like a true sister, she would give r a k s h a-
b a n d h a n to her brother. Although the prop-
er day for this Hindu ritual – when the sister
ties a string round the wrist of her brother
who reciprocates the gesture with a gift ac-
cording to his means – had passed since
several weeks, Rambhai could not but ac-
cept Madina’s sisterly act. Our departure
then was postponed for another half an
hour. First, the wife filled Madina’s bag with
grain and then brought another sack for me.
My protests, from utter embarrassment and
thinking of the dead buffalo, the draught
and all the rest, went unheard (I secretly
thought I could just buy for Madina what
she would have lost by my refusal). On top
of it, we were both given a fifty-rupee note.
When I tried, at least, to return the money, I
was told that since we had come together I
was no different from Madina and therefore
had to accept whatever was given, other-
wise they would have to suffer the evil con-
sequences of improper response to a sister’s
tying the string to her brothers wrist. This
could not be argued. Back in the Sidi village,
Madina was quite satisfied with the out-
come of our trip and kept reminding me of
her nice ‘brother’. 
With the Sidi, one is likely to encounter sit-
uations such as these during fieldwork,
when one’s own estimation of the interac-
tions observed seem contrary to people’s
rationalizations of what has happened. For
example, the Sidi consciously reject the
name ‘Habshi’ (from Arabic ‘Habash’) be-
cause it is used with a derogatory and often
racist meaning such as the young man had
deployed. However, Madina and other Sidi
have their own ways of countering conde-
scending attitudes and racism – the as-
sumed superiority of the Other is ridiculed
and debased. By exploiting custom and cul-
tural values such as gift giving, the Sidi are
able to re-interpret and thus subvert atti-
tudes and behaviour that would otherwise
undermine the self-respect and dignity of
the people. ♦
Sidi girls
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A p p r o a c h e s
C O N S T A N T  H A M È S
Scientific research, especially in the social sciences,
is extremely tributary to the ideas and the practices
in the societies where researchers live. It is thus that
studies conducted on religious phenomena, and no-
tably on Islam, experienced an eclipse characteristic
of the sixties and seventies. The reason for this,
amongst others, was that the class of intellectuals
and politicians were essentially preoccupied with
struggles and a social utopia of progress without ref-
erence, and even in opposition, to the traditional re-
ligious institutions. In an inverse yet equally exces-
sive movement, the eighties and nineties were wit-
ness to a veritable explosion of these same studies in
the context of identity, political, and social re-vindi-
cation, particularly coming from the Muslim world
and advocating an overtly religious ideology.
Magic, Islam 
and Scientific Research
In the eighties and nineties a ‘pendulum’
phenomenon can be observed in terms of
magic, both in practice and in studies con-
secrated to it. However, comparison with re-
ligious phenomena allows a significant dif-
ference to appear. Research on all that is
qualified as ‘Muslim’ abounds, except that
which concerns the sector of magical prac-
tices and ideas. It is not that the latter do not
exist: on the contrary, all the indications at-
test to their dynamism and vitality. In
France, since some 20 years, the West
African – and now North African – Muslim
marabouts counsel numbers of people in
their homes and some by means of radio
communication. These same practitioners
in Senegal, for example, prescribe recipes
and talismans for years on end, which can
be found by the hundreds in rubbish bins
after use.1 Private manuscript libraries in
West Africa almost always have their fair
share of manuals on magic, divination,
prayers of request, Quranic talismans, etc.
So-called ‘Islamic’ book stores all over the
Muslim world publish and republish small
and large books on magic – encouraged to
do so by the tangible benefits that create
belief in an increased social demand. It is
also not that research on magic is faltering;
on the contrary, its development follows, al-
beit in smaller proportions, the rising curve
of studies on the ‘religious’. But oddly
enough, its point of application concerns
societies of antiquity. Henceforth, it must
b e questioned whether there are obstacles
to developing the study of magic within the
framework of Islam.
Magic and European
R a t i o n a l i s m
In reality, all that was considered pell-
mell, magic, superstition, and witchcraft
was, in Europe, subject to reprobation, even
condemnation, by triumphant scientistic
thought at the end of the 19th and early 20t h
centuries and by Christian churches anxious
to eliminate, or at least relegate, a non-insti-
tutional and uncontrolled ‘sacred’ to the
margins of folklore. However, it seems that
European colonialism, which was launched
at that time, with that rationalist frame of
mind – as lay as it was religious – had natu-
rally been tempted to classify into the cate-
gories of magical thought a substantial part
of the beliefs of the colonized peoples, in-
cluding Muslims. In the colonial period,
works on magic experienced an hour of
glory, all the more significant since they also
placed within an evolutionist theory the
ideas of magic as an inferior or primitive
stage of an evolution of beliefs. Here reli-
gion and, according to some, science repre-
sented superior or ultimate stages. While
Islam was well recognized as a religion in
the field, colonial thinking deemed it em-
broiled in a jumble of ‘survivals’ and magical
behaviours. The European discourse in
which magic (inferior stage of religion) is
the concern of ‘others’ (in other words the
colonized) is found in many examples, in
some respects erudite and elaborate, such
as Magie et religion dans l’Afrique du Nord
(1908) by E. Doutté, or more unexpectedly,
in the analyses of the sociology of religion
by Max Weber (1864-1920).2
Europeans’ rationalist and normative way
of looking at certain beliefs and practices of
the colonized peoples provoked in turn, at-
titudes of censorship, discomfort and sup-
pression by the latter when faced with be-
haviour and ideas that earned them accusa-
tions of credulity, charlatanism, and back-
wardness. Taking upon themselves these
value judgements – made in the name of
reason, science, and progress – the intellec-
tual and political elite of the Muslim world,
at the moment of decolonization, took their
ideas even further and contributed to the si-
lencing of a substantial part of social prac-
tices to which the populations turned to
find solutions to or relief for their problems
and anxieties.
That Europe itself suffered from this at-
mosphere of censorship and avoidance of
magic is not at issue here. The point is the
particular discredit that – for Muslims and
Europeans alike – adversely affected all
magical activities and consequently the
scientific studies thereof. 
Magical Rituals and
C o n s u l t a t i o n s
With some distance, in relation to the
ideas of the colonial period and equally in re-
lation to the rationalist simplifications, the
moment may seem favourable for placing
anew the concept of magic within Islamic
thought into perspective. The materials
have been gathered – notably concerning
talismans with written engravings – and the-
oretical analyses such as those contained in
the collective work of Mirecki and Meyer3
have progressed. It is time to fit the Islamic
practices and ideas that M. Mauss did not
have at disposition in his time into E s q u i s s e
d’une théorie générale de la magie ( 1 9 0 2 ) .
Our own analyses bring us to certain ob-
servations and hypotheses. Utilization of a
magic containing Islamic, oral, or more
often written elements is found to be pre-
sent in every period and in every region of
the Muslim world. What is so surprising? The
notions of magic-witchcraft (s i h r), of the ma-
gician or sorcerer (s â h i r), or the bewitched
person, are strongly attested to in the Quran
and the hadith and constitute part of the
psychological and social realities of the uni-
verse of Muslim thought. The questions
posed by the Muslim world concerning
these realities often concern knowing how
to benefit from these available forces or
how to use them in such a way that is
canonically licit. From this point of view, the
Quranic condemnation of s i h r, completely
unclear in terms of those practices which
were in fact condemned, often accentuated
the secrecy of this sector of activity and
thought. Thus, the position of an author of
treatises of magic was most likely not al-
ways comfortable, if seen the light of re-
course to pseudonyms (pseudo-Aristotle,
pseudo-Hermès, pseudo-Ghazâlî, pseudo-
Suyûtî, etc.) or in terms of the difficulty in
determining whether a well-known author
such as, for example, al-Bûnî, represents
more than a name. It is noteworthy that this
situation is no longer true today. It is thus
that Shaykh Mâl’aynîn (died 1910), great re-
ligious man of letters and man of politics of
western Sahara, openly took up and re-
worked, in certain works published in Fez at
the turn of the century, the magical formu-
las attributed to al-Bûnî. In the same sense,
we observe that certain West African mara-
bouts no longer hesitate to demonstrate
their skills in astrology, despite the fact that
this ‘science’ had been formerly subject to
formal religious condemnation.
It seems important, theoretically, to return
all scientific autonomy to the concept of
magic and to consider it as a complete
structure of the human relation to the
world. That notably implies not defining
magic negatively, in relation to religion as
well as to science. Many domains of re-
search on Islamic magic have yet to be cov-
ered. In addition to field investigations on
the process of consultations, and of mak-
ing/carrying out magical rituals, it is neces-
sary to complete the inventories of ancient
texts, and gather data on the transmission
and teaching of the occult sciences about
which we know almost nothing. And be-
yond the numerous ‘technical’ questions,
such as the analysis of the printed transfor-
mation of the Quran when used in a talis-
manic way, we must compare the ‘powers’
of holy figures to those of magicians. Fur-
thermore, we must reflect upon the signifi-
cance and impact of all the practices con-
cerned at a societal level: is magic genuinely
‘a battlement against social destructions’ as
R. Girard4 h o l d s ? ♦
Constant Hamès is researcher at the Centre National
de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris, France.
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C F E Y
F R AN Ç O I S  B U RG A T The French Center for  Yemeni Studies
R e s e a r c h
Since 1982, the mission of the French
Center for Yemeni Studies (CFEY) is to initi-
ate, coordinate and to support the works of
the French, Yemeni, or foreign teams in the
Social Sciences and Archaeology focusing
on Yemen and its neighbouring countries
(Oman, Saudi Arabia, Eritrea). The fields of
current research are broad: from South Ara-
bian civilization to the construction of the
modern State; cultural heritage, identity
and change in Yemen; the archaeology and
history of Southern Arabia in the pre-Islam-
ic and Islamic periods; the study of the so-
cial significance of traditional practices and
of the evolving dynamics in contemporary
Yemeni society. 
The CFEY provides students and re-
searchers the scientific, documentary, ad-
ministrative and accommodation services
necessary for their projects. In the social
and political sciences, the CFEY attempts to
train specialists on Yemen and to encour-
age researchers on the Arab cultural area to
more systematically integrate comparative
contributions on this country, which is
often seen as the ‘historical matrix’ of the
Arab and Muslim world. Research results,
whether preliminary or final, are regularly
presented to interested audiences through
public lectures given in French, Arabic or
English. These conferences take place ei-
ther at the centre itself or in other locations
in Sanaa.
Cooperation and Formation
The CFEY cooperates in its research mis-
sions with several Yemeni, French and/or
foreign academic institutions. These collab-
orations can develop into partnerships with
the establishment of joint programmes.
Alongside its own programmes or in coop-
eration, the CFEY is able to support individ-
ual projects of students or researchers who
are designated by their universities. The re-
quests, accompanied by a brief presenta-
tion of the research project and a letter of
recommendation, must be submitted to the
centre at the beginning of the university’s
academic year. The CFEY is also able to facil-
itate the stay of students wanting to attend
intensive sessions or individual courses on
Arabic language at local language insti-
tutes. Lastly, the CFEY may offer internships
to interested students (e.g. office work, pub-
lic relations, documentation and research).
The conditions of the internships (i.e. salary,
accommodation, etc.) vary according to the
nature of the requirement and the time
needed to complete the assignment.
S t a t u t e s
The French Center for Yemeni Studies is a
research body in the social sciences which de-
pends administratively on the French Ministry
of Foreign Affairs’ Department of Social Sci-
ences and Archaeology. It is part of a world-
wide network of 28 French research centres
and institutes. Its management is supervised
by a scientific council of 12 members. Under
the initiative of Pr Christian Robin, the CFEY
was created in 1982. Its current director,
François Burgat, a political scientist, succeed-
ed anthropologist Franck Mermier (1991-
1997) on 1 October 1997.
Library and Publications
CFEY’s library comprises close to 3000 works,
half of which are in Arabic (including periodi-
cals), which focus mainly on Yemen and about
twenty running titles from the Yemeni press.
CFEY is currently computerizing this collection
(software DAD) and planning its progressive ex-
pansion to other countries of the Arabian Penin-
sula.
In the attempt to further critical discourse and
the exchange of ideas on Yemen and the Arabi -
an Peninsula, it is CFEY’s policy to organize lec-
tures and produce scholarly material. The CFEY
publishes in French, and occasionally translates
into Arabic, the works of its own researchers and
its Yemeni colleagues on the Arabian Peninsula.
The centre produces Les Chroniques Yéménites
(reviews of the centre’s annual activities com-
plemented by original articles) and Les cahiers
du CFEY (monographs or travel literature). It also
publishes in conjunction with scholarly journals
(Monde Arabe Maghreb-Machreq, Peuples Médi-
terranéens) or commercial publishers (Actes
Sud), as well as independently or in association
with other research centres such as IFEAD
(Syria), IREMAM (Aix-en-Provence), URBAMA
(Tours), American Institute for Yemeni Studies
(Sanaa), Deutsches Orient-Institute (Hamburg),
etc. Recent publications include: 
– CFEY-Centre de Recherche franco-
allemand de Berlin–Deutsches Orient
Institut de Hambourg, Le Yémen
c o n t e m p o r a i n, Franck Mermier, Rémi
Leveau, Udo Steinbach (Director) Paris,
Karthala, 1999; 
– Al-‘Ansi, Yahya, Traditional agricultural
knowledge in Yemen, CFEY-American
Institute for Yemeni Studies, 1998 (in
Arabic) (This is a collection of Yemeni
popular local practices in Agriculture
related to Astronomy);
– Mercier, Eric, Aden. Un parcours
i n t e r r o m p u, Sanaa-Tours, CFEY-URBAMA
(Villes du Monde Arabe collection), 1997,
ISSN 0247-8498, ISBN 2-86-106-1080.
(This is the first scientific French-
language work on the city of Aden,
a preliminary work for a doctoral thesis in
geography, interrupted by the premature
death of the author in October 1996.);
– Mermier, Franck (directed by), L’Etat face
à la démocratie, Monde arabe Maghreb-
M a c h r e k, 155, January-March 1997, ISSN
1241-5294. (This is a multidisciplinary
approach to contemporary Yemen by
a French-Yemeni research team.);
– Zayd Ali Muhammed, Trends of mu’tazilite
thought in Yemen, CFEY, 1997 (in Arabic);
a n d
– Al-Akwa’ Ismaïl b. Ali, Les hijra et
l e s forteresses du savoir au Yémen
( t r a n s l a t e d from Arabic by Brigitte
Marino), Cahiers du CFEY 2, 1996,
The revival of Islam in Al-Andalus, the Spain of today,
has been a cherished ideal of many Muslims. After
the fall of Granada in 1492, the brutal persecution,
forced conversion and expulsion of the Andalusian
Muslims (and Jews) by the Spanish Catholic Church
and royal court obliterated a famed multicultural so-
ciety. Today, Islam – and with it Islamic learning – is
making a comeback. 
Re-establishing Islamic Learning
i n Al-Andalus,  Cordoba
In spite of the horrors during and after the
Christian Castellan Conquista, apparently
wiping out any presence of Islam in the
country, a feeling of identification with a
Muslim past remained alive in the hearts of
many Spaniards, especially in the Andalu-
sian south. This historical identification also
finds expression in an increasing number of
conversions to Islam, a process that began
soon after the death of Franco and the re-
turn of democracy and freedom of con-
science to the country. Thousands embraced
Islam within a short span of time and their
numbers continue to increase. By the 1980s
the new Muslims started to form associa-
tions. Mosques were opened, mainly in An-
dalusia, but also in other places like Madrid,
also for the benefit of the rising number of
migrant Muslims. The autochthonous Mus-
lims include people from all walks of life,
men and women, the majority being in their
twenties at the time of their conversion.
In 1989 the government of Spain granted
official recognition to Islam, thus acknowl-
edging its roots in Spain. The government
requested the Muslims to organize national-
ly, which they did under the auspices of the
‘Comision Islamica de España’ (The Spanish
Muslim Commission) which represents the
Muslim community. The commission nego-
tiated an agreement (signed in 1992) with
the government over the rights of Muslims,
the most important aspect of which con-
cerns education. It stipulates the right to es-
tablish Muslim schools and universities.
Moreover, the State committed itself to in-
clude Islam and Arabic in the curricula of the
public schools for those students desiring to
follow the courses. The Comision Islamica
de España devises the curricula and recruits
t e a c h e r s .
The Universidad Islamica Averroes was es-
tablished within the 1992 agreement. Named
after the famous Andalusian philosopher Ibn
Rusd, the university was opened in 1995 in
the old medina of Cordoba, near the famous
Mezquita Aljama, the Great Mosque (now a
Catholic Cathedral). Attached to it, a new
beautiful small mosque was built, with its An-
dalusian minaret on the street. Some neigh-
bouring buildings were purchased since then,
allowing sufficient space for expansion in the
future. The founders of this private Andalu-
sian Spanish university consider it to be the
resurrection of the medieval university situat-
ed in the Great Mosque (Mezquita Aljama)
during Muslim times. The university is run by
a board, which is headed by Prof. A. Mahtar
M’Bow (Ex-Secretary General of UNESCO). The
university is a member of the Federation of
the Universities of the Muslim World and has
cooperation agreements with several univer-
sities in Europe and the Muslim world.
The Universidad Islamica Averroes offers
Islamic education to all those desiring it, be
they Muslim or not. Its plans of education
are adapted to the Spanish system by using
credit hours. The academic year is divided
into two semesters, giving 21 credit hours
per semester, i.e. a total of 168 credit hours
for the 4-year course. The courses are divid-
ed into three important themes: Arabic lan-
guage and literature, Islamic studies and
Andalusian studies. The languages of edu-
cation are Arabic and Spanish, but Persian
and Turkish are also taught. 
In September 1996, the university initiat-
ed a correspondence course offering a pro-
gramme identical to that which is conduct-
ed in situ. The university has a dedicated
staff and faculty, most of whom are Spanish
Muslims. Students have to pay a tuition fee;
however, for the studies carried out in situ
($2000 per year) no valid candidate has
been rejected on the grounds of inability to
pay. The university has a scholarship pro-
gramme to aid deserving students. The fee
for the correspondence course is very mod-
est ($400 per year), but no scholarships are
available in this case. ♦
For further information write to:
Universidad Islamica Averroes
3, Calleja de la Hoguera
14003 Cordoba – Spain
Fax & Tel: 0034-957-483235
E-mail: u.averroes@alcalvia.nt
Ali Kettani is vice-chairman
of the board and rector of
Universidad Islamica Averroes,
Cordoba, Spain.
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C S I C
J ØR G E N  S .  N I E L S E N
The CSIC was founded in 1976 as a central teaching
department of the federation of Selly Oak Colleges.
Its roots lay in a lectureship by the Edward Cadbury
Charitable Trust (ECCT) in the 1930s, when Dr
Alphonse Mingana was the first incumbent. With
Cadbury family support he had been able to collect a
large amount of Arabic and Syriac manuscripts still
housed today in the library at Selly Oak. Dr Mingana
started a tradition of text-based study of Islam and
Christian-Muslim relations which was notably con-
tinued by Dr John Sweetman in his magisterial work
on Islam and Christian Theology.
Centre for the Study of Islam and 
Christian-Muslim Relations
In the early 1970s, the existence of an in-
creasingly self-aware Muslim community in
Britain was becoming obvious. At Selly Oak
Colleges in Birmingham the then lecturer in
Islamic Studies, Dr John Taylor, became in-
volved in the ecumenical discussions on
Christian approaches to other faiths, which
led to his becoming the first officer for
Christian-Muslim dialogue at the World
Council of Churches in 1973. His successor,
Dr David Kerr, confirmed this change of em-
phasis from the traditional orientalist to the
contemporary when he was able to call to-
gether an international consultation in
1 9 7 5 .
This joint meeting of Muslims and Chris-
tians recommended the creation of what
was to become the CSIC. The idea was for
the Centre to comprise a joint venture of
Christians and Muslims, true to both tradi-
tions while also meeting the criteria of the
British university system. Given the institu-
tional context of the Centre, both of these
targets were problematic. The various col-
leges of the federation at Selly Oak are of
Christian foundation, some of them mission
training colleges, which in itself tended to
raise questions about academic credibility
and hence support had to be earned.
It is probably safe to say today that both
targets have been reached. Academic staff,
today counting five lecturers and three re-
searchers, have academic recognition at the
University of Birmingham through its De-
partment of Theology, and the academic de-
grees are awarded by the University. For the
first decade or so, student numbers were
low, seldom exceeding 20. Today there are
nearly 70, all on postgraduate degree pro-
grammes. For the first many years only very
few Muslim students came. Today 80% of
students are Muslims. Two thirds of all stu-
dents come from Africa and Asia, including
countries like Malaysia, Iran, Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan and Lebanon.
The process has now reached culmination:
after successful completion of negotiations,
on 1 August 1999 the CSIC will become an
integral part of the University of Birming-
ham’s Department of Theology, retaining its
specific identity and programmes within a
new graduate institute for theology and reli-
g i o n s .
As a postgraduate teaching and research
centre, the CSIC for many years concentrated
on developing its teaching programmes and
a couple of quite specific research and docu-
mentation projects. The teaching pro-
grammes include a Postgraduate Diploma, a
Master of Arts, a MPhil and a PhD. As general-
ly is the case throughout the British system of
higher education, the first two are based on a
combination of taught courses and a short
dissertation completed altogether in 12
months of full-time study. The MPhil and PhD
are research only leading to submission and
examination of a thesis. We are now begin-
ning to develop an MA in Middle Eastern
Christianity, which should be available from
September 1999, and as we become part of
the University of Birmingham, we are looking
at working in conjunction with other depart-
ments and faculties, particularly education,
law and social studies. The Centre has also
gradually expanded its cooperation with
other academic institutions around the world.
Some of these links have taken the form of
joint seminars – a list with related publica-
tions is available from j.nielsen.islam@sell-
yoak.ac.uk. Formal agreements with the Uni-
versity of Jordan and Al-Azhar involve ex-
changes of students and staff.
In terms of research and documentation,
the Centre has had a particular interest in
Africa and Europe. We can fairly claim to
have been among the earliest to direct at-
tention towards Islam in Europe. Apart from
numerous publications in this field, this
focus has now led to the award of a research
project grant from the Economic and Social
Research Council within its Transnational
Communities Programme (reported in the
last issue of the ISIM Newsletter by Dr
Steven Vertovec). This project, which deals
with a transnational Sufi order, includes
fieldwork in Britain, Dagestan, and Lebanon.
Details can be found on the project web-
site at www.sellyoak.ac.uk/csic/research.
At the same time, it has been possible to
revive the areas of study with which Drs
Mingana and Sweetman were identified.
Since 1990, we have hosted three ‘Wood-
brooke/Mingana Colloquia on Arab Chris-
tianity and Islam’, and our website is now
the home for a newsgroup on the subject
(contact d.thomas.islam@sellyoak.ac.uk).
The Centre’s interests determine that we
cannot be limited to academic work narrow-
ly defined. From the beginning, staff have
been involved in both Christian and Muslim
agencies as consultants or members of
working groups and the like. As the field of
Christian-Muslim relations has broadened
into and become part of wider social and po-
litical processes in the 1990s, so has the CSIC
become more widely involved with govern-
ments – local and national – and internation-
al agencies.
While the first almost quarter century has
been a period of establishing ourselves and
getting our feet firmly on the ground, it
seems probable that the coming merger
into the University of Birmingham will pro-
vide a foundation for both expansion of the
existing work and the development of new
programmes of teaching and research. ♦
Jørgen S. Nielsen is professor of Islamic Studies
a n d CSIC Director, Birmingham, UK.
E-mail: j.nielsen.islam@sellyoak.ac.uk
I D S
S A M Y  S .  S W A Y D
The Druzes are a Middle Eastern minority group with
their formal origins in 11t h century Fatimid Cairo,
where they began as a reform movement within the
esoteric Ismaili tradition during the caliphate of al-
Hakim Bi-Amr Allah (r. 996–1021). The Druze doc-
trine contains specific moral lessons and rules of in-
dividual and communal conduct that are embodied
in approximately 30 manuscripts, some of which
have been lost. Political and religious power were
normally separated within the Druze communities,
the religious specialists forming a class of initiates in
the esoteric principles. In contrast to related reli-
gious groups, women were traditionally initiated. 
The Institute of 
Druze Studies
Today, there are nearly one million Druzes
living in mountainous regions in Lebanon,
Syria, Israel, and Jordan. During the 19t h a n d
early 20t h centuries, smaller Druze immi-
grant communities established themselves
elsewhere around the world and can be
found in Australia, Canada, Europe, the
Philippines, South and Central America, the
United States, and West Africa. Since World
War II, small communities can also be found
in the Gulf States. In order to preserve their
traditions and maintain frequent contact
with their co-religionists, they have formed
associations, organized conventions, and
published pamphlets and newsletters. In
the United States, for example, the Ameri-
can Druze Society (ADS) has convened an-
nual gatherings since 1946 and, more re-
cently, established a main cultural centre in
Eagle Rock, California. Other established im-
migrant Druze societies include the British
Druze Society (BDS), the Canadian Druze So-
ciety (CDS), and the Sydney Druze Society
(SDS) in Australia. The Druzes are generally
one of the most understudied Middle East-
ern minorities and Islamic sects. Due to the
ubiquitous misconceptions of the Druzes in
both medieval and especially in 18t h a n d
1 9t h-century literature, the Institute of Druze
Studies (IDS) was established.
The IDS was founded in early 1998 as an
international academic research institute
and then, in September of that year, was in-
corporated as a non-profit organization of
the state of California. The IDS board of di-
rectors consists of more than 20 members
from seven countries and 15 universities.
The Institute aims to (1) provide information
on Druze history, society, and faith, (2) en-
courage research and studies on historical
and contemporary Druze communities and
(3) promote academic discourse and other
public forums about Druze-related topics. 
The IDS will pursue these objectives
through an international annual confer-
ence, a publication series, and a newsletter.
The annual conference will bring together
senior and junior scholars who are working
on Druze-related topics. In collaboration
with the G.E. von Grunebaum Center for
Near Eastern Studies, University of Califor-
nia, Los Angeles (UCLA), the Institute’s first
International Conference will take place at
UCLA Faculty Center on June 11-12, 1999.
The theme of the conference is: The Druzes:
1000 Years of History, Reform, and Tradition.
More than 20 scholars from 15 universities
and other research institutions are partici-
pating in the conference. Conference panels
include the following themes: Deconstruct-
ing 11th Century Cairo; History and Histori-
ography: Perceptions and Misconceptions;
Cosmology and Theology; Identity and
Community; and Identity, Solidarity, and
Nationality. The conference proceedings
will be published subsequently as the third
volume in the Institute’s publication series. 
The first book in the IDS publication series
was published in May 1998 by Samy S.
Swayd who is the founder of the IDS. The
book is titled: The Druzes: An Annotated Bibli-
ography (Kirkland, WA: ISES Publications,
xx+199pp.). In addition to a bibliography of
328 books and 427 articles, a chronology,
glossary, selected translations, maps, ge-
nealogical tables, and plates, this book in-
cludes a concise 50-page introduction to
Druze society, history, and faith. The second
book in the IDS publication series by the
same author, The Druze Scriptures: Exoteric
and Esoteric Hermeneutics, will be published
in late summer 1999. It examines the study
of Druze scriptures and includes annota-
tions of more than 80 Druze manuscripts,
and provides a compendium of Druze be-
liefs and practices. 
The newsletter, which is scheduled to be
published tri-annually beginning this sum-
mer, will provide updates about published
works and public talks, as well as research
reports on Druze villages and towns, promi-
nent families and individuals, and other ac-
tivities and programmes that are relevant to
the Druzes. ♦
The IDS encourages submissions of book
manuscripts for consideration in the Institute’s
publication series. It also encourages articles or
research reports for inclusion in the newsletter.
IDS Internet: www.idspublications.com
Samy S. Swayd teaches religion in the Department
o f Religious Studies at San Diego State University
(SDSU), California, USA.
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D A V O
G Ü N T E R  M E Y E R
The Deutsche Arbeitsgemeinschaft Vorderer Orient
für Gegenwartsbezogene Forschung und Dokumen-
tation (DAVO) was established in 1993. Since then,
more than 500 scholars and other persons interested
in the Middle East have become part of DAVO. Mem-
bership does not only consist in those from Germany,
but also from other European countries, North Amer-
ica and the Middle East.
German Middle East Studies Association
Research and Documentation
DAVO is a scholarly, non-political and non-
profit professional association open to all per-
sons with an interest in the Middle East. The
main aim of DAVO is to improve the exchange
of information on Middle East studies be-
tween its members and various national and
international institutions. Middle East studies
include disciplines relevant to the study of an
area comprising all Arab states and territories,
Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, the Mus-
lim states of the former USSR and Israel, as
well as the impact of this region on the devel-
opment of other parts of the world.
The association publishes the D A V O -
N a c h r i c h t e n, a biannual guide to German
and international Middle East studies. The
publication includes a roster of members,
announcements of meetings, conference
reports, introduction of new research pro-
jects, presentations of institutions en-
gaged in Middle East studies, internet
news, and book reviews. Furthermore, the
guide contains an overview of the latest
publications of DAVO members and cur-
rent articles in journals on the Middle East.
Each issue of the D A V O - N a c h r i c h t e n c o n-
tains up to 200 pages of information; many
articles are in English and French. General-
ly, less than two weeks transpires between
the deadline for contributions and the dis-
tribution of the printed issue. Recipients
include DAVO members, almost 200 li-
braries, research centres and other institu-
tions in the Middle East, Europe and North
A m e r i c a .
In addition, DAVO operates a weekly up-
dated homepage ‘DAVO-Info Aktuell’ on the
World Wide Web (http://www.geo.uni-
mainz.de/davo). It contains a global calen-
dar of Middle East conferences, information
on research centres and other institutions, a
register of websites, recent articles in jour-
nals, announcements of grants and other re-
cent information relevant to Middle East
s t u d i e s .
DAVO also organizes an annual congress
which is gradually changing from a German
conference to an international meeting with
rapidly growing numbers of participants
from all over the world. Although the major-
ity of the papers are still delivered in Ger-
man, English papers and discussions are
strongly encouraged. ♦
The Sixth Annual Congress of DAVO will take place in
Hamburg from 2–4 December 1999. The deadline for
the registration of papers is 2 November 1999. For
further information on this congress contact the
DAVO Conference Organization: Deutsches Orient-
Institut, Mittelweg 150, D-20148 Hamburg, Fax:
040/441484, e-mail: doihh@uni-hamburg.de
Those interested in the activities of DAVO may obtain
a trial copy of the latest issue of D A V O - N a c h r i c h t e n
free of charge by contacting the DAVO secretariat:
Centre for Research on the Arab World (CERAW)
Institute of Geography, University of Mainz
D-55099 Mainz, Germany.
Prof. Dr. Günter Meyer is president of DAVO.
E-mail: DAVO@geo.Uni-Mainz.de
Arabic Literature
o f A f r i c a
A Contribution to
t h e Intellectual History
o f I s l a m
Having migrated to Surinam, they still
maintained the westward direction of prayer.
Saudi teachers told them: ‘No, you should
not do that. In Surinam you should face East.’
But the people from Java replied: ‘No, in the
land of Java we faced to the West, we can not
make a change. I also follow my parents. Be-
cause originally our ancestors faced to the
West, we do so too. If we are forced to do oth-
erwise, we absolutely say: No!’
The equation of Islamization with Ara-
bization is foreign to the reformist Javanese
Muslims in the Netherlands. In their eyes,
the change of prayer direction follows from
religious imperative and rational reasoning.
They quote the verse (2:144): ‘Turn your
face then to the Sacred Mosque; and wher-
ever you are, turn your faces towards it.’
Since Mecca is located southeast of the
Netherlands, they see no alternative but to
oblige. They argue that praying and recit-
ing in Arabic should not be considered Ara-
bization because it is part of religion, not of
c u l t u r e .
Preserving Identity
The debate on the k e b l a t is part of a
much longer discourse on Javanese identi-
ty. Almost from the beginning of the Is-
lamization of Java, attempts have been
made to reject the centrality of Mecca and
– what is seen as – the Arabization of the
Javanese. Preserving identity has become
an important and complicated problem for
Javanese Muslims in the Netherlands as
well. This is primarily due to the fact that
most of the second and the third genera-
tions no longer speak Javanese, although
some still understand it. Being a creator
and re-creator, and transmitter of culture,
the loss of the original language marks an
important transformation. Moreover, they
do not have diasporic memories of Java, as
they were born and raised in Surinam or
the Netherlands. 
Today, Java is represented as a Holy
Land, but also as an experience of the past
generation, the first generation of the Ja-
vanese in Surinam, who are regarded as
the original Javanese (Jawa Tus o r J a w a
A s l i). The k e j a w e n Muslims demonstrate a
far stronger commitment to the preserva-
tion of the Javanese culture than the re-
formist Javanese. Their organizations focus
on Javanese dances, music and songs and
on the Javanese literature like the Primbon
and Mujarabat literature, which combine
John Hunwick and R.S. O’Fahey have em-
barked upon a joint project in collaboration
with a number of other scholars, for the pub-
lication of a seven-volume work under the
general title ‘Arabic Literature of Africa’. The
work is being published by E.J. Brill of Leiden
and the first two volumes of the series have
already appeared (1994 and 1995). The se-
ries is under the joint general editorship of
Hunwick and O’Fahey. 
The editors take it as axiomatic that we
cannot understand the trends and currents
of Muslim discourse in Africa, its relationship
to wider Islamic discourses and its local
shaping by historical and cultural factors un-
less we consider the broader picture of Is-
lamic scholarship in the region. For this we
need to know not only who the scholars
were and what they wrote, but also how
they are related to one another intellectual-
ly, and how learning was nurtured, transmit-
ted, explicated, revived, revised, contested.
It is the task, then, of the several volumes
of the series ‘Arabic Literature of Africa’ to
explore this intellectual heritage. The aim of
the series is to produce for sub-Saharan
Africa a guide to its Islamic literature and
scholarly production in Arabic and in certain
African languages that goes beyond a mere
enumeration of scholars and their writings.
Rather it aims to open up the intellectual his-
tory of the region’s Muslims and to relate it
to the intellectual history of the larger world
of Islam. 
Volume I, compiled by R.S. O’Fahey is sub-
titled ‘The Writings of Eastern Sudanic Africa
to c. 1900’, and it was prepared with the col-
laboration of Muhammad Ibrahim Abu
Salim, Albrecht Hofheinz, Yahya Muhammad
Ibrahim, Berndt Radtke and Knut Vikør. It
deals with authors living in the area of the
present Republic of the Sudan and their writ-
ings, as well as the writings of the Idrisiyya
tradition both within the Sudan and outside
it, and the Sanusiyya tradition. Volume II is
sub-titled ‘The Writings of Central Sudanic
Africa’ (i.e. Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Cameroun).
It was compiled by John Hunwick with the
collaboration of Razaq D. Abubakre, Hamidu
Bobboyi, Roman Loimeier, Stefan Reichmuth
and Muhammad Sani Umar. Within each
chapter writers are grouped according to
their family, tariqa, or teaching affiliation
and also (so far as is possible) chronological-
ly. Information on works in Fulfulde and
Hausa (and some Yoruba) by the authors
who wrote in Arabic is also given. Currently
in preparation are volumes on Ethiopia,
Sudan and Eastern Africa, which includes Is-
lamic literature in Swahili and volumes on
the Arabic writings of scholars in Ghana,
Mali, Senegal and Niger. Yet another will
deal with Mauritania. A supplementary vol-
ume will treat the writings of Central Sudan-
ic Africa and will be prepared in collabora-
tion with Nigerian scholars. ♦
John Hunwick, Department of History,
N o r t h w e s t e r n University, Evanston, USA.
R.S. O’Fahey, Department of History,
U n i v e r s i t yo f Bergen, Norway.
Javanese prediction and other popular ele-
ments, including Islamic ones. However,
young people show less interest in litera-
ture. 
Above all, in their resistance to the per-
ceived Arabization of the Javanese, the k e-
j a w e n Muslims attempt to Javanize Islam,
the preservation of the western k e b l a t
serves as the clearest example of this
quest. In the Netherlands this tendency is
even stronger than that in Java at the pre-
sent time. Moreover, the diasporic experi-
ences and challenges in the Netherlands
force them to contextualize their tradition.
It can even be argued that they have creat-
ed a new identity that is a ‘Surinam-Ja-
vanese’ identity, which differs in some of
its manifestations from that of the Indone-
sian Javanese. ♦
P U B L I C A T I O N S
This article is based upon observation of meetings
o f various Surinam-Javanese organizations and
interviews with a number of their members. A larger
and more detailed article will be published in
S h a r q i y y a t, journal of the Netherlands Organization
for the Study of Islam.
Moch. Nur Ichwan is an MA student of Islamic Studies
at Leiden University and a fellow of the Indonesia-
Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies (INIS),
the Netherlands. E-mail: MN.Ichwan@mailcity.com
N o t e s
1 . On the Javanese in Surinam, see Joseph Ismael,
D e Immigratie van Indonesiers in Suriname. PhD
dissertation of Leiden University 1949; Annemarie
de Waal Malefijt, The Javanese of Surinam: Segment
of a Plural Society. Assen: Van Gorcum Com. N.V.,
1963; G.D. van Wengen, The Cultural Inheritance of
the Javanese in Surinam. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975.
2 . See Yvonne Towikromo, De islam van de Javanen
uit Suriname in Nederland. Den Haag: Amrit, 1997.
Continued from page 36:
Prayer in the Surinam-Javanese Diasporic Experience / b y Moch. Nur Ichwan
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AAS 
OM A R  K H A L I D I Differentiation and Homogenization among 
Indian MuslimsDifferentiation and homogenization wasthe theme of a panel at the Association of
Asian Studies meeting in Boston on 12
March 1999. Sponsored by the South Asian
Muslim Studies Association (SAMSA) and
chaired by Prof. Theodore P. Wright, Jr (re-
tired, State University of New York-Albany),
the panel brought four papers, one read in
the absence of the presenter, and a discus-
sant, Prof. Ali Asani of Harvard University.
The ideology of Muslim nationalism in India
dominant during the 1940s held that Mus-
lims constituted a nation distinct in every
respect from other Indians. The fieldwork of
the anthropologists published in the 1970s
contended that contrary to the ideology of
‘two nations,’ Muslims were regionally, lin-
guistically, ritually and behaviourally di-
verse, in addition to the division by sect.
Our panel re-examined this issue, interro-
gating both differentiation and homoge-
nization in recent decades. 
Omar Khalidi (MIT) presented a paper on
the homogenization of Konkani Muslims of
coastal Maharashtra to Urdu, a language
spoken in North India and the Deccan.
Konkani Muslims are adopting Urdu instead
of native Konkani for education, formal
speech, and mass communication amongst
themselves and others on a large scale. Kha-
lidi argued that if the present trend contin-
ues, it is likely that this group will be fully
homogenized with the Urdu speaking com-
munities of North India and the Deccan. 
Similarly, Jonah Blank (a recent Harvard
PhD and presently with US News & World Re-
port) presented a paper on the Islamization
and modernization of the Daudi Bohras of
Mumbai and western India. Over the past
decades, the clergy of the Bohras has at-
tempted – with great success – to establish a
group identity that is at once universally Is-
lamic and unique to the denomination. It has
done so not by rejecting modern or Western
ideas and technologies, but rather by em-
bracing them: the Bohras have used moder-
nity as a tool to reinvigorate their core tradi-
tions. Jonah’s case study should serve as a
powerful refutation to those who would es-
sentialize Islamic revivalism or even (to use a
more ideologically-laden term) Islamic fun-
damentalism as anti-modern. 
Jonah’s argument seems to confirm some
of the conclusions reached by Ali Asani of
Harvard University (panel discussant) in a
1987 paper on the Khojahs, an Ismaili de-
nomination similar in many ways to the
Bohras. Asani had concluded that within the
short span of half a century, the Khojah
sense of identification with the larger Islamic
tradition has become so strong that many
young members have come to regard their
community’s earlier beliefs as belonging to a
phase in history when the early missionaries
had to make concessions to the Hindu mi-
lieu. At present, they affirm that they are
merely returning to their proper fold in
Islam. 
The third paper delivered by Laura D. Jenk-
ins (University of Cincinnati) was on ‘Caste,
Class and Islam: Debating the Boundaries of
“Backwardness” in India.’ While normative
Islam is caste-free, educationally and eco-
nomically poor Muslim groups are often as-
sociated with low social status, some of
whom are grouped as Other Backward Class-
es (OBC), a bureaucratic category compris-
ing both Hindu and Muslim poor. Many Mus-
lim OBCs are seeking affirmative action to
improve their conditions, but the question is
beset by the problem of group definition of
backwardness, which has the potential of
splitting Muslims along quasi-caste lines.
Jenkins’ paper thus shows the persistence of
differentiation based on caste or caste-like
clusters among Indian Muslims, particularly
if some groups benefit from inclusion in the
OBC category and others not. 
Finally, the paper by Frank Fanselow (Uni-
versity of Brunei-Darussalam), read in his ab-
sence by Khalidi, described and analysed the
conversion of Dalits to Islam in the early
1980s. Although it was a local affair confined
to an obscure village called Minakshipuram
in Tamilnadu, the publicity surrounding the
conversion drew national attention souring
Hindu-Muslim relations in a state known for
inter-communal harmony, thus negatively
homogenizing it with the national trend. ♦
Dr Omar Khalidi is an independent scholar at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Aga Khan
Program for Islamic Architecture, Cambridge, USA.
E-mail: okhalidi@mit.edu
Univ er s i ty o f  C hic a go
S C O T T  L U C A S The 14 t h Annual Middle East History
and Theory C o n f e r e n c eThe 14t h Annual Middle East History andTheory Conference held at the University of
Chicago from 10-11 April 1999, was both an
educational and enjoyable event for all
those involved. Twenty graduate students
and professors from thirteen different
American universities presented papers in
seven panels, which took place over a two-
day period. Five of these papers covered is-
sues concerning Uzbekistan and Tajikistan,
such as vulnerability management, state
and identity formation, and the decoloniza-
tion of national discourse. One panel ex-
plored how Palestine was used by other na-
tional movements as a tool for the achieve-
ment of political legitimacy, while another
panel stimulated discussions about the dra-
matic rise in international stature of Iranian
art films as well as the possibilities inherent
in the study of the vernacular architecture
of Gecekondu neighbourhoods in modern
Istanbul. The remaining papers were related
to the interpretation of pre-modern/early-
modern classical Islamicate texts and mod-
ern socio-political issues in Jordan, Algeria,
and Egypt. 
The keynote address was delivered by
Professor John L. Esposito and consisted in a
critique of the dominant ‘secular fundamen-
talist’ attitude of the Western academia,
which refuses to study Islam and Muslim so-
ciety as a dynamic religious phenomenon
and, thus, finds itself issuing wildly inaccu-
rate explanations of modern Muslim soci-
eties, as well as serious underestimations of
the political power which revivalist Islamic
groups wield. The conference closed with its
annual lamb roast, which was satiating for
participants and attendees alike. ♦
Scott Lucas, Department of Near Eastern Languages
and Civilizations, University of Chicago, USA.
E-mail: slucas@midway.uchicago.edu
Univ er s i ty o f  Hel s i nki
H O L G E R  W E I S S Social Justice, Social Welfare and Praxis in 
Islamic Societies in AfricaIn April 1999, the University of Helsinki’s re-search project on ‘Zakât: poverty, social wel-
fare and Islamic taxation’ arranged a two-day
workshop, together with the Department of
Asian and African Studies of the University of
Helsinki, on ‘Social justice, social welfare and
praxis in Islamic societies in Africa’. Re-
searchers from the Nordic countries and Ger-
many presented papers dealing with issues
such as the possibilities of Islamic economy
and Islamic banking as well as case-studies of
how various forms of social welfare pro-
grammes have worked in Islamic communi-
ties in Africa (including North Africa).  Seven
scholars presented papers at the workshop: 
Holger Weiss (University of Helsinki, Fin-
land) pointed out that much of the debate in
the field of Islamic economics has been deal-
ing with morals and ethics rather than pure
economics. He presented in his paper the po-
sition of two Nigerian scholars, Sule Ahmad
Gusau and Ibraheem Sulaiman, and under-
lined that most of their writings are critiques
of the present military rulers in Nigeria, but
are vague in their dealings with social or eco-
nomic questions.
Endre Stiansen (Nordic Africa Institute, Up-
psala, Sweden) gave an overview of Islamic
banking in the Sudan as well as an overview
of the network of Islamic economics. He pre-
sented the problems connected with r i b a
and its translation and reflected upon the
connection of Islamic economics and John
Hunwick’s idea of a ‘moral economy of salva-
tion’. Stiansen remarked upon the rather di-
vided character of the current debate in the
Sudan, where some forms of Islamic banking
have been criticized by Muslims themselves. 
Ruediger Seesemann (University of Bay-
reuth, Germany) presented a welfare project
run by the Tijaniyya shaykh Ibrâhîm Sîdî in El
Fasher. The programme is namely one of so-
cial rehabilitation for problem children and
street kids. He underlined the problems of
the insufficient attempts by the Islamist gov-
ernment in the Sudan to improve the living
conditions of the northern Muslim popula-
tion. Instead, the long-neglected social wel-
fare activities of the various Sufi orders are
providing an informal social security system. 
Knut Vikør (Centre for Middle Eastern and
Islamic Studies, Bergen, Norway) discussed
how and why the economic and social effects
of the Sanûsîya order was the result of an in-
terplay between choices made by the broth-
erhood and by the social actors of the sur-
rounding community. The brotherhood’s
role in providing ‘social welfare’ was in-
scribed into this dynamic relationship. For
example, the brotherhood provided former
nomads not only with economic aid in terms
of lending land for cultivation or handouts,
but it also offered symbolic capital by means
of attachment. 
Tuomo Melasuo (Tampere Peace Research
Institute, Finland) gave an overview of the Al-
gerian Ulama Movement and Social Action
during French colonialism. The focus of his
presentation was on the Ulama Movement’s
establishment of schools, through which it
sought to restore Muslim society in Algeria as
well as to improve Islamic civilization. Thus,
the Ulama Movement combined a cultural
call with social action but was, at a later
stage, to have political implications as well. 
Franz Kogelmann (University of Bayreuth,
Germany) discussed the possibilities of reli-
gious-motivated welfare institutions, such as
pious endowments (waqf/habus) in pre-mod-
ern societies. His case study was based on the
development of Sidi Fredj in Fez, which was
the most important endowment complex in
Morocco and had devoted itself exclusively to
social welfare activities. He pointed out that
under French colonial rule, the pious endow-
ments became more tightly organized and
economically efficient. However, the adminis-
trative centralization process meant that this
previously highly autonomous form of wel-
fare now fell outside the area of responsibility
of the local community. 
Roman Loimeier (University of Bayreuth,
Germany) gave an analysis of the campaign
against the Quranic schools in Senegal be-
tween 1992 and 1996. The secular State and
global development agencies such as
UNICEF, as well as Islamic reformers were
united in their attempt to dissolve the exist-
ing Islamic system of socialization as main-
tained by the Quranic schools. They were all
of the opinion that the autonomy of the
Quranic school as a central institution of Is-
lamic society had to be destroyed and the so-
cial and political influence of the marabouts,
the established religious scholars, must be
eliminated. ♦
The participants of the workshop are revising their
papers for a collective volume, which is to be
published in late 1999.
Dr Holger Weiss is docent in African History,
University of Helsinki, Finland.
E-mail: holger.weiss@helsinki.fi
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C I R A
K A M R A N  D A D K H A H The 17 t h Annual Conference of the C e n t e r
for Iranian Research and AnalysisThe 17th annual CIRA conference, jointlysponsored by CIRA and Northeastern Univer-
sity, was held April 23 and 24 in Boston, Mass-
achusetts, USA, with the theme of ‘Iran at the
Threshold of the New Millennium’. More than
100 researchers, journalists, students, poets
and artists from several countries participat-
ed. 
The CIRA conference was opened with a
welcome address delivered by Dr Richard
Freeland, President of Northeastern Universi-
ty. Sessions were held in the mornings and af-
ternoons in the Egan Research Center at
Northeastern University, which boasts a num-
ber of state-of-the-art facilities for research
and conferencing. The most popular sessions
were those dealing with the current political
situation in Iran, its relationship with the Unit-
ed States, media coverage of Iran, and issues
related to Iranians abroad. Michael Dukakis,
former governor of Massachusetts and De-
mocratic candidate for the presidency in
1988, chaired a session on foreign and de-
fence policies of Iran, where the relationship
between Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan,
and the conflict with Afghanistan were dis-
cussed. James Bill gave a keynote speech on
the United States-Iran relationship, character-
izing it as a conflict between two hegemones,
one global and the other regional. In another
session, Ali Jalali of the VOA, Stephen Fair-
banks and Iraj Gorgin of Radio Free Europe,
and Baqer Moin and Setareh Alavi of the BBC
discussed the effect of foreign broadcasting
on Iranian society. 
Other topics included Islam and modern-
day problems, women, human rights, civil so-
ciety, and evolution of Iranian society in the
post-revolution decades. Homayoun Katouz-
ian addressed a plenary session and present-
ed a theory of Iranian revolutions. In sessions
devoted to the Iranian economy, analysis was
provided on monetary policy and the inde-
pendence of the central bank, Iran’s member-
ship in the World Trade Organization, bank-
ing laws, the agrarian question, development
problems, and the role of foundations that
are gigantic economic conglomerates. One of
the most popular sessions was on assimila-
tion, identity, and community among Iranians
in diaspora. In addition to current economic
and political questions, the agenda included
talks on literature, cinema, architecture and
history. In one session, two poets – Ahmad
Ghazinoor and Morteza Rezvan – read their
poetry, and Hamid Mossadegh, who recently
passed away, was remembered. Four sessions
had the format of ‘author meets critics’ in
which the author of a book on Iranian society
engaged in a dialogue with a number of crit-
ics. Participants were treated to a showing of
The Pear Tree, a film by Darius Mehrjui. ♦
The 18th annual CIRA conference will be held
A p r i l 28–29, 2000, at the Hyatt Regency, Bethesda,
Maryland, USA, with the theme of ‘Iran 2000:
T h e Challenges Ahead’.
Dr Kamran Dadkhah is associate professor at the
Department of Economics, Northeastern University
and Executive Director of CIRA, USA.
E-mail: kdadkhah@lynx.dac.neu.edu
S a m a r k a n d
R E U E L  H A N K S Uzbekistan in the 21 s t C e n t u r y
The international conference ‘Uzbekistan
in the 21s t Century: Transition and Integra-
tion’ convened at Samarkand State Institute
for Foreign Languages on 12-13 May 1999.
The conference was co-sponsored by the in-
stitute and the Association for the Advance-
ment of Central Asian Research (AACAR),
with Yusuf Abdullaev (Rector, SSIFL) and
Reuel Hanks (Editor, Journal of Central Asian
S t u d i e s) serving as co-directors. Several hun-
dred people were in attendance, and the
event was extensively covered by local and
national media in Uzbekistan.
A total of 45 scholars participated from
Uzbekistan, the United States and the Unit-
ed Kingdom, with papers organized into four
broad sessions: ‘Economic Issues’, ‘Political
Issues’, ‘Spirituality Issues’ and ‘Educational
Issues’. The first session included commen-
tary on strategy for economic reform, invest-
ment potential, the possibility of creating
‘free economic zones’ in Uzbekistan, and the
future development of tourism in the coun-
try. This spectrum of topics certainly is cru-
cial to economic development, but many
commentators avoided the most serious is-
sues: a rapidly-expanding workforce without
corresponding economic expansion, the
lack of substantial and geographically-dis-
persed foreign investment, and political in-
stability, as evidenced by the February bomb-
ings in Tashkent.
The session on political issues included pa-
pers on the mass media in Uzbekistan,
women’s role in the political process, and
the status of Karakalpakstan, among others.
One paper dealt with the concept of ‘eastern
democracy’ in Uzbekistan, an attempt to
cast the country’s authoritarian administra-
tion in the most favourable light possible by
redefining the character of ‘democracy’. The
most interesting and enlightening presenta-
tions dealing with ‘spirituality’ focused on
the traditional role of Sufism in Uzbek soci-
ety, the role of the m a h a l l a, and the difficul-
ties of reconstructing the country’s history
and the creation of a ‘national awareness’
among Uzbekistan’s citizenry.
The final session included a detailed pre-
sentation on educational reform by Yusuf
Abdullaev, the country’s leading specialist
on Western educational systems, and two
papers on the challenges of training educa-
tional specialists in modern pedagogical
techniques. The speakers were in general
agreement that Uzbekistan’s educational
system, particularly higher education, is in
need of restructuring, but the suggested
methods and means of achieving reform
were quite varied. Many participants, both
Uzbeki and foreign, expressed enthusiasm
for the rare chance to dialogue directly with
colleagues working on similar issues and
problems. Select papers from the confer-
ence will be considered for forthcoming is-
sues of the Journal for Central Asian Studies.
The co-directors envision organizing a simi-
lar conference for the spring of 2001. ♦
Dr Reuel Hanks is assistant professor of Geography at
Oklahoma State University, USA.
E-mail: hreuel@okway.okstate.edu
B oo k Pr esenta t io n
L A I L A  AL - Z W A I N I Legal Pluralism in the Arab World
The notion of legal pluralism is known to
both lawyers and social scientists. From the
lawyers’ point of view, it expresses the recog-
nition by the State (the legislator) of the exis-
tence of a multiplicity of legal sources, which
either constitute the official legislation, or are
admitted as subsidiary sources in case of a
legal lacuna. These sources can be religious
law, customary law, or international treaties,
amongst others. This concept thus assumes a
more or less ideological dimension, by which
the State wishes to accentuate its pluralistic
orientation, yet does not call into question its
legal monopoly.
Several socio-legal scientists have refuted
this prescriptive approach to law, and refor-
mulated the concept of legal pluralism as the
parallel existence of a plurality of legal norms
that are produced by different autonomous
‘social fields’. These social fields possess their
own normative and regulatory capacities, and
are capable of enforcing these on their mem-
bers. This implies that external legislation has
not and cannot have the impact that it pre-
sumes to have. Studying law in this theoretical
context therefore means reversing the per-
spective from the legislator to the social fields.
In December 1996, the Centre d’Etudes et
de Documentation Economique, Juridique et
Sociale (CEDEJ) and the Netherlands-Flemish
Institute in Cairo (NVIC) jointly sponsored a
two-day round table in Cairo on the theory
and practice of legal pluralism in the Arab
world. The organizers of the round table (edi-
tors of the book), wanted to develop an ap-
proach to the legal phenomenon in the Arab
world which, from a sociological perspective,
takes into consideration the complex of social
fields adhered to by the individual, as well as
the normativity and type of interaction they
develop. From the different case studies that
were presented, it became apparent that al-
though the theory of legal pluralism is a handy
tool for analysing socio-legal activities, there is
not only ‘one’ such theory. Legal pluralism is a
model for analysis that necessitates modifica-
tion according to each specific case.
In order to grasp the subject from its multi-
ple angles, contributors from a wide variety of
disciplines and nationalities were invited: soci-
ologists, anthropologists, political scientists,
legal theoreticians, and practising lawyers
originating from France, the Netherlands, Bel-
gium, Great Britain, Germany, the United
States, and Egypt. Starting with a preface by
John Griffiths, whose seminal article on legal
pluralism denoted the starting point of the
seminar, the present publication consists of
three main parts: 
Part One discusses the various theories of
legal pluralism (Gordon Woodman); the im-
possibility of sorting out norms, law, and prac-
tices (Jean-Noël Ferrié); the implications of ter-
minology on the study of legal pluralism, as
well as the need to develop an anthropology
of the actors of the norms, especially in the
Arab world where law is intertwined with reli-
gion (Baudouin Dupret); and a critical survey
of Western law studies on Arab-Muslim coun-
tries (Jörn Thielmann).
Part Two presents case studies from a com-
parative perspective: a comparison between
the court systems of Belgium and Egypt, espe-
cially with regard to the interpretation of
norms presented as Islamic (Marie-Claire
Foblets and Baudouin Dupret); a discussion of
Palestinian law as a clear case of internal plu-
ralism of state law (Bernard Botiveau); the con-
flict between legal pluralism and cultural unity
in Morocco (Lawrence Rosen); the dissonance
between Islamic law and the International
Convention of the Rights of the Child (Murielle
Paradelle); the shortcoming of legal pluralism
to approach an emotionally-charged subject
like Islamic law, as in the Syrian context (Mau-
rits Berger); and the effects of legal pluralism
in the treatment of unfair contractual terms in
the United Arab Emirates and Egypt (Hassan
Gemei).
Finally, Part Three deals with the phenome-
non of legal pluralism in Egypt: a case of feud-
ing families in 19th-century Egypt involving
statute, and Islamic and customary law
(Rudolph Peters); the working of haqq al-arab,
i.e. customary arbitration in Upper Egypt
(Sarah Ben Nefissa); the responsibility of legal
pluralism in the setback of modernity in Egypt
(Nabil `Abd al-Fattah); the enclosure of the
Egyptian legal field as illustrated by the
Youssef Chahine-case (Nathalie Bernard-Mau-
giron); the interplay of Islamic law, family law
and social customs in the Egyptian Personal
Status Law of 1985 (Nagla Nassar); financial
law and practices between Islamic law and the
current Egyptian legal system (Ziad Bahaa-
Eldin); the use of several legal sources in
Egyptian courts regarding the rights of apos-
tates (Ahmed Seif al-Islam Hamad); and the
secular reconstruction of Islamic law by the
Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court in its
decision regarding the veil in state-run
schools (Kilian Bälz). ♦
About the Editors
– Baudouin Dupret is educated in Law, Arabic and
Islamic Sciences at the Catholic University of
Leuven, Belgium, and has a PhD in Political
Sciences from the IEP (Institut d’Etudes Politiques),
Paris. He is currently a researcher at CNRS
researcher at CDEJ, Cairo.
– Maurits Berger studied Dutch Law and Arabic
Studies with a specialization in Islamic Law at
t h e University of Utrecht, the Netherlands.
He has practised as a lawyer and is currently
a P h D student at the University of Amsterdam.
– Laila al-Zwaini studied Dutch Law and Arabic
Studies at Leiden University, the Netherlands has
a degree in Islamic and Middle Eastern from SOAS,
London. She presently works as a PhD student
a t Leiden University.
Legal Pluralism in the Arab World 
edited by Baudouin Dupret, Maurits Berger,
Laila al-Zwaini
ISBN 90-411-1105-0 Hardback, 304 pages
Kluwer Law International, February 1999
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6564 BL  Heilig Landstichting
( N i j m e g e n )
Tel: +31 24 3823110
Fax: +31 24 3823111
Through 2 November 1999
• The World of Islam. The exhibition,
with photographs by Isphording and
objects of art, depicts Islam today in
the Middle East and Far East.
G e m e e n t e m u s e u m
D e n H a a g
Stadhouderslaan 41,
2517 HV Den Haag
Tel: +31 70 3381111
Continuing exhibition 
• Islamic crafts. The renewed
exhibition from its own collection, in





Tel: +31 10 2707172 
Fax: +31 10 2707182 
m e d i a t h e e k @ w e r e l d m u s e u m .
r o t t e r d a m . n l
• Due to renovations the museum will
be closed until October 2000. It will
reopen with a permanent exhibition
of Islamic art from its own collection.
De Nieuwe Kerk
D a m
A m s t e r d a m
Tel: +31 20 6386909
e-mail: mail@nieuwekerk.nl
26 June – 17 October 1999
• The dancing demons of Mongolia.
Over 100 art treasures from
Mongolia such as textiles, masks,
paintings and sculptures to be shown
for the first time in the Netherlands.
Forthcoming Winter 1999 – 2000




Tel: +31 45 5604581
3 October 1998 – January 2000
• The bathhouse. Bath culture
i nE a s t and West
T r o p e n m u s e u m
A m s t e r d a m
Linnaeusstraat 2 
1092 CK  Amsterdam 
Tel: +31 20 5688215
Through 15 August 1999
• Ethiopia: The Heritage of an Empire
exhibits several hundred diverse
objects and recreates market, court
and home scenes in a survey of art




3083 CW  Rotterdam
Tel: +31 10 2030207
17 October 1999 –
24 October 1999
• Cultural week Turkey. Events such
a s art, music and dance, theatre,
lectures and debates organized in
almost all well-known places of art




T e l / F a x : +31 53 3413788





Tel: +31 20 6264432
Fax: +31 20 6264433
• Contemporary art exhibitions by
artists from the Islamic world. 
M u s i c
Stichting Kulsan
WG-plein 126
1 0 5 4 SC Amsterdam 
T e l / F a x : +31 20 6182164
20 – 30 October 1999
• Turkish pop star Sezen Aksu &
t h e Dutch Willem Breuker Kollektief.
RasaNetwerk Non-Western
m u s i c
Pauwstraat 13a
3512 TG  Utrecht
Tel: +31 30 2319676
Fax: +31 30 2315507
L e c t u r e s / S o c i e t i e s
N e d e r l a n d s - A r a b i s c h e
K r i n g
S e c r e t a r i a a t :
H. Zwaardecroonstraat 17




Tel: +31 30 2319553
e-mail: raz@casema.net
• Organizes lectures and other
activities in four regional branches:
Amsterdam, The Hague, Groningen,
Nijmegen, and Utrecht. 
F R A N C E
Grand Palais
Porte Champs-Elysées, 
3, Avenue du Général-Eisenhower 
75008 Paris 
Tel: +33 1 44131717 
Fax: +33 1 45635433
9 April through 12 July 1999
• Egyptian Art in the Age of the
Pyramids spans from the third
through the sixth dynasty, covering
the first great era of Egyptian art
with some 200 works from reliefs and
unpainted limestone heads to
furniture and monumental sculpture.
Institut du Monde Arabe
1, Rue des Fosses St-Bernard,
75236 Paris.
Tel: +33 1 40513960/3310 
18 May – 29 August 1999
• Bahrain, a civilisation of two seas.
From Dilmun to Tylos. This exhibition
traces the history of Dilmun
(2500–1200 BC), recently of renewed
interest to archeologists and
historians. Bahrain again flourished
between the 300 BC until the 400 AD
under the name of Tylos; the impulse
given by the conquests of Alexander
the Great.
13 May – 20 June 1999
• Photographs of Arabia: the Hedjaz
1907- 1917. The photographs are
from the Collection of the Ecole
Biblique et Archeologique Francaise
de Jerusalem. Parallel to these
pictures are exhibited photographs
of the contemporary city of Jeddah
by Reem Al Faysal.
29 June – 29 August 1999
• De Sumer a Babylone. Photographs
by Yves Gellie. Between 1997 and
1999 Yves Gellie made several
journeys into Iraq. He reports a
different view from the picture given
by most media; drawing attention to
the richness of the cultures and the
diversity of the people.
19 October 1999–
27 February 2000
• Morocco, a way of life. Evoking the
magic of the places and discovering
the refined mosaics and the
architecture of private houses, the
exhibition resorts to the past without
neglecting certain aspects of the
more contemporary urban life.
Music, films and poetry try to
recreate the specific spheres of the
vie citadine in Morocco.
Hassan Massoudy Atelier
18 Quai de la Marne
75019 Paris 
Tel/fax: +33 1 42031551
Open: Every last Saturday of
t h e month from 2pm – 7pm.
U p o n appointment by telephone
on other days.
January – June 1999
• Original Calligraphies, lithographies
F i l m s
C i n e - I M A
Institut du Monde Arabe, Paris
Auditorium 
Tel: +33 1 40513814
Through June 1999, Saturdays and
Sundays at 3 and 5 pm.
• The Arab Cinema at the Cannes
Festival 1946–1998
M u s i c
The IMA in L’Abbaye
d e R o y a u m o n t
13 June through 11 July 1999
• Temps de Maroc. Six concerts of
arab-andalusian music. 
G E R M A N Y
Museum für Islamische
K u n s t
M u s e u m i n s e l
Am Kupfergraben
Eingang Pergamonmuseum
B e r l i n - M i t t e
Tel: +49 30 20905401
• Large collection of Islamic Art in




Tel: +49 711 2225173
Fax: +49 711 2225194
h t t p : / / w w w . i f a . d e
• Exhibitions and contemporary art
from the Middle East.




K u w a i t
Tel: +965 5653006
Until 24 June 1999,
e v e r yT h u r s d a y
• The Travels of Ibn Battuta. A u n i q u e
audio-visual programme of his
journey from Morocco to China and
back, in the 14th century.
S I N G A P O R E
Asian Civilisations




• Calligraphy from the Tareq Rajab
Museum Kuwait. The Qur’an was
central to the development of the a r t
of beautiful writing. In this exhibition
the various scripts that developed
over the centuries and also
calligraphy as a decorative motif on
various media like ceramics and
metalwork are explored.




Tel: +41 61 2712202
Fax: +41 61 2721861
o f f i c e @ a n t i k e n m u s e u m b a s e l . c h
Open: Tuesdays to Sundays 10-17h
Through July 1999
• Egyptian Art: A provisional
presentation of the new section. 300
objects spanning four centuries:
statues, reliefs, jewellery, ceramics,
animal sculptures, etc.
U N I T E D  K I N G D O M
Victoria and Albert
M u s e u m
Cromwell Road
London SW7 2RL
Tel: +44 171 9388500 
h t t p : / / w w w . v a m . a c . u k
• At the Indian and South-East Asian
Department, the collection covers
the arts of South and Southeast Asia,
including India, Pakistan, Bangla-
desh, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Tibet,
Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Burma,
Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia.
A t Metalwork, Silver and Jewelry
Department, the collection includes a
rich collection of Islamic metalwork
and collections of ironwork,
Continental silver, arms and armour,
enamels, brasswork, pewter and
medieval metalwork. 
Brunei Gallery
School of Oriental and African
S t u d i e s
Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square
London WC1
Tel: +44 181 7802815
July – September 1999
• Royal Persian Paintings: The Qajar
Epoch, 1785-1925, a period where
figural painting flourished. The show
includes, among others, loans from
the Hermitage, the Louvre and the
Royal Asiatic Society. The first major
exhibition exclusively devoted to
Qajar art shown in Europe. A
Conference on the Culture, Art and
Architecture in Qajar Persia will be
held at the School of Oriental and
African Studies in London from 2-4
September 1999 (see also ‘Academic
Meetings’ in this issue of the ISIM
N e w s l e t t e r ) .
Egee Art Consultancy
9 Chelsea manor studios
Flood Street
London SW3 5SR
Tel: +44 171 3516818
Fax: +44 171 3763510
h t t p : / / w w w . e g e e a r t . c o m
Open: Monday – Saturday 2–6pm 
C o n t i n u i n g
• Contemporary and Antique Middle
Eastern Art.
Soni Gallery
25 Connaught Street Marble Arch
London W2
Tel/fax: +44 171 2629101
h t t p : / / w w w . s o n i g a l l e r y . c o m
C o n t i n u i n g
• International contemporary art
especially from the Indo-Pak
subcontinent and the Arab World.
Visiting Arts
Information: Project manager
R a c h e l Abedi, 
Tel: +44 171 3893019
Fax. +44 171 3893016
r a c h e l . v a @ d i a l . p i p e x . c o m
h t t p : / / w w w . b r i t c o u n . o r g / v i s i t i n g a r t
s/islam/ 
or: The British Council
Arts Division
11 Portland Place, London W1N 4EJ 
Tel: +44 171 9308466 
Fax: +44 171 3893199
February 1999 through July 1999
• Mutualities: Britain and Islam.
Cultural and Arts Programme. A
programme of cultural and arts
events that draws attention to Islam-
related arts events in Britain and to
encourages new ones. The
programme reflects the expressive
relationship between the arts and
Islam and highlights contemporary
artistic thought as it seeks to address
the challenges and meaning of Islam
in the modern world. The
programme will culminate in a one-
day seminar in July addressing the





Tel: +44 171 4127111
Fax: +44 171 3238614/8480
• Permanent Oriental collection 
U N I T E D  S T A T E S
The Art Museum 
Princeton University
Princeton, New Jersey 08544-1018
Tel: +1 609 258-3787/3788
Autumn 1999 or Spring 2000
• Islamic Art
Letters in Gold Ottoman Calligraphy
from the Sakip Sabanci Collection,
I s t a n b u l .
• Draws upon one of Turkey’s leading
private collections to display 70
exceptional examples of Ottoman-
era calligraphy. 
Joslyn Art Museum
2200 Dodge Street 68102-1292
Omaha, Nebraska
Tel: +1 402 3423300
Fax: +1 402 3422376
i n f o @ j o s l y n . o r g
27 March – 25 July 1999
• Egypt, Gift of the Nile: Ancient
Egyptian Art and Architecture from
the University of Pennsylvania
Museum. Displays highlights of the
university’s century-old archeaology
p r o g r a m m e .
Metropolitan Museum
o f A r t
1000 Fifth Avenue at 82nd Street 
New York, New York 10028 
Tel: +1 212 5357710
17 March 1999 – 18 July 1999
• The Nature of Islamic Ornament, Part
III: Geometric Patterns explores the
history of complex patterns derived
from simple figures (circles, triangles,
polygons). The third of a four-part
series on Islamic ornament dating
from the 9th to the 18th centuries.
Some 25 objects that feature
predominantly geometric
decoration, drawn from the
Metropolitan Museum’s own
collection, including illuminated
manuscripts, rugs, carved and inlaid
woodwork, and pottery, reflect the
variety of production of Islamic art
and the wide range of application of
geometric patterns.
Arthur M. Sackler Gallery 
Harvard University Art Museums, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 
Tel: +1 617 4959400
21 May – 22 August 1999
• Courts and Countryside: Islamic
Painting of the Fourteenth to the
Seventeenth Century. Works of art
produced in Iran during the II-
Khanid, Timurid and Safavid periods
form the core of the exhibition,
supplemented by paintings from
Ottoman Turkey and Mughal India,
whose rulers shared a common
nomadic imperial heritage.
9 October 1999
through 2 January 2000 
• Letters in Gold: Ottoman
Calligraphy from the Sakip
Sabanci Collection, Istanbul
Calligraphy is the quintessential
visual art form of the Islamic world.
This exhibition will feature
approximately 70 exceptional works
of Islamic calligraphy, dating from
the fifteenth through the early
twentieth century, from Ottoman
Turkey. Drawn from the largest
private collection of Ottoman
calligraphy in Turkey, these works
illustrate the brilliant development of
this art form over five centuries with
examples by its greatest masters,
including Seyh Hamdullah, Ahmed
Karahisari, Hafiz Osman and Sami
E f e n d i .
9 October 1999
through 2 January 2000 
• A Grand Legacy: Arts of the Ottoman
Empire. Founded seven hundred
years ago, the Ottoman Empire
(1299-1922) as its zenith stretched
onto the continents of Africa, Europe
and Asia. The ambition, grandeur
and complexity of the empire were
brilliantly expressed in the arts. As a
complement to Letters in Gold, this
exhibition will examine the grand
legacy of Ottoman painting,
ceramics, textiles and metalwork,
using works from the permanent
collection at the Art Museums.
The Arthur M. Sackler
Gallery and Freer
G a l l e r y of Art 
Smithsonian Institution 
Washington, D.C, 20560 
Tel: +1 202 3572700 (voice);
3 5 7 1 7 2 9
23 January 1999 – 8 August 1999
• Masterworks of Indian Painting III.
On view is a changing selection of
16th- through 19th-century Indian
paintings from the Mughal dynasty
(1526-1858) and the Rajput courts
that controlled northern and western
India between the 17th-19th
centuries. Included are pages from
the Kevorkian Album, a page from a
manuscript of Hamzanama, a page
from a manuscript of the
Mahabharata, a page from a
manuscript of the Ramayana, a page
from a Shahjahan album, and
o t h e r s .
3 May 1998 – Indefinitely
• Arts of the Islamic World. Some 60
works – Koran pages, metalwork,
ceramics, glass, paintings, and
calligraphy – from the 9th to 17th
centuries explore Islamic artistic
traditions. Themes include the forms
and functions of the works of art, the
role of calligraphy, the use of
figurative decoration, and the
meaning of abstract designs.
The Los Angeles County
Museum of Art
5905 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90036
Tel: +1 323 8576000
13 June – 10 August 1999
• The Ardabil Carpet. This carpet,
whose better-known mate hangs in
London’s Victoria and Albert
Museum, is arguably one of the most
important works in LACMA’s
collection. Brought to England
sometime in the late nineteenth
century, the carpets were reported to
have come from the Safavid shrine at
Ardabil. According to their dated
signatures, this matched pair of
carpets were made in 1539-40 by a
certain Maqsud of Kashan.
Ghost Ranch
New Mexico
Tel: +1 505 6854333
a w a i r @ i g c . a p c . o r g
11 July through 18 July 1999
• Understanding the Islamic Paradigm:
A Summer Program, sponsored by
Arab World and Islamic Resources of
Berkeley, California. Art, poetry,
chanting lectures and dialogues will
help non-Muslims understand the
faith journeys and worldviews of
I s l a m .
Art & Culture Agenda
The Agenda is produced by
t h e Centre of Islamic Culture
in Rotterdam, The Nether-
lands. Please send all
information with regard to
activities related to culture
and art in the Islamic World
t o :
The Centre of Islamic Culture,
P.O. Box 361,
3 0 0 0 AJ Rotterdam,
T h eN e t h e r l a n d s
Fax: +31 10 270 71 82
E-mail: mediatheek@wereld
m u s e u m . r o t t e r d a m . n l
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Alexandria: From Book to
Text, the Invention of
P h i l o l o g y
D a t e : 23-25 June 1999
V e n u e: Bibliothèque nationale de
France (Tolbiac), Paris, France
I n f o r m a t i o n: This international
conference is linked to the future
opening of the new Alexandrian
Library in Egypt. A second
conference ‘Alexandria: the
metamorphoses of reading’ will
b e held at the Alexandrian Library
in Egypt, 27-3 0 November 1999.
Christian Jacob, CNRS, Paris,





D a t e : 30 June – 2 July 1999
V e n u e: Department of Sociology,
Manchester Metropolitan
University, Manchester, UK
I n f o r m a t i o n: Nadeem Hai,
tel +44 161 2473009,
N.Hai@mmu.ac.uk; Paul K e n n e d y
+44 161 2473006,
P . K e n n e d y @ m m u . a c . u k ;
fax +44 161 2476321
German and International
Research on Oman
D a t e : 2-3 July 1999
V e n u e: DETECON Building,
Oberkasseler Str. 2, Bonn-
Ramersdorf, Germany
I n f o r m a t i o n: Oman-Tagung, c/o
Joachim Duester, Thomas-Mann-
Str. 62, D-53111 Bonn, Germany,
fax +49 228 1752357,
o m a n d o c @ p o b o x . c o m
U R L: http://www.oman.org/bonn.htm
Conference on the Foreign
Policies of Middle East
S t a t e s
D a t e : 12-15 July 1999
V e n u e: University of St. Andrews,
S c o t l a n d
I n f o r m a t i o n : Raymond Hinnebusch,
Department of International
Relations, University of
S t . Andrews, Fife, KY16 9AL,
Scotland, UK, tel +44 1334 462938,
fax +44 1334 462937,
r h 1 0 @ s t - a n d r e w s . a c . u k
U R L: http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk
Third Biennal Conference
of the Association for the
Study of Travel in Egypt
and the Near East,
Cambridge, UK
D a t e : 15-18 July 1999
I n f o r m a t i o n: Janet Starkey, Centre for
Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies,
University of Durham, South End
House, South Road, Durham DH1
3TG, UK, fax +44 1388 731809,
j.c.m.starkey@durham.ac.uk, or
Caroline Williams, 6 Coventry Rd,
Williamsburg VA 23188 
Visual Arts as Contact
Zones: Europe and the
Three Empires of Islam in
the Early Modern Period
D a t e: 22-23 July 1999
V e n u e: Headley Lecture Theatre,
T h e Ashmolean Museum, Oxford,
U K
I n f o r m a t i o n: Liz Will, The Barakat
Trust, c/o The Oriental Institute,
n e a r e a s t @ o r i n s t . o x . a c . u k
U R L: http://users.ox.ac.uk/~neareast/
conferen.htm 




D a t e: 23-24 July 1999
V e n u e: University of Sydney, St John’s
College, Australia
I n f o r m a t i o n: Dr Ahmad Shboul,
a h m a d . s h b o u l @ s e m i t i c . u s y d . e d u .
au, fax +61 2 93513574;
D r Christine Asmar,
C . A s m a r @ c t l . u s y d . e d u . a u ,
fax +61 2 93514331
U R L: http://www.nettl.usyd.edu.au/
a m e s a / c o n f e r e n c e . h t m
Iranian Constitutional
R e v o l u t i o n
D a t e: 4-5 August 1999
V e n u e: Tehran, Iran
I n f o r m a t i o n: Institute for Iranian
Contemporary Historical Studies,
128. Fayyazi (Fereshteh) Ave.,
P O Box 19395-1975, Elahieh,
Tehran 19649, Iran,
tel +98 21 2005425,
fax +98 21 262098
U R L: http://www.neda.net/iichs
The 11th International
Congress of Turkish Art
( I C T A - X I )
D a t e: 23-28 August 1999
V e n u e: Utrecht University, Utrecht,
The Netherlands
I n f o r m a t i o n: ICTA-XI@let.uu.nl
U R L: http://www.let.uu.nl/
o o s t e r s / i c t a 0 . h t m l
The Qajar Epoch: Cuture,
Art & Architecture in Qajar
P e r s i a
D a t e : 2-4 September 1999
V e n u e : School of Oriental and African
Studies, London, UK
I n f o r m a t i o n : Qajar Conference,
c / oP O Box 2256, London W1A 1YS,
fax +44 171 4317923,
i n f o @ i r a n h e r i t a g e . c o m
D e a d l i n e : Applications by 15 February





D a t e : 21-22 September 1999
I n f o r m a t i o n : Dr Nadje Al-Ali, Sussex
Centre for Migration Research,
t e l +44 1273 606755, fax +44 1273
620662, N.Al-Ali@sussex.ac.uk;
D r Khalid Koser, Migration Research
Unit, Department of Geography,
University of College London,
t e l +44 171 3807564,
fax +44 171 3807565,
k k o s e r @ g e o g r a p h y . u c l . a c . u k
Europe and the South
i n the 21s t C e n t u r y :
Challenges for Renewed
Cooperation. 9t h G e n e r a l
Conference of EADI
D a t e : 22-25 September 1999
V e n u e : GEMDEV, 9 rue Malher, Paris,
F r a n c e
I n f o r m a t i o n : EADI Secretariat, 24,
r u e Rothschild, P.O. Box 272,
C H 1211 Geneva 21, Switzerland,
tel +41 22 7314648,
fax +41 22 7385797,
e a d i @ u n i 2 a . u n i g e . c h




o f the Soul
D a t e : 25 September 1999
V e n u e : American University,
Washington DC, USA
I n f o r m a t i o n : Tel +1 301 6541569;
Lynn Wilcox, P.O. Box 19922,
Sacramento CA 95825, USA,
tel +1 800 3381467,
fax +1 916 9231201,
s u f i p s y @ p a c b e l l . n e t






D a t e : 27-29 September 1999
V e n u e : Department of Law, and
t h e Department of Political and
Social Sciences, University of
Ghent, Belgium
I n f o r m a t i o n : EURAMES Committee,
Centre for Third World Studies,
Universiteitstraat 8, B-9000 Ghent,
Belgium, tel +32 9 2646955,
fax +32 9 2646997,
c h r i s t o p h e r . p a r k e r @ p i n g . b e
D e a d l i n e : Abstracts by 15 July 1999 
8t h Conference of
Africanists on Africa at
t h e Threshold of the Third
M i l l e n i u m
D a t e : 28-30 September 1999
V e n u e : Institute for African Studies
(IAS), Moscow, Russia
I n f o r m a t i o n : IAS, 30/1 Spiridonovka
Str., Moscow, 103001, Russia,
tel +7 95 2906385, +7 95 2902752,
fax +7 95 2020786, dir@inafr.msk.su
D e a d l i n e : Abstracts by 1 March 1999
The Thirteenth Turkish
Congress of History
D a t e : 4-8 October 1999
I n f o r m a t i o n : Prof. Dr. Yusuf Halacoglu,
Turk Tarih Kurumu, Kizilay Sokak
No. 1, 06100 Sihhiye-Ankara-
Turkiye, tel +90 312 3102368,
fax +90 312 3101698
1999 International
Symposium Beyond the
Border: a New Framework
for Understanding the
Dynamism of Muslim
S o c i e t i e s
D a t e : 8-10 October 1999
V e n u e : Kyoto International
Conference Hall, Kyoto, Japan
I n f o r m a t i o n : Islamic Area Studies,
1999 International Symposium
Committee, The University of
Tokyo, Bungakubu Annexe, 7-3-1
Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113-
0033, Japan, tel +81 3 56843285,
i - i n r @ l . u - t o k y o . a c . j p
U R L : http:// www.l.u-tokyo.ac.jp/IAS
Islam and Politics in Russia
and Central Asia (Early
1 7t h – Late 20t h C e n t u r i e s )
D a t e : 13-14 October 1999
V e n u e : Maison franco-japonaise,
Tokyo, Japan
I n f o r m a t i o n : Dr Stephane A.
Dudoignon, dudoignon@aol.com;
Prof. Komatsu Hisao,
k o m a t s u @ l . u - t o k y o . a c . j p
U R L : http:// www.l.u-tokyo.ac.jp/IAS
Transformation Processes
and Islam in Africa
D a t e : 15 October 1999
V e n u e : African Studies Centre, room
1A27, Pieter de la Courtgebouw,
Wassenaarseweg 52, Leiden,
T h eN e t h e r l a n d s
I n f o r m a t i o n : Dr Anneke Breedveld,
Africa Studies Centre,
P.O. Box 9555, 2300 RB Leiden,
T h eN e t h e r l a n d s ,
tel (w) +31 71 5273375,
(h) +31 71 5120380,
b r d v l d @ r u l c r i . l e i d e n u n i v . n l .
The conference is organized by
t h e Africa Studies Centre (ASC) in
co-operation with the ISIM.
Sixth Annual Conference
of the Economic Research
Forum for the Arab
Countries, Iran and Turkey
( E R F )
D a t e : 29-31 October 1999
I n f o r m a t i o n : Dr Hana’ Al-Sabghan,
Grants & Conference Officer, ERF,
7 Boulos Hanna Street, Dokki, Cairo,
Egypt, fax +20 2 3616042,
e r f @ i d s c . g o v . e g
Women in Palestine.
Fourth International
Conference of the Gaza
Community Mental Health
Program (GCMHP)
D a t e : 21-23 November 1999
I n f o r m a t i o n : Husam El-Nounou, Public
Relations Coordinator, GCMHP,
P.O.Box 1049, Gaza City, Palestine,
tel +972 7 865949, fax 972 7
824072, pr@gcmhp.net
D e a d l i n e : Papers by 1 July 1999
First Annual Conference of
the Association of Muslim
Social Scientists (UK)
D a t e : 30-31 October 1999
V e n u e : University of London
I n f o r m a t i o n : amss@dial.pipex.com or
write to AMSS, P.O. Box 126,
Richmond, Surrey TW9 2UD, UK
D e a d l i n e : Abstracts by 15 April 1999;
Finished papers by the end of July




Meeting of the Association
of Third World Studies
D a t e : 18-20 November 1999
V e n u e : Herradura, San Jose, Costa Rica
I n f o r m a t i o n : Dr Tom Leonard,
International Studies Program,
College of Liberal Arts and
Sciences, University of North
Florida, Jacksonville FL 32224,
t e l +1 904 6202886,
fax +1 904 6201018,
t l e o n a r d @ g w . u n f . e d u
D e a d l i n e : Pre-registration by
1 5 September 1999
Middle East Studies
Association (MESA) 33r d
Annual Meeting
D a t e : 19-22 November 1999
V e n u e : Marriott Wardman Park Hotel,
Washington DC, USA
U R L : h t t p : / / w w w . m e s a . a r i z o n a . e d u
AAR/SBL Annual Meeting
D a t e : 20-23 November 1999
V e n u e : John B. Hynes Veterans
Memorial Convention Center,
Boston, Massachusetts, USA
Annual meeting of the
Dutch Association for
Middle Eastern and Islamic
Studies (MOI)
D a t e : 26 November 1999
V e n u e : N i j m e g e n
I n f o r m a t i o n : Dept. of the Languages
and Cultures of the Islamic Middle
East, Universiteit Leiden,
P.O. Box 9515, 2300 RA Leiden,
T h eN e t h e r l a n d s
New African Perspectives:
2 2n d Annual & Inter-
national Conference of
t h e African Studies Asso-
ciation of Australasia and
the Pacific (AFSAAP ’99)
D a t e : 26-28 November 1999
V e n u e : St George’s College, University
of Western Australia (UWA), Perth
I n f o r m a t i o n : Professor Cherry Gertzel,
g e r t z e l c @ s p e c t r u m . c u r t i n . e d u . a u ,
tel (h) +61 8 92997418 or Dr. Peter
Limb, plimb@library.uwa.edu.au,
tel +61 8 93802348,
fax +61 8 93801012
D e a d l i n e : Titles due 15 June 1999;
Abstracts by 31 August 1999
U R L :
h t t p : / / w w w . a r t s . u w a . e d u . a u / A S C W
A / c o n f e r e n c e 9 9
The Centrality of the
Qur’an in Islamic and
Middle Eastern Culture
D a t e : December 1999
I n f o r m a t i o n : A. Jones or R. Nettler at
the The Oriental Institute, Pusey
Lane, Oxford, OX1 2LE, UK
U R L : h t t p : / / u s e r s . o x . a c . u k / ~ n e a r e a s t /
c o n f e r e n c . h t m
The Sixth Annual Congress




( D A V O )
D a t e : 2-4 December 1999
V e n u e : Haus Rissen, Hamburg,
G e r m a n y
I n f o r m a t i o n : D A V O - C o n g r e s s
Organization, Deutsches Orient-
Institut, Mittelweg 150, D-20148
Hamburg, Germany,
tel +49 40 4132050,
fax +49 40 441484,
d o i h h @ u n i - h a m b u r g . d e
D e a d l i n e : Papers by 2 November 1999
U R L : h t t p : / / w w w . g e o . u n i - m a i n z . d e /
d a v o
Labour in Pakistan
D a t e : 26-29 December 1999
V e n u e : K a r a c h i
I n f o r m a t i o n : Dr Yunas Samad,
Department of Social and
Economic Studies, University of
Bradford, West Yorkshire, BD7 1DP,
UK, a.y.samad@bradford.ac.uk,
tel +44 1274 234802,
fax +44 1274 385295;
Dr Kamran Asad Ali, Department of
Anthropology, University of
Rochester, USA,
k n a r @ u h u r a . c c . r o c h e s t e r . e d u ,
tel +1 716 2758614; Karamat Ali,
k a r a m a t @ p i l e r . k h i . s d n p k . u n d p . o r g ,
tel +92 21 4557009,
fax +92 21 45557009
D e a d l i n e : Abstracts by 1 September
1999; Papers by 1 November 1999
Crossing Borders:
Cultural, National and
Islamic Identities in Asia
Panel at the 2000 Association of Asian
Studies Annual Meeting 
D a t e : 9-12 March 2000
V e n u e : Town and Country Resort &
Convention Center, San Diego,
California, USA
I n f o r m a t i o n : Ron Lukens-Bull,
R l u k e n s b u l @ a o l . c o m
Iran 2000: The Challenges
ahead. 18t h Annual CIRA
C o n f e r e n c e
D a t e : 28-29 April 2000
V e n u e : Hyatt Regency Bethesda,
Maryland, USA
I n f o r m a t i o n : Kamran Dadkhah,
Department of Economics,
Northeastern University, Boston,
MA 02115, USA, tel +1 617
3732297, kdadkhah@lynx.neu.edu
D e a d l i n e : Abstracts and proposals by
31 October 1999




T h e M a d h h a b
D a t e : 4-6 May 2000
I n f o r m a t i o n : Peri Bearman, Harvard
Law School, Pound Hall 501,
Cambridge, MA 02138,
p b e a r m a n @ l a w . h a r v a r d . e d u
D e a d l i n e : Papers by 1 November 1999
U R L : h t t p : / / w w w . l a w . h a r v a r d . e d u /
P r o g r a m s / I L S P
The Third Biennial
Conference on Iranian
S t u d i e s
D a t e : 25-28 May 2000
V e n u e : Hyatt Regency Hotel,
Bethesda, Maryland, USA
I n f o r m a t i o n : SIS Executive Secretary,
Kambiz Eslami, c/o Princeton
University Library,
tel +1 609 2581308,
fax +1 609 2580441,
k e s l a m i @ p o p 3 . c i t . p r i n c e t o n . e d u
D e a d l i n e : Abstracts by 30 September
1 9 9 9
6t h Biennial EASA
Conference: Crossing
Categorical Boundaries:
Religion as Politics /
Politics as Religion
Date: 26-29 July 2000
V e n u e : Krakow, Poland
I n f o r m a t i o n : Secretariat European
Association of Social
Anthropologists (EASA), Urgell 259,
s.s.3, E-08026 Barcelona, Spain,
tel/fax +34 9 33212259,
e a s a @ t r i v i u m . g h . u b . e s
D e a d l i n e : Workshop proposals by
3 September 1999
U R L : h t t p : / / w w w . u b . e s / e a s a / 6 t h . h t m
International Inter-
disciplinary Conference
o n Language, Thought and
Reality: Science, Religion
and Philosophy
D a t e : 1-4 August 2000
V e n u e : Calcutta, India
I n f o r m a t i o n : Dr Chandana
Chakrabarti, Elon College Campus
Box 2336, Elon College, N.C. 27244,
USA, chakraba@numen.elon.edu
D e a d l i n e : Proposals by 25 October ’99




for the History of
Religions (IAHR)
D a t e : 5-12 August 2000
V e n u e : International Convention
Centre Durban, South Africa
I n f o r m a t i o n : Prof. Pratap Kumar,
Department of Science of Religion,
University of Durban-Westville,
Private Bag X54001, Durban 4000,
South Africa,
kumar@pixie.udw.ac.za; General
Secretary of the IAHR, Prof. Armin
Geertz, Department of the Study of
Religion, University of Aarhus, Main
Building, DK-8000 Aarhus C.
Denmark, geertz@teologi.aau.dk 
U R L : h t t p : / / w w w . u d w . a c . z a / i a h r
International Congress of
Asian and North African
Studies (ICANAS) on
Oriental and Asian Studies
in the Era of Globalization
D a t e : 27 August – 1 September 2000
V e n u e : Montreal Convention Center,
201 Viger Avenue West, Montreal,
C a n a d a
I n f o r m a t i o n : ICANAS 2000 Secretariat,
Bureau des Congrès, Université de
Montreal, P.O. Box 6128, Station
Downtown, Montréal (Québec)
H3C 3J7, Canada
D e a d l i n e : Abstracts by 2 August 1999
U R L : h t t p : / / w w w . b c o c . u m o n t r e a l . c a
International Conference
on Middle Eastern Popular
C u l t u r e
D a t e : 17-21 September 2000
V e n u e : Magdalen College, University
of Oxford, UK
I n f o r m a t i o n : Near Eastern Studies
Programme, The Oriental Institute,
University of Oxford,
n e a r e a s t @ o r i n s t . o x . a c . u k
U R L : h t t p : / / u s e r s . o x . a c . u k /
~ n e a r e a s t / m i d d l e . h t m
Islamic Studies in Europe
S e r i e s
The International Institute for
Islamic Thought (IIIT) and national
academic institutions will be
holding a series of seminars on
Islamic Studies in Europe in various
European cities from February
2000. The seminars will focus on
the state of this discipline and
identify serious lacunae in the
present state of research within its
many fields of specialization. The
tentative date for UK conference is
July 2000. For all other dates and
more information, please contact
IIIT at pf06@dial.pipex.com.
Academic Meetings
In order for the ISIM Info
Pages to prosper, we kindly
ask for your participation by
filling out the forms for
Vacancy Announcements and
Special Events. These forms
can be found online on the
ISIM website:
h t t p : / / i s i m . l e i d e n u n i v . n l
If you wish to have a formula
sent by e-mail, fax, or post,
please contact the ISIM
S e c r e t a r i a t :
Tel: +31 71 5277905
Fax: +31 71 5277906
E - m a i l :
I S I M @ r u l l e t . l e i d e n u n i v . n l
Ger Duijzings
Kosovo: The End of a ‘Mixed’ Pilgrimage
1
I S I M
E d i t o r i a l
by Dick Douwes
2





V I S U A L  A R T S
R.O. Rom Kalilu
Islam and Artistic Response among
t h e Yoruba of Nigeria
4
G E N E R A L  I S S UE S
Hammed Shahidian
Islam’s ‘Others’: Living (Out)side Islam
5
Nikki R. Keddie




Islamic Banking: Moving Towards a
Pragmatic Approach?
7
A R C H I T E C T U R E  A N D  S P A C E
Hasan-Uddin Khan
Identity, Authenticity and Power:
t h e Mosque of Hassan II
8
Sharifah Zaleha
Surau and Mosques in Malaysia
9
Rogier Bedaux
Protecting Mali’s Cultural Heritage
1 0
Nelida Fuccaro




Transformation of the Hui district in Xi’an
1 2
Brian Larkin 








Islamization and Secularization through
Architecture: the Case of Ismailia
1 5
R E G I O N A L  I S S UE S
Joseph Errington
Language, Religion, and Identity in
I n d o n e s i a
1 6
Andrée Feillard
Pre-election Visit to East Java’s Ulama
1 7
Michael Laffan
A Visit to Jakarta’s Bayt al-Qur’an
1 8
Imtiyaz Yusuf
Aspects of Islam in Thailand Today
1 9
Linda Waldbridge
Inter-communal Violence in Pakistan and




Tablighi Jama’at in Politics?
2 1
Abdul Karim Khan
The Servants of God in the North-West
Frontier Province of British India
2 2
Afsaneh Najmabadi
Writing History as if Women
and Gender Mattered 
2 3
Hala Fattah
Culture and Identity in the Work of
an Historian of Ottoman Basra
2 4
Ahmad S. Moussalli
Political Islam in Sunni Communities
o f L e b a n o n
2 5
Youssef Courbage
Christianity and Islam: Demography
i n t h e Middle East
2 6
Lidwien Kapteijns
Somali Women’s Songs for the First
L a d i e s of Early Islam
2 7
Beatrice Nicolini
Religion and Trade in the Indian Ocean:











Balkan Islam and the Mythology of Kosovo
3 1
Nathalie Clayer and
A l e x a n d r e P o p o v i c










’A School for All’: Muslim Pupils in Sweden
3 5
Moch. Nur Ichwan
Prayer in the Surinam-Javanese
Diasporic Experience
3 6
Richard Brent Turner 
Mainstream Islam in the African-American
E x p e r i e n c e
3 7
Gustav Thaiss
Muharram Rituals and the Carnivalesque
i nT r i n i d a d
3 8
R E S E A R C H
Helene Basu
Going for Visits with a Woman-Fakir:
t h e African Diaspora in Gujarat
3 9
Constant Hamès
Magic, Islam and Scientific Research
4 0
I N S T I T U T E S
Harvard Law School:
Islamic Legal Studies Program
1 3
François Burgat











The Institute of Druze Studies
4 2
O R G A N I Z A T I O N S
Günter Meyer
German Middle East Studies Association
f o r Contemporary: Research and
D o c u m e n t a t i o n
4 3






The 14th Annual Middle East History
a n d Theory Conference
4 4
Holger Weiss
Social Justice, Social Welfare and Praxis
i n Islamic Societies in Africa
4 4
Kamran Dadkhah
The 17th Annual Conference of the Center
for Iranian Research and Analysis
4 5
Reuel Hanks
Uzbekistan in the 21st Century
4 5
P U B L I C A T I O N S
Arabic Literature of Africa
4 3
Laila al-Zwaini
Legal Pluralism in the Arab World
4 5
I N F O P A G E S




C o n t e n t s
The International Institute for
t h e Study of Islam in the Modern
World (ISIM) promotes and
conducts interdisciplinary
research on contemporary social
and intellectual trends and
movements in Muslim societies
and communities. The ISIM’s
research approaches are
expressly interdisciplinary and
comparative, covering a large
geographic range which includes
North Africa and the Middle East,
Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia,
South and Southeast Asia, and
(Muslim communities in) the
West. Broad in its scope, the ISIM
brings together all areas of
e x p e r t i s e .
4 8 I S I M  N E W S L E T T E R  3 / 9 9
